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ABSTRACT 
The thesis consists of three main chapters on optimal incentives for a multi-level 
allocation process of HIV/AIDS prevention funds. HIV/AIDS prevention funds often 
traverse several levels of distribution. At each level, equity-based heuristics are often 
used by decision-makers that may lead to sub-optimal allocation. Mathematical 
programming models may help to allocate prevention funds optimally. Thus, incentives 
could be given to decision-makers to encourage optimal allocation. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of incentives by developing a model in which an 
upper-level decision-maker (UD) allocates funds to a single lower-level decision-maker 
(LD) who then distributes funds to local programs. The UD makes use of an incentive 
scheme to encourage a LD to allocate optimally. The optimal decision at the lower-level 
depends on the strength of the incentive provided by the upper-level and the preferences 
for equity by the lower-level. The results demonstrate that under certain conditions an 
incentive may help the upper-level to encourage optimal allocation at the lower-level. 
Chapter 5 extends the model developed in Chapter 4 to incorporate information 
asymmetry. The information about the total infections prevented per dollar and 
preferences of the LD regarding equity-based allocation is known at the lower-level, but 
unknown at the upper-level. We seek to answer the following questions: What is the 
impact of incentives under information asymmetry? We examine conditions when loss 
of efficiency is higher or zero at the upper-level. 
Chapter 6 evaluates the impact of two types of incentives between and within the two 
LDs. The UD sets the level of two types of incentives and then the two LDs sets the 
fraction of the funds to be reserved for proportional allocation and the amounts allocated 
to the lower-level programs. We analyze each decision-makers’ behaviour at the 
equilibrium when either or both incentive schemes are incorporated. 
 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS, resource allocation, incentives, optimization 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) prevention funds are often allocated at multiple levels. A national level decision 
maker may allocate funds to regional decision makers, who then distribute funds to local 
organizations, risk groups, or programs. For example, for the FY 2002-2006, the World 
Bank distributed US$1.7 billion to national and regional AIDS programs that then 
dispersed funds to local programs, risk groups or organizations. In 2009, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria dispersed US$ 9 billion to principal 
recipients (PRs) nominated by various countries through country coordinating 
mechanisms (CCMs) and these PRs further distributed funds to various sub-recipients to 
prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. 
Simple allocation rules are often used by the decision makers at each level of the 
decision making process to help guide the allocation of HIV/AIDS prevention funds, 
e.g., allocating in proportion to HIV prevalence, incidence, or population size. The 
Global Fund’s technical review panel (TRP) review proposals are based on technical 
merit, including the soundness of the approach, the feasibility of the proposal, its 
potential sustainability and the anticipated degree of impact. Reviewers make use of 
epidemiological information or the implementation of previous financing related to the 
proposal under review. TRP recommendations are made by consensus and if a 
consensus cannot be reached then the chair calls for a decision by majority vote of those 
present. However, these rules may lead to sub-optimal decisions.  
Mathematical programming models have been developed to aid in the healthcare 
resource allocation processes at both single and multiple levels of decision making by 
effectively using constrained resources and significantly improving healthcare 
outcomes. My thesis investigates the impact of incentives to encourage the optimal 
allocation of prevention funds by developing a set of mathematical models. Specifically, 
the thesis addresses the following questions: Under what circumstances can financial 
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incentives help encourage the optimal allocation of prevention funds? And what is the 
optimal level of such incentives?  
In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of major international aid organizations and their 
allocation processes for HIV/AIDS prevention funds. We then highlight several major 
issues of importance for researchers in the field of HIV/AIDS policy modeling as well 
as for policy makers with the aim to convey both the effectiveness, and challenges of the 
allocation of limited HIV/AIDS prevention funds. In Chapter 3,we review various 
resource allocation models and incentive-based models that are used in a variety of 
healthcare settings and for HIV/AIDS in particular.  
In Chapter 4,we develop a dynamic programming model for a multi-level HIV/AIDS 
prevention funds allocation process in which a single upper-level decision maker (UD) 
uses incentives to promote optimal allocation by a single lower-level decision maker 
(LD) who then allocates funds to three programs. The UD uses an incentive scheme to 
encourage the LD to reduce the fraction of funds reserved for equity by making the 
amount received by the lower level dependent on this fraction. In particular, the upper 
level may withhold funds to encourage an allocation that is more efficient. 
In Chapter 5, we incorporate information asymmetry in the model developed in Chapter 
4. This Chapter consists of two cases. In the first case, we assume that the preferences of 
the LD with respect to allocating HIV/AIDS prevention funds based on equity are 
unknown to the UD. In the second case, the number of infections prevented per dollar in 
a program is known to the LD, but unknown to the UD. 
In Chapter 6, we model an incentive-based multi-level resource allocation process with 
an UD allocating funds to two LDs who then allocate funds to three programs. The UD 
sets level of two types of incentives, between and within regions that maximizes the 
total number of infections averted and then the two LDs simultaneously set the fraction 
of the funds to be reserved for the proportional allocation and the amounts allocated to 
lower-level programs. The UD uses two types of incentives to encourage LDs to 
allocate optimally.  
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Our numerical analysis suggests that under certain conditions incentives can encourage 
an optimal allocation based on the possession of symmetric and asymmetric 
information. However, there is a loss of efficiency when we compare an asymmetric 
information case with a symmetric information case. Finally, in Chapter 7, we describe 
the lessons learned in the doctoral research. 
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Chapter 2 
Practical Applications of HIV/AIDS Prevention Funds Allocation 
Process 
Funding for HIV/AIDS has increased considerably in the last decade. In 2007, the 
estimated funding to prevent HIV/AIDS worldwide was approximately $10 billion 
(Table 2.1), an almost forty-fold increase since 1996, when the funding was $260 
million [1]. This increase from a ―millions‖ to a ―billions‖ of dollars was largely due to 
a series of international funding initiatives.  
Governments coordinate the majority of the international funding initiatives (Table 2.1). 
Examples include the joint United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); the 
World Bank's Global AIDS Programme; World Health Organization (WHO); the U.S. 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria; and the Gates Foundation. The major national funding 
agencies to prevent HIV/AIDS in the U.S. are:  the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), and the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency 
(CARE) Act (RWCA); in Canada, there is the Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS. 
2.1 United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) coordinates the 
HIV/AIDS related efforts of the UNAIDS Secretariat and 10 funds, programmes, and 
agencies of the UN system organizations. These 10 agencies are: The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), The World Food Programme (WFP), The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The International Labour 
Organization (ILO), The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), The World Health Organization (WHO), and The World 
Bank. The UNAIDS Secretariat has staff in more than 80 countries and headquarters in 
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Geneva, Switzerland. Its stated goals are to carry out work in the areas of leadership, 
mobilization, planning, financing, technical assistance, human rights, gender 
discrimination, and most at-risk populations, etc. (Table 2.2) [1].  
UNAIDS helps various countries launch their national AIDS programmes. It also keeps 
track of the financial resources that are required at the global and country levels in order 
to generate information about the epidemic and the response to it. In 2008-09, UNAIDS 
spent approximately US$484,820,000 on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
programmes [2]. Table 2.3 provides the budget allocation at global and regional levels 
[3].  
The UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board (PCB) approves how the Unified Budget 
and Work plan (UBW) are detailed. The UBW Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework then make use of the qualitative and quantitative indicators to monitor the 
results of the programme at the country level. It covers information about the 
implementation of activities and expenditures and incorporates a mid-term review based 
on two criteria to determine the release of funds for the following year.  These criteria 
are (i) progress against indicators, and (ii) the implementation of the allocated funds. 
Thus, funding decisions made by the PCB are based on performance. A UBW 
information system tracks expenditures and the results of investments of each 
Cosponsor, the Secretariat, and Interagency activities at a country level [2].  
2.2. World Bank Global AIDS Program 
The World Bank provides financial and technical support by providing low-interest 
loans, interest-free credits and grants to developing countries to invest in education, 
health, environment, agriculture, and other areas. The Bank consists of two institutions: 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the 
International Development Association (IDA), which has 186 member countries. The 
IBRD focuses on middle income and poor countries, while IDA focuses on the poorest 
countries. For the poorest countries, the grants could be 100% financed, in contrast to 
middle income countries where they are only partially financed [4]. 
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The Bank works with other UN agencies to prevent HIV/AIDS in various countries by 
implementing different activities such as providing policy advice on how to design build 
and monitor evaluation systems; providing technical and financial support to national 
AIDS authorities, private, and public sectors; and developing evidence-based AIDS 
strategies and action plans. The bank contributes to the knowledge base for HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, and care through policy research. It also conducts research and 
reports on global surveillance of HIV/AIDS and related risk behaviours. The World 
Bank has committed about US$1.7 billion through grants, loans and credits to programs 
to prevent HIV/AIDS since 2002 [4].  
The World Bank uses its evaluation system to assess the progress of its activities and 
submits reports in the form of case studies from specific countries or regions or on 
major initiatives to the Joint Programme of UNAIDS. For 2008–2009, the report 
supplemented by evaluation study, called the ―Evaluation of the World Bank’s 
Assistance to AIDS National Coordination Authorities‖ was submitted to the UBW 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework [4].  
2.3. World Health Organization (WHO) 
WHO is a part of the United Nations System, which includes membership from 193 
countries with six regional offices and headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. It 
coordinates and directs various international healthcare activities in 85 countries by 
partnering with UN Agencies, Ministries of Health, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), health service providers, health care 
institutions, and people living with HIV/AIDS to help, plan, and implement programmes 
to prevent HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS policies and the annual budget are set at the 
headquarters by the HIV/AIDS team whereas the policies at the regional level are set by 
the regional offices and are specific to the needs in their regions [5].  
WHO spent $3.3 billion US in 2006-07, out of which 70% came from donations from 
various countries, agencies, and other partners; the remaining one quarter came from 
regular ―dues‖ from Member States. WHO allocates its budget to crucial health 
interventions such as response to epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and the reduction of 
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child mortality, health systems policies such as quality of medicines, determinants of 
health such as nutrition and tobacco usage, and Member States. In 2006-2007, WHO 
allocated 53% of its budget to health interventions; 21% to support Member States; 13% 
to health systems, polices, and products; and 11% to determinants of health [5]. 
In 2003, UNAIDS and WHO jointly launched the ―3 by 5‖ initiative in which the target 
was to provide antiretroviral treatment (ART) to 3 million people living with HIV/AIDS 
in low- and middle-income countries by 2005. By 2006, 2,040,000 were receiving ART 
[6]. In 2005, UNAIDS and WHO set a goal of universal access to HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, care, and support by 2010 which consisted of five objectives in 
which one of them was to maximize the health sector’s contribution to HIV/AIDS 
prevention. For its prevention efforts, WHO focuses on evidence-based interventions 
targeted towards at-risk populations such as men who have sex with men, injection drug 
users (IDUs), prisoners, etc. The organization aims to prevent HIV/AIDS transmission 
among vulnerable populations and to promote interventions in high-prevalence regions 
[5]. 
WHO uses a monitoring and reporting framework for the key areas such as universal 
access to testing, counseling, prevention in health care settings, sexual HIV 
transmission, and transmission through injection drug use, treatment and care, sexually 
transmitted infections control, and drug procurement, health financing and health 
information systems based on various indicators [5]. 
2.4. U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
President George W. Bush launched a health initiative, the U.S. President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, which was renewed on July 30, 2008 for 5 
more years, authorizing up to $48 billion to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria globally. Of this amount, $39 billion was for PEPFAR bilateral HIV/AIDS 
programs and for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria [7].  
To ensure a unified approach to prevent an HIV/AIDS epidemic, a new system was 
established at every level of the U.S. Government under the leadership of the U.S. 
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Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC). Primary implementing departments and agencies 
are the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Commerce (DoC), the 
Department of Labor (DoL), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
Peace Corps [7].  
Through FY 2013, PEPFAR plans to support life-saving treatments for 3 million 
HIV/AIDS-infected men, women and children, to seek the prevention of 12 million new 
infections, and to care for 12 million orphans and vulnerable children (Table 4). 
PEPFAR supports evidence-based prevention programs by targeting interventions based 
on the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS infection in each country by reducing sexual 
transmission, preventing mother-to-child transmission, and reducing the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS through unsafe blood and medical injections, and male circumcision [7]. 
Table 2.4 shows country-by-country approved funding by PEPFAR and provides an 
overview of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
In 2003, PEPFAR excluded the purchase of generic drugs with PEPFAR funds. The 
funding agreement required that the drugs purchased with PEPFAR funding must be 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or a regulatory agency in 
Canada, Japan, or Western Europe [8]. WHO had previously approved generic drugs, 
which are less costly than anti-retroviral medications for HIV/AIDS treatment. 
However, that policy was no longer sufficient under the PEPFAR regulations. Thus, the 
rollout of lifesaving drugs slowed as 70 percent of antiretroviral drugs bought in 
Nigeria, Haiti, and Zambia are expected to be generic. In 2006, the FDA approved 
nearly 30 generic HIV/AIDS drugs. However, none of these could be distributed by 
PEPFAR because several African countries refused to trust the FDA, and insisted that 
the drugs be approved by WHO before importing them [9]. To solve this problem, FDA 
officials shared their files on the drugs with WHO so that WHO could add them to its 
list of approved medicines [9]. PEPFAR eventually began distributing generics by the 
end of 2005 and in FY 2007 some 73% of all the antiretroviral drugs delivered by 
PEPFAR were generic [10]. 
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PEPFAR does not support needle and syringe exchange programmes. However, many 
people have objected, as needle exchange programmes have proved beneficial to protect 
IDUs from HIV transmission. PEPFAR focuses on abstinence until marriage programs 
rather than on sex education and condom distribution [11]. 
The economic crisis could affect the delivery of PEPFAR funding in 2010. Domestic 
concerns may take precedence over the global health initiative, resulting in flat funding 
for PEPFAR [12]. In a Joint Clinical Research Centre in Uganda, clinics have been 
forced to stop enrolling new patients due to the uncertainty in PEPFAR’s budget [13]. 
At times, the controversial areas have overshadowed what has already been achieved by 
PEPFAR. 
2.5. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, established in 2002, is 
collaboration between governments, the private sector, and affected communities. It 
attracts and allocates constrained resource to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria. The Global Fund works in partnership with bilateral and multilateral 
organizations to support efforts related to the three diseases. Since 2002, the Global 
Fund, with its total budget of US$ 15.6 billion for more than 572 programs in 140 
countries, has allocated a quarter of all its budget to prevent HIV/AIDS and the 
remaining funds to prevent tuberculosis and malaria [14]. In November 2008, the Global 
Fund approved US$1.164 billion to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS in 37 countries. Table 
2.5 sets out the funding allocations by region and disease.  
The funding process works as follows: The Global Fund's Board issues a call for 
proposals annually. Various countries then submit their proposals to the Global Fund 
through a country coordinating mechanism (CCM) based on priority needs at the 
national level. The Global Fund Secretariat screens the submitted proposals and the 
Technical Review Panel (TRP) reviews eligible grant proposals with respect to their 
technical merit, based on the soundness of the approach, feasibility and potential for 
sustainability and impact. Reviewers may make use of epidemiological information or 
the efficiency of the implementation of previous financing concerning the proposal 
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under review to evaluate a proposal. TRP’s recommendations are based on consensus, 
and if a consensus cannot be reached, then decisions are based on a majority vote of 
those present. The TRP then provides funding recommendations to the Board. The 
Board then makes the appropriate funding decisions by consensus (Figure 2.1). The 
Global Fund signs a legal grant agreement with Principal Recipients (PRs), designated 
by the CCM. PRs directly receive grants from the Global Fund to prevent and treat 
HIV/AIDS and to pass the funds on to the sub-recipients. There can be multiple PRs in 
one country. Additional funding can be requested by PRs based on their demonstrated 
progress towards the intended results. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the distribution of 
funding by geographic region and by type of PR, respectively [14]. 
2.6. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation helps people in developing countries escape 
their poverty and in the U.S. it supports people with the fewest resources to gain access 
to various opportunities to succeed in school and life. The Foundation has its 
headquarters in Seattle, Washington, and has four regional offices in three different 
countries to manage three core programs. The Global Development Program helps 
people in developing countries to escape hunger and poverty. The Global Health 
Program focuses on discovering insights to fight serious diseases, developing effective 
and affordable vaccines and medicines, and delivering proven health solutions in 
developing countries. The United States Program focuses on improving public 
education. The Foundation has 781 employees and an endowment of US$30.8 billion. It 
has granted US$20.1 billion since its inception. In 2008, the foundation granted US$2.8 
billion to support programs in more than 100 countries [15]. 
The Global Health Program focuses on diseases that cause the highest levels of illness 
and death in developing countries. These diseases include HIV/AIDS. The Foundation 
has worked in partnership with The Collaboration for AIDS Vaccine Discovery, the 
Consortium to Respond Effectively to the AIDS and TB Epidemic, The Global Fund, 
and PEPFAR to prevent HIV/AIDS. It awarded US$338 million for the India AIDS 
Initiative, US$33 million to improve TB control strategies in China, and US$86 million 
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to develop a new and low-cost diagnosis for HIV/AIDS. In total, the Foundation has 
awarded US$ 424 million to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS [15]. 
The Foundation awards the majority of its grants to U.S. tax-exempt organizations 
called grantees, which are identified by their staff. Grantees then work with 
beneficiaries in the field to manage the three core programs (Figure 2.4). A small 
percentage of the grant-making is done by issuing requests for proposals (RFPs). 
Proposals are prioritized based on measurable results, the use of preventive approaches, 
and the promise of significant and long-lasting change. If a proposal is accepted, then a 
grant is issued. Grantees are expected to measure their progress and to report their 
results to the Foundation [15]. 
2.7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is a major component of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). CDC’s top organizational 
component includes the Office of the Director as well as six Coordinating Centers and 
Offices and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The 
Office of the Director coordinates and directs all CDC activities and medical programs. 
The six coordinating centers include: the Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention (CCEHIP), the Coordinating Center for Health Information and 
Service (CCHIS), the Coordinating Center for Health Promotion (CCHP),  the 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases (CCID), the Coordinating Office for Global 
Health (COGH), the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency 
Response (COTPER) [16]. NIOSH ensures safety and health for all those in the 
workplace through research and prevention. CCID includes the National Center for 
HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP), which maximizes 
public health and safety through prevention, control of disease, and death due to 
HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STDs, and TB [16]. In FY 2009, CDCs budget was $6.3 
billion.  Of this, $1,947,827,000 was for CCID, and of this $1,006,375,000 was for 
HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB prevention programs. For FY 2010, CDC has 
requested US$6,389 million including $2,019,622,000 for CCID that again includes 
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$1,060,299,000 for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB prevention programs. The 
CDC awards nearly 85% of its budget through grants and contracts [17].  
To help control the HIV/AIDS epidemic, CDC works with community, state, national, 
and international partners in a variety of surveillance, research, prevention, and 
evaluation activities. Most of CDC's HIV/AIDS prevention efforts are the responsibility 
of the Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases (CCID), and the National Center for 
HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP). Within this Center, 
there are the two Divisions of HIV/AIDS Prevention (DHAP) that seek to prevent 
HIV/AIDS infection and reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS-related illness and death. 
The Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention−Intervention Research and Support (DHAP-
IRS) provides support for HIV/AIDS prevention research and the development, 
implementation, and evaluation of evidence-based HIV/AIDS prevention programs. The 
Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention−Surveillance and Epidemiology (DHAP−SE) 
conduct HIV/AIDS prevention research, and surveillance as well as the development, 
and testing of effective biomedical interventions to reduce HIV transmission and disease 
progression [16]. In FY 2009, CDC’s budget for HIV/AIDS domestic and research was 
$691,860,000 and for the FY 2010, CDC has requested $744,914,000. Table 2.6 shows 
the funding history of CDC from FY 2000 to FY 2010 for HIV/AIDS [17]. 
CDC allocates funds to 65 states and local governments called ―grantees‖ who then 
distribute funds to risk groups, local programs, and organizations. All grantees have one 
or more community planning groups (CPGs) that identify a list of priority populations 
based on risk behaviour, gender, and race/ethnicity categories. CPGs provides a 
comprehensive plan for HIV/AIDS prevention consisting of priority populations ranked 
from lowest to highest priority by the health departments. Based on CPG’s plan, the 
health department prepares a proposal to be submitted to CDC. Following the award 
from CDC, grantees issue requests for proposals (RFPs). NGOs/CBOs/FBOs or local 
organizations then submit proposals and further distribution of funds takes place [16]. 
Table 2.7 shows a list of living HIV/AIDS cases by areas of residence and Table 2.8 
shows CDC’s funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and surveillance programs by state and 
local health departments for FY 2008. 
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2.8. The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (RWCA) 
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) is a federal agency of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services established in 1982. It consists of 6 
bureaus and 13 offices. It helps to improve access to health care services for uninsured, 
underserved, and special needs populations as well as people living with HIV/AIDS, 
pregnant women, mothers and children by providing financial support to health care 
providers in every state and U.S. territory. It also supports programs that protect 
civilians against bioterrorism, and that compensate individuals harmed by a vaccination; 
it also maintains databases that protect against health care malpractice and health care 
waste, fraud and abuse. In FY 2008, HRSA provided health care to 23 million people 
with a budget of $7 billion [18]. 
The agency’s Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency (CARE) Act 
(RWCA) allocates funds to various cities, states, public, and private entities to support 
underserved people suffering from HIV/AIDS. In FY 2008, RWCA allocated $2.1 
billion to five major parts (A, B, C, D, and  E) described below [19]. 
Part A provides grants to Eligible Metropolitan Areas (EMAs), an area with a 
population of 50,000 or more and over 2000 reported AIDS cases in the last five years, 
and to Transitional Grant Areas (TGAs), defined as an area with 1000-2000 new AIDS 
cases in last 5 years. In FY 2008, $627.148 million was awarded to 22 EMAs and 34 
TGAs. Part A funding includes formula grants, supplemental grants, and Minority AIDS 
Initiative Funds for minority populations. Formula grants are based on the number of 
reported HIV/AIDS cases, Supplemental grants are based on need and other criteria, and 
Minority AIDS Initiative Funds are based on need as well as the distribution of minority 
populations living with HIV/AIDS [19].  
Part B provides grants to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and 5 U.S. Pacific Territories and Associated Jurisdictions. Part B 
awarded $1.195 million in FY 2008 including a base grant to States and Territories 
using a formula based on the number of people living with HIV/AIDS, $808.5 million to 
the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP), $5 million to supplemental grants for 
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States with ―Emerging Communities‖ having 500-1000 reported AIDS cases, and $7 
million to the Minority AIDS Initiative. ADAP provides medication to people suffering 
from HIV/AIDS [19].  
In FY 2008, Part C granted $198.754 million for planning, capacity and development, 
and early intervention services and Part D granted $73.69 million for family-centered 
care, support, logistics, and coordination services. Part E granted $34.09 million to 
AIDS Educational Training Centers, $12.85 million to Dental Reimbursement Program, 
and $25 million was set aside for Special Projects of National Significance (SPNS) [19]. 
Table 2.9 shows distribution of Ryan White Program Funding by Region and Part for 
FY 2007. 
The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006 directs 75% of the 
total funds to core services such as medical, dental and prescription assistance and also 
allows greater flexibility to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
reallocate funds to respond to changing epidemic requirements. 
2.9. The Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS in Canada and Abroad 
The Federal Initiative was launched to: address HIV/AIDS in Canada and abroad--
including the prevention of a number of new infections--reduce the social and economic 
impact of HIV/AIDS, slow the progression of the disease to improve quality of life, and 
contribute to the global relief effort. The Federal Initiative is a partnership between the 
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR), and the Correctional Services Canada. It provides funding for 
prevention, support programs, research, surveillance, public awareness, and evaluation 
for HIV/AIDS. 
PHAC is also responsible for the coordination of the Federal Initiative and has a budget 
of $13,900,000 for preventing and treating HIV/AIDS. In addition, it is responsible for 
HIV/AIDS communications, social marketing, national and regional programs, policy 
development, surveillance, laboratory science and global engagement focusing on 
technical assistance, and policy advice. PHAC funds national and regional level 
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programs. Funds are distributed to five national level programs to support a voluntary-
sector response; help engage people living with HIV/AIDS; encourage an integrated 
approach to disease prevention; enhance the capacity of individuals, organizations to 
respond to the epidemic; enable the development of effective interventions, and enhance 
a broader response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
PHAC funds regional level programs through six regional offices and the Northern 
Secretariat responsible for administering the AIDS Community Action Program 
(ACAP), which provides funding to different regions. For FY 2005-06, ACAP grants 
were allocated based on weighted criteria that consisted of 40% allocation based on 
population, 25% based on base amount for each province and territory, 25% based on 
provincial/territorial rates of AIDS cases per million, 10% based on the extent to which 
funding is available from provincial/territorial governments for ACAP-type activities. 
For FY 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, grants were based on the new framework using 
three principles: burden, vulnerability, and equity with the weightings that result in these 
allocations being directed towards those geographic areas that have the highest 
proportions of vulnerable populations to HIV/AIDS. Table 2.10 shows the distribution 
of ACAP funds. 
Health Canada is responsible for community-based HIV/AIDS education, prevention, 
and related services for First Nations and Inuit communities. It provides funding to 
support global engagement to non-profit organizations and institutions through the 
HIV/AIDS Global Engagement Grants Programme. CIHR is responsible for setting 
priorities and administering the research program. It provides funding to support 
research and helps build research capacity. Correctional Service Canada is responsible 
for providing services related to the prevention, care, treatment of HIV/AIDS to 
prisoners. 
2.10. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are legally constituted with no participation 
of any government and they maintain their status by excluding government 
representatives from membership in the organization. NGOs emphasize humanitarian 
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issues, socio-economic and sustainable development. For example, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies work to eliminate stigma and 
discrimination for people living with HIV/AIDS. There are many other NGOs working 
to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS such as the Family Health International (FHI), the 
Global Network of People Living with HIV, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 
AVERT, and the International Council for AIDS Service Organizations. Table 2.11 lists 
the major NGOs and their budgets. 
Governments collaborate with NGOs to prevent HIV/AIDS. For example, FHI 
implemented the AIDS Control and Prevention (AIDSCAP) project funded by the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 54 countries including 
Latin America and the Caribbean. AIDSCAP worked with over 500 different NGOs, 
community groups, and universities, reached 19 million people and distributed more 
than 254 million condoms. FHI gets revenue support from the U.S. government, and 
other governments as well as from a variety of foundations, individuals, multilaterals, 
and corporations (Table 2.12). In 2008, FHI spent 85% of its operational funds, 
$322.290 million US, in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS. 
2.11. Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) 
Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), are defined by USAID, as groups of individuals 
volunteering for a stated spiritual or belief system. FBOs often have a good 
understanding of the local culture and are able to reach isolated areas due to their 
organizational network, and thus, can effectively work in rural parts of poor countries. 
FBOs are major providers of care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS in 
developing countries. FBOs collaborate with major agencies to provide counseling and 
testing services to people suffering from HIV/AIDS. For example, World Vision 
collaborated with USAID to implement innovative HIV/AIDS prevention strategies in 
Asia among high-risk groups. Revenue sources and operating expenses of World Vision 
are given in Table 2.13. Faith Summit, 2010 organized by the Art of Living Foundation, 
an FBO in India brought over 500 spiritual leaders together against HIV/AIDS. They 
delved into specific action plan to address HIV/AIDS across all states in India. In 
Uganda, religious leaders of Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Muslim faiths, worked with 
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the Ministry of Health to employ funds from the World Health Organization Global 
Program on AIDS (WHO/GPA) to prevent HIV/AIDS infections.  
2.12. Community Based Organizations (CBOs) 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are non-profit organizations run primarily by 
volunteers that provide social services at the local level. CBOs are valued for their vital 
contributions to the health and well-being of the society. Many CBOs receive funding 
from a variety of sources including grants, donations, fees, and fundraising.  But 
government is the primary source of funding for most of these agencies. For example, 
USAID granted $2 million to CBOs to care and support people living with HIV/AIDS 
under the new Community REACH (Rapid and Effective Action Combating 
HIV/AIDS) program. The ―Community REACH‖ program is designed to promote 
community-based programs. These programs issue requests for applications and NGOs 
and CBOs working on either local or worldwide bases in selected countries are eligible 
to apply for grants. Many CBOs in different countries have received grants from the 
Community REACH program, e.g., the Dawn of Hope Ethiopia Association, CARE-
Rwanda, Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care. 
2.13 Summary 
We have described many international funding initiatives that are distributing up to 
billions of dollars to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS. These organizations use various 
approaches to make funding decisions. For example, they use qualitative and 
quantitative indicators, epidemiological information, and the efficiency of the 
implementation of previous financing as well as consensus or majority vote decision 
making. While these approaches may be useful for allocating treatment funds, for 
allocating prevention funds they may lead to sub-optimal allocations since they may be 
based on either consensus or vote [20]. Further, there is a lack of coordination between 
the different agencies sharing the responsibility of HIV/AIDS prevention since these 
agencies are funded through different sources, serve different constituents, have 
different responsibilities other than the HIV/AIDS issue, and report to different 
committees. These agencies also compete for funding and public attention. Hence, 
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federal leadership is needed to coordinate these agencies and their activities as well as 
other organizations like NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs in order to prevent, cure, and treat the 
maximum number of people suffering from HIV/AIDS [20]. 
Further, there is lack of tools to translate research findings into action at the community 
level, and the way in which activities are prioritized, conducted, monitored, and 
assessed needs a more pragmatic and reasonable base[20]. 
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Table 2.1: Funds Allocation by International Funding Agencies 
  
Funding Initiative (in US$) 
UNAIDS 484,820,000 
World Bank`s Global AIDS Program 1,700,000,000 
WHO 93,300,000 
PEPFAR 3,733,100,000 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria 
1,164,000,000 
Gates Foundation 457,000,000 
Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS in 
Canada 
13,900,000 
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Table 2.2: UNAIDS Allocation in $US by Principal Outcomes
1
. 
 
Principal Outcomes  Revised Budget 
for 2008–2009 
($US)  
1. Leadership and Resource Mobilization  218,009,374  
2. Planning, financing, technical assistance and 
coordination  
107,411,487  
3. Strengthened evidence base and accountability  30,520,600  
4. Human resources and systems capacities  45,615,495  
5. Human rights, gender, stigma and 
discrimination  
29,855,935  
6. Most at-risk populations  16,090,000  
7. Women and girls, young people, children and 
populations of humanitarian concern  
32,317,109  
Contingency     5,000,000  
Total  484,820,000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Source: UNAIDS, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp 
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Table 2.3: Budget Allocation by Agency and Regions (in $US)
2
. 
 
Agency  Sub-
Saharan 
Africa  
Middle 
East and N. 
Africa  
Asia and 
Pacific  
Europe and 
Central 
Asia  
Americas  Global  
UNHCR  2,830,000 1,356,042 1,650,833 766,458 353,750 8,607,917 
UNICEF  18,999,576 3,194,984 13,637,783 5,061,392 5,611,611 46,195,654 
WFP  3,679,250 1,132,330 3,113,634 566,714 566,714 13,592,358 
UNDP  12,000,000 5,460,000 8,500,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 10,500,000 
UNFPA  35,817,440 2,463,800 20,981,440 4,714,910 4,947,210 16,665,200 
UNODC  3,533,433 3,533,433 15,435,522 14,877,612 3,533,433 21,386,567 
ILO  8,000,000 2,250,000 4,800,000 3,400,000 3,400,000 8,050,000 
UNESCO  10,864,400 865,000 7,647,400 3,251,600 5,639,800 6,331,800 
WHO  50,703,984 3,413,895 18,012,118 7,108,035 10,802,175 39,259,793 
World 
Bank  
9,360,000 1,086,000 5,496,000 1,550,000 1,850,000 27,660,000 
Secretariat  38,814,040 11,415,894 28,539,735 19,026,490 17,123,842 67,480,000 
Inter-
agency  
63,883,265 10,560,929 30,233,247 20,811,242 18,326,318 2,935,000 
Total  258,485,38
8 
46,732,306 158,047,71
3 
87,134,453 77,154,852 268,664,28
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
Source: UNAIDS, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp 
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Table 2.4: FY 2009 Approved Funding by PEPFAR and 2008 HIV/AIDS Epidemic 
Overview
3
. 
 
Region/Country Sum of Approved 
Funding (in US$ 
millions) for FY 
2009 
Adult HIV 
Prevalence 
Rate (%) 
Number of People 
Living with HIV 
Number of 
Orphans 
Due to 
AIDS 
Africa  $ 3,430.6    
Angola $ 7.0 2.1 190,000 50,000 
Botswana $ 91.2 23.9 300,000 95,000 
Cote d’lvoire $ 116.0 3.9 480,000 420,000 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
$ 16.1 1.2-1.5 400,000-500,000  
Ethiopia $ 310.9 2.1 980,000 650,000 
Ghana $ 5.3 1.9 260,000 160,000 
Kenya $ 528.9 7.8 1,100,000  
Lesotho $ 12.1 23.2 270,000 110,000 
Malawi $ 25.2 11.9 930,000 550,000 
Mozambique $ 202.2 12.5 1,500,000 400,000 
Namibia $ 106.8 15.3 200,000  
Nigeria $ 440.6 3.1 2,600,000 1,200,000 
Rwanda $ 122.6 2.8 150,000 220,000 
South Africa $ 546.3 18.1 5,700,000 1,400,000 
Sudan $ 8.8 1.4 320,000  
Swaziland $ 14.3 26.1 190,000 56,000 
Tanzania $ 301.1 6.2 1,400,000 970,000 
Uganda $ 282.4 5.4 940,000 1,200,000 
Zambia $ 266.3 15.2 1,100,000 600,000 
Zimbabwe $ 26.5 15.3 1,300,000 1,000,000 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
$ 126.3    
Cambodia $ 18.0 0.8 75,000  
China $ 10.3 0.1 700,000  
Indonesia $ 7.8 0.2 270,000  
Thailand $ 5.5 1.4 610,000  
Vietnam $ 84.7 0.5 290,000  
Europe and 
Eurasia 
$ 14.7    
Russia $ 8.0 1.1 940,000  
Ukraine $ 6.7 1.6 440,000  
South and 
Central Asia 
$ 29.3    
India $ 29.3 0.3 2,400,000  
Western 
Hemisphere 
$ 132.3    
 
 
                                                 
3
Source: PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/124050.pdf 
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Table 2.4:Continued. 
 
Region/Country Sum of Approved 
Funding (in US$ 
millions) for FY 
2009 
Adult HIV 
Prevalence 
Rate (%) 
Number of People 
Living with HIV 
Number of 
Orphans 
Due to 
AIDS 
Antigua and 
Barbuda** 
    
Bahamas**  3.0 6,200  
Barbados**  1.2 2,200  
Belize**  2.1 3,600  
Dominica**     
Dominican 
Republic 
$ 8.3 1.1 62,000  
Grenada**     
Guyana $ 20.5 2.5 13,000  
Haiti $ 100.5 2.2 120,000  
Jamaica**  1.6 27,000  
St. Kitts and 
Nevis** 
    
Saint Luda**     
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines** 
    
Suriname**  2.4 6,800  
Trinidad and 
Tobago ** 
 1.5 14,000  
Total $3,733.1    
 
This table provides estimates of HIV/AIDS epidemic as of December 2007. The adult 
prevalence rate provides proportion of adults (15-49 years) living with HIV in 2007. 
The number of people living with HIV provides an estimate of adult and children with 
HIV infection in 2007. The number of orphans due to AIDS represents the estimated 
number of children (0-17 years) in 2007 who have lost one or both parents to AIDS. For 
countries where no recent data were available, country specific estimates have not been 
listed in the table.  
*Adult ages 15-49, Kenya AIDS Indicator Survey 2007 
**Countries that comprise the Caribbean Region Platform were awarded US$3.0 million 
 
Table 2.4 explanation: Provides an overview of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in PEPFAR 
countries/regional platforms, organized by region of PEPFAR investment. Only 
countries/regional platforms preparing PEPFAR operational plans, reflecting most of the 
PEPFAR country investments, are included in the table above. 
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Table 2.5: Approved Funding by the Global Fund by Region and Disease for Round 8, 
2008
4
. 
 
Region  Approved Funding (in  US$ 
millions) 
East Asia and the Pacific 387.4 for 17 programs in 9 
countries 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 141.9 for 16 programs in 9 
countries 
Latin America & the Caribbean 161.9 for 11 programs in 10 
countries 
North Africa & the Middle East 147.4 for 10 programs in 7 
countries 
South Asia 98.3 for 8 programs in 5 
countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa: East Africa 796.1for 15 programs in 10 
countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Southern 
Africa 
414.0 for 13 programs in 5 
countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa: West & 
Central Africa 
912.3 for 20 programs in 13 
countries 
Disease  
HIV/AIDS 1.164 for programs in 37 
countries 
Malaria 1.568 for programs in 28 
countries 
Tuberculosis 327 for programs in 29 countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
Source: The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/trp/reports/ 
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Table 2.6: Funding History from FY 2000 to FY 2010 for HIV/AIDS by CDC
5
.
 
 
Fiscal 
Year  
Research and 
Domestic HIV 
Prevention 
(Infectious 
Disease)  
Other  
Domestic 
HIV 
Prevention  
Global AIDS 
Program
6
  
CDC-Wide HIV 
Total
7
  
2000  $564,458,000  $87,706,000  $35,000,000  $687,164,000  
2001  $653,462,000  $96,199,000  $104,527,000  $854,188,000  
2002  $689,169,000  $96,038,000  $168,720,000  $953,927,000  
20031  $699,620,000  $93,977,000  $182,569,000  $976,166,000  
2004
8
 $667,940,000  $70,032,000  $266,864,000  $1,004,836,000  
2005  $662,267,000  $69,438,000  $123,830,000  $855,535,000  
2006
9
  $651,657,000  $64,008,000  $122,560,000  $838,225,000  
2007  $695,454,000  $62,802,000  $120,985,000  $879,241,000  
2008  $691,860,000  $40,223,000  $118,863,000  $850,946,000  
2009  $691,860,000  $40,223,000  $118,863,000  $850,946,000  
2010  $744,914,000  $40,223,000  $118,979,000  $904,116,000  
 
Note: Global AIDS amounts include funding for the Prevention of Mother to Child HIV 
Transmission initiative, which was transferred to the Department of State Office of the 
Global AIDS Coordinator in 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
Source: Department of Human and Health Services, FY 2010, CDC  
http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2010_CDC_
CJ_Final.pdf 
6
Amount for Global AIDS Program does not include PEPFAR funding. 
7
From 2000 to 2003 CDC-wide HIV/AIDS funding is comprised of specific activities within the National 
Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP), the National Center for 
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP), and the National Center for Infectious 
Diseases (NCID). CDC-wide HIV/AIDS amounts shown for 2004 to 2007 are comprised of activities 
conducted by NCHHSTP, other parts of the Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, NCCDPHP, and 
the National Center for Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities (NCBDDD). For the 2010 budget 
submission, funds supporting hemophilia/HIV activities in NCBDDDP and for oral health/HIV, 
BRFSS/HIV, and Safe Motherhood/HIV activities in NCCDPHP have been removed from the HIV-wide 
table. FY 2008 and FY 2009 figures have been adjusted to become comparable to FY 2010 figures.  
8In FY 2004, CDC’s budget was restructured to separate actual program costs from the administration and 
management of those programs. Funding levels are not comparable to those of previous years. Also in that 
year, funding for the HIV lab activities was moved from the Infectious Disease budget activity to the 
Research and Domestic HIV Prevention sub-line in the HIV, STD and TB prevention budget activity. 
9
In 2006, HIV/AIDS Basic Research was moved from the Infectious Disease budget activity to the CDC 
Research and Domestic HIV Prevention sub-line under HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB 
Prevention. 
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Table 2.7: Estimated numbers of persons living with HIV infection (not AIDS) or with 
AIDS at the end of 2007, by area of residence—United States and dependent areas10.  
 
 Adults or adolescents and children (<13 years) 
Areas of 
Residence 
Living with HIV 
infection (not 
AIDS)
11
 
Living with AIDS 
Alabama  5,740 4,046 
Alaska 289 343 
Arizona  6,226 5,110 
Arkansas 2,425 2,286 
California  - 65,582 
Colorado  6.067 4,286 
Connecticut - 6,930 
Delaware  - 1,844 
District of 
Columbia 
- 8,895 
Florida
12
 39,686 48,059 
Georgia 13,873 18,011 
Hawaii - 1,136 
Idaho 409 318 
Illinois - 17,075 
Indiana  3,939 4,019 
Iowa 644 917 
Kansas 1,370 1,390 
Kentucky - 2,286 
Louisiana 7,738 8,491 
Maine - 537 
Maryland - 15,682 
Massachusetts - 9,181 
Michigan 6,501 7,088 
Minnesota 3,380 2,439 
Mississippi 4,376 3,341 
Missouri 5,139 5,725 
Montana - 205 
Nebraska 708 835 
Nevada 3,564 2,997 
 
 
                                                 
10
Source : The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2007report/table14.htm 
11
Total number of persons living with HIV infection (not AIDS) includes persons reported from areas 
with confidential name-based HIV infection reporting who were residents of other states or whose area of 
residence is unknown. Total number of persons living with AIDS includes persons whose area of 
residence is unknown.  
12
Florida has confidential name-based HIV infection reporting on and after July 1997. 
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Table 2.7:Continued. 
 
 Adults or adolescents and children (<13 years) 
Areas of 
Residence 
Living with HIV 
infection (not 
AIDS)
13
 
Living with AIDS 
New 
Hampshire 
- 588 
New Jersey 17,612 17,671 
New Mexico 962 1,339 
New York 46,390 75,253 
North Carolina 13,122 9,129 
North Dakota 87 80 
Ohio 8,557 7,426 
Oklahoma 2,237 2,274 
Oregon - 2, 951 
Pennsylvania - 19,236 
Rhode Island - 1,350 
South Carolina 6,626 7,510 
South  Dakota 207 147 
Tennessee 7,154 6,834 
Texas 26,605 34,940 
Utah 954 1,207 
Vermont - 239 
Virginia 10,577 8,872 
Washington - 5,629 
West Virginia 670 785 
Wisconsin 2,432 2,296 
Wyoming 98 106 
Sub-total 256,363 455,636 
 
Table 2.7 explanation: the numbers represent point estimates after adjusting reported 
case counts for reporting delays, but not for incomplete reporting. Dashes indicate data 
not shown because the state did not have laws requiring confidential name-based HIV 
infection reporting since at least 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
Total number of persons living with HIV infection (not AIDS) includes persons reported from areas 
with confidential name-based HIV infection reporting who were residents of other states or whose area of 
residence is unknown. Total number of persons living with AIDS includes persons whose area of 
residence is unknown.  
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Table 2.8: Discretionary State/Formula Grants by CDC for HIV/AIDS Prevention and 
Surveillance Programs for State and Local Health Departments
14
. 
 
State/Territory/
Grantee  
FY 2008 
Prevention 
Projects  
FY 2008 Case 
Surveillance  
Total
15
 
Alabama  $2,129,587  $855,835  $2,985,422   
Alaska  $1,417,619  $120,010  $1,537,629   
Arizona  $3,028,369  $630,733  $3,659,102   
Arkansas  $1,582,922  $215,333  $1,798,255   
California  $13,618,189  $2,503,358  $16,121,547   
Colorado  $4,387,622  $1,483,874  $5,871,496   
Connecticut  $6,260,601  $992,965  $7,253,566   
Delaware  $1,888,920  $218,628  $2,107,548   
District of 
Columbia  
$5,736,854  $1,757,516  $7,494,370   
Florida  $19,255,996  $3,278,335  $22,534,331   
Georgia  $8,090,047  $1,235,185  $9,325,232   
Hawaii  $2,041,255  $175,975  $2,217,230   
Idaho  $883,103  $69,747  $952,850   
Illinois  $4,068,878  $729,058  $4,797,936   
Indiana  $2,508,313  $758,488  $3,266,801   
Iowa  $1,649,372  $176,112  $1,825,484   
Kansas  $1,617,269  $143,735  $1,761,004   
Kentucky  $1,921,570  $133,063  $2,054,633   
Louisiana  $5,227,602  $1,479,984  $6,707,586   
Maine  $1,613,073  $105,487  $1,718,560   
Maryland  $9,737,986  $1,749,181  $11,487,167   
Massachusetts  $8,655,094  $1,096,037  $9,751,131   
Michigan  $6,386,659  $1,701,840  $8,088,499   
Minnesota  $3,171,739  $257,870  $3,429,609   
Mississippi  $1,835,920  $334,518  $2,170,438   
Missouri  $3,737,842  $1,161,182  $4,899,024   
Montana  $1,263,843  $66,893  $1,330,736   
Nebraska  $1,205,605  $142,515  $1,348,120   
Nevada  $2,756,285  $785,703  $3,541,988   
New Hampshire  $1,598,713  $93,099  $1,691,812   
New Jersey  $13,192,984  $3,372,243  $16,565,227   
New Mexico  $2,270,963  $234,483  $2,505,446   
 
                                                 
14
Source: Department of Human and Health Services, FY 2010, CDC  
http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/appropriations_budget_form_pdf/FY2010_CDC_
CJ_Final.pdf 
15
Amounts reflect new funding only. Approximately $3 million in unobligated funds was also awarded to 
support the new funds. 
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Table 2.8: Continued. 
 
State/Territory/
Grantee  
FY 2008 
Prevention 
Projects  
FY 2008 Case 
Surveillance  
Total
16
 
New York  $26,785,716  $2,733,243  $29,518,959   
North Carolina  $4,208,066  $792,412  $5,000,478   
North Dakota  $672,678  $63,329  $736,007   
Ohio  $5,206,904  $911,402  $6,118,306   
Oklahoma  $2,434,358  $484,092  $2,918,450   
Oregon  $3,018,171  $291,031  $3,309,202   
Pennsylvania  $4,377,928  $616,209  $4,994,137   
Rhode Island  $1,642,131  $224,293  $1,866,424   
South Carolina  $4,460,943  $809,337  $5,270,280   
South Dakota  $642,291  $61,003  $703,294   
Tennessee  $3,913,051  $942,399  $4,855,450   
Texas  $12,936,907  $2,229,005  $15,165,912   
Utah  $1,071,870  $177,801  $1,249,671   
Vermont  $1,460,681  $84,325  $1,545,006   
Virginia  $4,938,495  $827,536  $5,766,031   
Washington  $3,337,579  $1,704,245  $5,041,824   
West Virginia  $1,684,759  $208,934  $1,893,693   
Wisconsin  $2,788,528  $399,453  $3,187,981   
Wyoming  $787,249  $61,819  $849,068   
Chicago  $5,443,889  $1,433,107  $6,876,996   
Houston  $5,092,037  $1,705,603  $6,797,640   
Los Angeles  $12,888,698  $2,369,850  $15,258,548   
New York City  $21,281,593  $3,968,220  $25,249,813   
Philadelphia  $6,327,782  $1,212,151  $7,539,933   
San Francisco  $9,005,739  $1,849,740  $10,855,479   
American 
Samoa  
$174,435  $6,719  $181,154   
Guam  $499,622  $22,975  $522,597   
Marshall 
Islands  
$122,518  $17,672  $140,190   
Micronesia  $212,866  $17,273  $230,139   
Northern 
Mariana Islands  
$192,386  $22,712  $215,098   
Palau  $235,697  $22,091  $257,788   
 
                                                 
16
Amounts reflect new funding only. Approximately $3 million in unobligated funds was also awarded to 
support the new funds. 
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Table 2.8: Continued. 
 
State/Territory/
Grantee  
FY 2008 
Prevention 
Projects  
FY 2008 Case 
Surveillance  
Total
17
 
Puerto Rico  $4,051,694  $1,136,524  $5,188,218   
Virgin Islands  $407,698  $120,495  $528,193   
Total 
States/Cities/Te
rritories  
$297,045,753  $55,585,985  $352,631,738   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
Amounts reflect new funding only. Approximately $3 million in unobligated funds was also awarded to 
support the new funds. 
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Table 2.9: Distribution of Ryan White Program Funding by Region and Part, FY 2007
18
.
 
 
 Part A 
Total 
Part B 
(Total) 
Part C Part D AETC SPNS Part F 
Dental 
Reimbu-
rsement 
Program 
Commu
nity-
Based 
Dental 
Partner-
ship 
Program 
United States 28.2% 56.1% 8.9% 3.3% 1.8% 1.1% 0.4% 0.2% 
Alabama 0.0% 74.3% 21.2% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Alaska 0.0% 56.6% 43.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Arizona 30.6% 59.4% 5.9% 2.7% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Arkansas 0.0% 82.5% 11.8% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
California 35.3% 49.2% 7.8% 2.6% 3.2% 1.3% 0.5% 0.1% 
Colorado 27.8% 52.8% 6.7% 3.5% 8.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 
Connecticut 28.1% 51.2% 13.2% 3.7% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Delaware 0.0% 83.6% 11.5% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
District of 
Columbia 
52.1% 35.5% 4.5% 2.5% 4.0% 1.1% 0.3% 0.0% 
Fl rida 33.2% 55.9% 5.1% 3.4% 1.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.1% 
Georgia 24.0% 56.5% 13.0% 1.5% 3.3% 1.5% 0.2% 0.0% 
Hawaii 0.0% 93.0% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Idaho 0.0% 59.8% 40.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Illinois 33.2% 48.0% 9.8% 3.2% 3.6% 1.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Indiana 18.6% 74.9% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Iowa 0.0% 64.8% 34.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 
Kansas 0.0% 80.8% 19.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Kentucky 0.0% 69.2% 20.7% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 3.3% 
Louisiana 25.9% 53.0% 9.7% 4.8% 3.8% 2.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
Maine 0.0% 57.4% 42.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Maryland 31.2% 61.8% 3.9% 2.5% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Massachusetts 32.3% 38.5% 15.2% 5.3% 3.9% 2.8% 1.5% 0.6% 
Michigan 28.1% 56.9% 9.4% 4.1% 0.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
Minnesota 34.9% 55.3% 7.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
Mississippi 0.0% 76.3% 16.5% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 
Missouri 33.5% 51.3% 8.6% 6.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Montana 0.0% 60.1% 39.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Nebraska 0.0% 77.4% 22.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
Nevada 32.2% 55.3% 9.7% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New 
Hampshire 
0.0% 68.7% 15.6% 15.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Jersey 31.5% 56.7% 6.8% 2.8% 1.0% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 
New Mexico 0.0% 69.5% 24.8% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
                                                 
18
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparebar.jsp?ind=535&cat=11 
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Table 2.9: Continued. 
 
  Part A 
Total 
Part B 
(Total) 
Part C Part D AETC SPNS Part F 
Dental 
Reimbu-
rsement 
Program 
Commu
nity-
Based 
Dental 
Partner-
ship 
Program 
New York 34.8% 50.7% 7.2% 3.5% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 0.2% 
North Carolina 9.0% 72.5% 10.7% 5.3% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
North Dakota 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ohio 12.4% 72.5% 10.4% 3.4% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oklahoma 0.0% 82.0% 14.0% 3.4% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Oregon 25.9% 55.1% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.5% 1.4% 2.1% 
Pennsylvania 27.3% 48.8% 13.4% 3.5% 5.1% 1.6% 0.4% 0.0% 
Rhode Island 0.0% 59.0% 18.0% 10.2% 0.0% 12.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
South Carolina 0.0% 81.8% 14.2% 1.6% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
South Dakota 0.0% 67.4% 32.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Tennessee 30.0% 59.5% 6.1% 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Texas 29.6% 60.4% 5.1% 3.3% 1.1% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 
Utah 0.0% 83.5% 16.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
Vermont 0.0% 64.2% 35.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Virginia 13.7% 78.1% 5.9% 2.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Washington 25.8% 50.9% 9.3% 3.9% 10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
West Virginia 0.0% 75.9% 24.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Wisconsin 0.0% 73.5% 16.8% 6.6% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Wyoming 0.0% 73.6% 26.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Guam 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Puerto Rico 27.5% 57.9% 12.6% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Virgin Islands 0.0% 72.2% 13.8% 14.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Table 2.10: The Distribution of ACAP Allocation Funds (in CAD$)
19
. 
 
Region  2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
British 
Columbia 
1,339,956 1,515,709 1,761,891 2,329,827(17%) 
Alberta 906,129 906,129 906,129 984,575 (7%) 
Manitoba/Sask
atchewan 
941,949 941,949 941,949 941,949(7%) 
Ontario 2,702,466 3,017,212 3,473,671 4,556,482(33%) 
Quebec 2,072,765 2,229,137 2,493,496 3,189,937(23%) 
New 
Brunswick, 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 
Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward 
Island 
1,456,184 1,456,184 1,456,184 1,456,184(10%) 
Yukon, 
Northwest 
Territories, 
Nunavut 
396,680 396,680 396,680 441,046(3%) 
Total  $9,816,129 $10,463,000 $11,430,000 $13,900,000(100%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
Source: Public Health Agency of Canada,  
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/aids-sida/publication/reports/acap-pacs/acap-pacs-eng.php 
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Table 2.11: NGOs working to reduce spread of HIV/AIDS 
 
NGOs Budget Available 
(US$ millions) 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies’ 
- 
Family Health International 369.876
20
 
Global Network of People Living with HIV - 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance 71.1
21
 
International Council for AIDS Service 
Organizations 
- 
AVERT 0.175
22
 
Elton John AIDS Foundation 2.99
23
 
NAM 1.19
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
Source: Family Health International. 
http://www.fhi.org/NR/rdonlyres/edhbtg4dyeob2k7wod26lf3qu45sbalmy6ezh5dds5mwgni4auhd4h4yq7n
uftwwqyz4tqakn5gcoj/FHIAnnualReport2009.pdf. 
21
Source: International HIV/AIDS Alliance, http://www.aidsalliance.org/homepagedetails.aspx?id=1. 
22
Source: AVERT.  2007  [cited 2008 June 1]; http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm. 
23
Source: Elton John AIDS Foundation; http://www.ejaf.org/. 
24
Source: NAM, http://www.aidsmap.com/cms1038153.aspx. 
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Table 2.12: Financial Summary from September 2007-08 by FHI
25
. 
 
Revenue and Support 2008 (in US$ 
million) 
US Government 302.126 
Other Governments 22.787 
Foundations and Individuals 19.687 
Corporations 12.555 
Multilaterals 11.278 
Interest, investment and lab 
services income 
1.443 
Total revenues, gains and 
support 
369.876 
Expenses  
Operational use of funds 322.290 
General and Administrative 44.080 
Fundraising  0.186 
Total expenses 366.556 
Net Assets, Beginning of Year 12.368 
Change in Net Assets 3.320 
Net Assets, End of Year 15.688 
Work by Health Area  
HIV/AIDS 85% 
Reproductive Health 11% 
Other Public Health and 
Development 
4% 
Work by Practice Area  
Health and Development 
Programs 
76% 
Research  24% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
Source: Family Health International, 
http://www.fhi.org/NR/rdonlyres/edhbtg4dyeob2k7wod26lf3qu45sbalmy6ezh5dds5mwgni4auhd4h4yq7n
uftwwqyz4tqakn5gcoj/FHIAnnualReport2009.pdf 
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Table 2.13: Financial Highlights by World Vision
26
. 
 
Revenue Sources (in US$ millions) 2008 
Private cash contributions 468 
Government grants (food and cash) 281 
Gifts-in-kind 366 
Other income, net 6 
Total revenue 1,109 
Operating Expenses (in US$ millions)  
Programs that benefit children, families, 
and communities in need 
979 
Fundraising  97 
Management & general 52 
Total operating expenses 1,128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
Source: World Vision, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/ar-financials. 
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Figure 2.1: The Global Fund Proposal Process
27
. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Source : The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/structures/?lang=en 
THE BOARD
Issues call for proposals
CCM
Devises national strategy and submits proposals to Government
Multi- & Bilateral Development Partners, Non-Governmental Organizations, 
Affected Communities, Faith-based Organizations, Academic Institutions, Private Sectors
Technical Review Panel
Reviews and recommends for funding
SECRETARIAT
Screens for eligibility
THE BOARD
Approves funding for first two years
CCM
Designates organization to serve as PR
PRINCIPAL RECIPIENT (PR)
SUB RECIPIENT
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of funding by geographic region by the Global Fund
28
. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of funding by type of Principal Recipient by the Global Fund
29
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Source : The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/distributionfunding/?lang=en#geographic_region. 
29
Source : The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,  
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/recipients/?lang=en 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 
57%
Middle East and 
North Africa, 6%
East Asia and Pacific, 
12%
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 9%
Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 8%
South Asia, 8%
Government, 50%
Communities, 4%
Academic, 5%
Private Sector, 6%
Faith-based 
Organizations, 5%
NGOs and CBOs, 25%
Other, 5%
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Figure 2.4: Funding process in Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
30
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
Source:  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
 http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grantseeker/Pages/overview.aspx 
Grantees & 
Partners 
The Bill and Melinda  
Gates Foundation 
Beneficiaries  
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Models of HIV/AIDS Prevention Funds Allocation Process 
3.1. Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal federalism means decentralization of decision making to sub-national levels of 
government regarding allocation of financial resources. Rondinelli pioneered the formal 
analysis regarding decentralization [1] which Mills applied to health care sector [2]. 
Fiscal federalism in health care sector is often adopted in many countries. In Denmark, 
the federal government allocates funds to 5 main regions which are responsible for all 
the health care activities in their respective regions. A region has an incentive to provide 
service that will substitute for hospital care. For instance, a region will pay a certain 
amount for a hospitalized citizen. If via prevention hospitalization is reduced, then 
savings will accrue to the region [3]. 
In Norway, the federal government allocates funds to the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services, which then distributes funds to 5 regional health authorities, who then 
distribute funds to 32 health enterprises consisting of hospitals and clinics. Norwegian 
decentralized health care system is believed to increase welfare since local authorities 
are free to act according to local preferences, availability of data, and local cost structure 
[4]. In Canada, the federal and provincial relationship in the health care sector has been 
viewed as cooperative and collaborative federalism wherein the federal government 
cooperates and collaborates with provincial governments to make health care policy 
decisions [5]. In other countries, for example, India and China [6], Uganda, Ghana, 
Zambia, and the Philippines [7] all tiers of government share responsibility for all health 
care activities. 
There are various advantages and disadvantages associated with fiscal federalism or the 
decentralization of decision making in health sector. Fiscal federalism provides 
autonomy to local government to decide on how much to spend and where according to 
local preferences and local needs under symmetric information [8, 9]. Brueckner uses a 
growth model to show that decentralization leads sub-national governments to provide 
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public services tailored to the needs of local consumers which increases the incentive to 
save. This incentive directs higher investment in human capital which in turn leads to 
faster economic growth [10]. Magnussen et al. showed that decentralization has been 
viewed as a means to improve the outcomes of the health care sector in European 
countries. However, in case of information asymmetry about local preferences at the 
national level, this approach leads to ambiguity in health outcomes [4]. Breuille and 
Gary-Bobo developed a principal multi-agent model to characterize optimal inter-
governmental funds transfer under information asymmetry [11].  
One major disadvantage of decentralization is that the sub-national levels of government 
have varying capacities or some of them may possess a weak capacity to distribute 
resources optimally. Further, resources are distributed based on local priorities which 
may lead to sub-optimal health outcomes [9]. Thus, conditionality or performance 
criteria are often used by federal government to dictate the terms of how to utilize 
limited resources. Sometimes incentives are also provided by the federal government to 
effectively guide local governments’ behaviour towards distributing resources optimally 
[7]. 
HIV prevention resources, too, are often allocated at multiple levels. At the sub-national 
levels, resources are distributed based on local priorities which may lead to sub-optimal 
health outcomes. We consider optimal incentives in a decentralized HIV prevention 
resource allocation process under symmetric and asymmetric information.  
3.2 Resource Allocation in Health Care 
Resource allocation in health care is defined as the dispersion of limited resources, for 
example, the distribution of funds to various regions, populations, risk groups, or 
programs. Various methods have been proposed to disperse these limited resources in an 
optimal way. The following paragraphs summarize some of the methods used in the 
allocation of health care resources. 
Economic evaluation is used to identify the most efficient way of allocating scarce 
healthcare resources to alternative activities where the costs and consequences of these 
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decisions are compared to provide evidence to help policy makers and healthcare 
planners make effective choices. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is one basic type of 
economic evaluation. 
3.2.1 Equity-based Heuristics 
Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA) provides valid criteria to decision makers for 
choosing health care interventions by comparing the costs versus the effectiveness of 
various interventions in cases where effectiveness can be measured by disease-specific 
outcomes [12]. An incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), is defined as the total 
incremental cost divided by the total incremental benefit of an intervention, and is 
calculated for each intervention. ICER’s of different health care interventions are then 
compared to allocate funds. Cost is expressed in dollars and health benefits in units of 
health such as the reduction in the length of hospital stays, life years saved or additional 
years of life gained adjusted for quality of life defined as quality adjusted life years 
(QALYs) gained [12].  
Hoel showed the significance of CEA in allocating health care resources by maximizing 
the expected utility of the policy maker subject to net health expenditures [13]. Cohen et 
al. demonstrated the value of CEA by developing an optimization model that lead to the 
allocation of funds among interventions in descending order of cost-effectiveness [14]. 
Weinstein showed that the optimal solution was comprised of allocating resources in 
increasing order of their effectiveness ratio until the budget is exhausted [15]. Most 
CEA analyses assume that all competing programs exhibit mutual exclusivity, perfect 
divisibility, and constant returns to scale. However, these assumptions may not be 
satisfied in practice [14]. Because the CEA needs realistic estimates of the cost and 
effectiveness of all interventions, the practicality of this option is decreased [16]. Many 
statistical issues arising from the comparison of different types of intervention [17], the 
ethical issues [18], and the theoretical issues [19, 20] in the CEA have been discussed by 
several researchers. Though, the CEA can offer valid criteria to the decision maker on 
which to base the choice of various health care interventions, there may be issues related 
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to the cost-effectiveness ratios and translating them into realistic criteria for resource 
allocation [15]. 
League Tables 
League tables rank alternative interventions based on their ICER’s and are valuable 
tools to inform decision makers about the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. 
Mason et al. presented guidelines to help decision makers interpret league tables and 
made recommendations for future league tables’ development [21]. Mauskopf et al. 
proposed a reference case that expanded league tables, making league tables a more 
effective tool for decision making [22]. However, construction of such tables is difficult 
because it requires standardization across studies, with respect to both method and 
underlying assumptions [23]. 
Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) 
PBMA helps maximize the impact of limited healthcare resources on the health needs of 
a population by assisting decision makers in effectively allocating resources. This 
approach is based on two key economic principles: opportunity cost and marginal 
analysis. The objective is to either minimize the opportunity costs or maximize the 
benefits [24]. PBMA involves assessing the costs and benefits of proposed changes in 
healthcare delivery and focusing on the marginal benefits to assess the impact of 
proposed changes [25]. Various studies have given a fuller description of PBMA [26], in 
the South Australian context [27], and in the U.K. and Canadian contexts [26]. Dionne 
et al. conducted an empirical study which showed PMBA to be a useful priority setting 
framework [28]. However, PBMA is affected by organizational barriers, inadequate 
resourcing, and a culture dedicated to supporting proactive change [29].  
3.2.2 Optimization Models  
Several studies have proposed linear programming (LP) models where the assumptions 
of program divisibility and constant returns to scale are not required. Kuo et al. 
developed an LP model to allocate operating room time among surgeons to maximize 
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total weekly revenue [30]. Similarly, Saaty et al. proposed an LP model to solve human 
resource allocation problems [31]. 
Earnshaw et al. presented various formulations of integer programming (IP) problems to 
allocate interventions to specific populations with diabetes mellitus [32]. Earnshaw and 
Dennett also provided an overview of the potential use of LP/IP models in various 
healthcare resource allocation settings [33]. Epstein et al. and others proposed an IP 
model with the objective of determining the optimal value of the available health care 
treatments subject to budgetary constraints and evaluated various budgetary policies 
showing the opportunity loss, in terms of health benefits forgone, for each policy [34]. 
Numerous researchers have developed IP models to efficiently distribute surgical cases 
to various multifunctional operating rooms [35, 36].  
Zaric and Brandeau formulated a dynamic programming (DP) model in which the 
budget is allocated over multiple time periods to different populations where the 
objective is to maximize the quality of adjusted life years (QALYs) gained or minimize 
the total number of new infections subject to the applicable budget constraints [37]. It 
was shown that optimal allocation consists of investing as much as possible in some 
populations and nothing in other populations and that the reallocation of funds may lead 
to more benefits. Bala and Mauskopf proposed a DP model to optimally assign 
treatments to different health states [38]. 
3.2.3 Operations Research Models 
Zaric and Brandeau combined epidemic modeling with optimization techniques with the 
objective to maximize the quality of adjusted life years (QALYs) gained or minimize 
the total number of new infections for interacting populations and assuming a non-linear 
production function that relates the amount invested in an intervention to change in risky 
behaviour [39]. Obtained solutions were then compared with simple allocation 
strategies, which often led to suboptimal allocations. Brandeau et al. developed a similar 
formulation for a set of non-interacting populations presented by a simple 
susceptible/infected (S/I) epidemic model and assumed a general cost function that 
related cost with the reduction in the sufficient contact rate in each population and 
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showed that the optimal allocation of limited prevention funds depended on numerous 
factors [40]. 
3.3 HIV Resource Allocation 
3.3.1 Equity-based Heuristics 
Bautista-Arredondo et al. suggested a general framework focusing on CEA for the 
allocation of HIV/AIDS prevention funds for developing countries [41]. Pinkerton et al. 
developed a resource allocation model based on league tables suggesting the allocation 
of funds to interventions in increasing order of their cost-effectiveness ratio until the 
budget is exhausted [42]. 
3.3.2 Optimization Models 
LP models with the objective to maximize the weighted number of HIV infections 
averted subject to constraints on budget, funds distributed to at-risk individuals, and 
equity have been proposed and studied under several scenarios using information from 
Florida showing an improvement of 73% over simple allocation strategies [43, 44]. 
Stinnett and Paltiel developed a mixed integer programming model incorporating partial 
indivisibilities, non-constant returns to scale, and global mutual exclusivity of various 
prevention programs[45]. Kaplan and Pollack reviewed various budget allocation rules 
employed by HIV community planning groups and devised a dynamic programming 
model to maximize the number of HIV infections prevented subject to budget 
constraints [46]. Richter et al. proposed a dynamic programming model for HIV 
transmission in injection drug users and non-users with the objective to minimize the 
number of new HIV infections over a fixed time period [47].  
3.3.3 Operations Research Models 
Various simulation models have been proposed to evaluate the impact of HIV 
interventions. Zaric et al. performed computer simulations to analyze the effects of 
interventions on an HIV epidemic [48]. Korenromp et al. studied the effects of 
intervention by stochastic simulation in a rural African population [49]. Nagelkerke et 
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al. developed a dynamic compartmental simulation model to identify the best policy to 
inhibit the spread of HIV in Botswana and India [50]. 
Zaric and Brandeau developed an optimal investment portfolio that maximizes the 
number of HIV infections averted based on an allocation method that considers non-
linear epidemic dynamics [51]. They showed that simple allocation methods may lead to 
sub-optimal allocation. Lasry et al. combined epidemic modeling with an optimization 
technique for a two-level decision-making process which consisted of allocating funds 
to four sub-populations at the lowest level which were modeled using a susceptible-
infected epidemic model. They showed that if optimization modeling is to be applied at 
one level of decision-making process then it is beneficial to apply it at both the lower 
and upper level. Hence, the upper-level decision maker should develop incentives to 
encourage optimal allocations at the lower-levels [52]. 
3.4 Bi-level Optimization 
Bi-level programming problem (BLP) is a special case of multi-level programming 
problem (MLP) solving. MLP is a set of nested optimization problems where the control 
over the decision variables is partitioned among the various levels, but a decision 
variable at one level may affect the objective function of other levels. Thus, the decision 
maker may influence the policies utilized at other levels and thereby improve his own 
objective function. Two-levels in a hierarchy define a BLP. 
The formal formulation of the linear BLP has been provided by Fortuny-Amat and 
McCarl [53] and by Candler and Townsley [54]. Numerous versions of the BLP are 
provided by various authors [55-57]. Fortuny-Amat and McCarl formulated a linear 
BLP with no upper-level constraints and a unique lower-level solution [53]. Bialas and 
Karwan formulated the BLP as a non-convex programming problem and demonstrated 
its tractability [55]. Several researchers have studied the fundamental concept of BLP. 
Simultaneously, several algorithms have also been proposed to solve the BLP. Shimizu 
and Aiyoshi developed a computational method based on a series of non-linear 
programming problems approximating the original problem and obtaining the sequence 
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of approximating solutions converging on the true solution [58]. Bard presented an 
algorithm to solve BLP using sensitivity analysis [56].  
In this thesis, we formulate a BLP in which a decision at one level affects the objective 
function at other level and the decision maker at one level can influence the decisions 
made at other level, thereby improving the objective function. 
3.5 Incentives in Health Care Settings 
The concept of using incentives to encourage optimal behaviour in health care has been 
investigated in several settings. In principal-agent problem, the principal has a primary 
stake in the performance of the system, but delegates operational control of that system 
to an agent. Two situations arise, in the first-best situation, the agent’s actions can be 
observed by the principal, whereas, in the second-best situation, the agent’s actions are 
hidden from the principal. However, in both situations, the principal can observe the 
outcome of the action taken by an agent. The principal provides incentives or 
compensation contracts based on the observed outcome to induce the agent to operate in 
the principal’s best interests [59].  
Mas-Colell et al. provided an overview of principal-agent models [60]. Fuloria and 
Zenios considered an incentive-based contractual agreement between a purchaser and a 
provider of health care in which the purchaser reimburses the provider according to a 
pre-specified payment system in the context of Medicare’s End Stage Renal Disease 
Program. They formulated a principal–agent model where the purchaser maximizes the 
amount of social welfare and the provider maximizes its expected utility from the level 
of consumption and derived an outcome- adjusted payment system that motivates the 
provider to adopt actions promoting the purchaser’s welfare [61]. Su and Zenios 
considered a mechanism-design problem in the context of the kidney transplant waiting 
system. The authors maximized the objective function, which is the sum of expected 
utilities of all patients and minimum improvement in the expected utility of different 
patients’ types. They showed that the allocation mechanism does induce patients to 
declare the type of kidney he/she would be willing to accept at the time they join the 
kidney waiting-list by ensuring that patients who wait longer receive better kidneys [62]. 
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However, we are not aware of any research on incentives to promote the optimal 
allocation of HIV prevention resources. My thesis investigates the impact of using 
incentives in a multi-level allocation process of HIV prevention funds. 
3.6 Game Theoretic Models 
Some work incorporating game theory has been done in health care resource distribution 
settings. Nagel modeled group decision making as a one-shot zero sum game and 
developed strategies that bring into consideration the expectation of individual players 
by influencing their perceptions [63]. Cohen and Burg proposed a zero-sum game that 
chooses between efficiency and fairness in the distribution of health care resources in 
the United States. In the U.S., there is a wide gap between more-favoured and less-
advantaged groups in terms of access to health care resources. A dynamic setting 
focusing on the redistribution of the health care resources was proposed in such a way 
that the inequality gap was reduced by distributing a larger share of health care 
resources to less-advantaged groups without making the more-favoured group worse off 
[64].  
Jan formulated ―short-termism‖, a decision making tool used  in the public sector that 
favours choices that yield short-term gains, as prisoner’s dilemma and coordination 
games are used to address the incentives that occurs in such games. The allocation of 
resources across programs is based on a marginal cost-effectiveness/cost-benefit 
analysis, which was modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma game and the adoption of 
information systems across hospitals as a coordination game. They showed the role of 
credible commitment in facilitating long-term decision making in a health care setting 
[65]. Jan et al. analyzed the group decision-making process as a one-shot zero sum game 
in the context of Divisions of General Practice in Queensland, Australia and 
demonstrated a consultative process in which the relevant stakeholders (players) were 
encouraged to take into consideration the global allocation issue and to move beyond 
their localized interests [66].  
McPake et al. modeled two-tier charging, the practice in which hospitals offer two 
separate qualities of service, basic and premium, at different prices, as a Stackelberg 
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game in which the Ministry of Health (MOH) is the leader and the hospital is a follower. 
MOH sets the prices that maximize its utility function subject to its budget constraint set 
by Ministry of Finance and then the hospital follows by setting its quality levels by 
maximizing the use of any surplus. The case in which MOH sets prices but provides 
only lump-sum subsidies to the hospital was compared to the case in which MOH sets 
prices and also provides an activity-based subsidy for the provision of a basic service 
that reflects the volume of the service provided. McPake et al. showed that switching to 
activity-based payment doubles the quality level of the basic and premium service [67]. 
Sun et al. modeled various countries as players in a game during an outbreak of an 
influenza epidemic by making optimal decisions about allocating their own drug 
stockpiles to protect their populations. They developed a two-period multivariate model 
to represent the epidemic within and across countries by capturing three types of 
uncertainties: the number of initial infections, the spread of the disease, and drug 
efficacy. Their analysis showed that Nash equilibrium exists for between-country 
infections suggesting that countries should agree on an allocation scheme that would 
benefit everyone [68]. However, we are not aware of any modeling of HIV prevention 
funds allocation process as a Stackelberg game.  
In Chapter 6, we model an incentive-based multi-level resource allocation process with 
an upper-level decision maker (UD) by allocating funds to two lower-level decision 
makers (LDs) who then allocate funds to three programs. The UD sets the level of 
incentive that maximizes the total infections averted and then the two LDs 
simultaneously set the fraction of the funds to be reserved for the proportional allocation 
maximizing their utility functions. The UD uses an incentive scheme to encourage a LD 
to reduce the fraction of funds reserved for equity by making the amount received by 
each LD dependent on this fraction and the decision of other LD. 
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Figure 3: Taxonomy Diagram. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal Incentives for Multi-level Allocation of HIV Prevention 
Resources 
4.1. Introduction  
HIV prevention funds are often allocated at multiple levels. For example, a national 
level decision maker may allocate funds to regional decision makers who then distribute 
funds to local organizations, risk groups, or programs. In the U.S., the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) disperses funds to several community planning 
groups (CPGs) who then distribute the funds to local programs or risk groups. An 
international organization such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria distributes funds to different countries. Funds received by countries may then be 
allocated to sub-recipients such as regional decision makers or to specific programs [1].  
In many countries health care funds are often allocated by central government to 
regional governments’ who then distribute funds to hospitals and clinics in their 
respective regions. This is called fiscal federalism or decentralization or transfer of 
financial power from a central to less central authority [2, 3]. In fiscal federalism, local 
authorities make decisions in accordance with local preferences which may not lead to 
optimal outcome [4, 5].  
Similarly, many regional-level decision makers allocate HIV prevention funds often 
using equity-based heuristics including various forms of proportional allocation which 
may not lead to optimal health care outcome [6-8]. Some examples of proportionality 
include dividing the budget equally among competing programs; dividing resources 
equally among programs without considering the effectiveness of targeted programs; or 
allocating in proportion to HIV prevalence, incidence, or population size.  
There are numerous mathematical programming models of health care resource 
allocation that are applicable when there is a single decision maker. These include linear 
programming models [9-12], mixed-linear integer programming models [13], dynamic 
programming models [14-16], and stochastic programming models [13, 17, 18]. 
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Resource allocation models that incorporate epidemic dynamics have also been 
developed for the specific case of HIV [19-23]. 
The issue of equity versus efficiency tradeoffs in HIV resource allocation has been 
examined, both at a single-level [20, 24] and at multiple-levels of decision-making [25, 
26]. Lasry et al. modeled a two-level decision-making process combining epidemic 
modeling with optimization technique in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. They built a 
model in which an upper level decision maker (UD) allocates funds to lower-level 
decision makers (LD), who further distribute the funds to two sub-populations, each 
funding two different prevention programs. The four sub-populations are modelled 
using susceptible/infected epidemic model. The authors showed an improvement of 7% 
over the number of new HIV infections if optimal allocation takes place at the lower 
level [25]. 
Zaric and Brandeau modeled a two-level decision-making process with a single UD, 
multiple LDs, and three sub-populations in each region. The model was based on 40 
U.S. states with 3 risk groups per state [26]. As in Lasry et al, the authors found that 
optimal allocation at the lower level often yields greater gains than optimal allocation at 
the higher level, and in some cases differences can be substantial. They concluded that 
the UDs such as donor organizations, should develop incentives to promote optimal 
allocation at the lower level [26]. We expand on the work of Lasry et al. and Zaric and 
Brandeau by investigating the impact of an incentive program to encourage optimal 
allocation at the lower level.  
The concept of using incentives to encourage optimal behaviour in health care has been 
investigated in several settings. Fuloria and Zenios considered an incentive-based 
contractual agreement between a purchaser and a provider of health care in which the 
purchaser reimburses the provider according to a pre-specified payment system in the 
context of Medicare’s End Stage Renal Disease Program. They formulated a principal –
agent model where the purchaser maximizes social welfare and the provider maximizes 
its expected utility from consumption and derived an outcome- adjusted payment system 
that motivates the provider to adopt actions promoting the purchaser’s welfare [27]. Su 
and Zenios considered a mechanism-design problem in the context of the kidney 
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transplant waiting system by maximizing the objective function, which is the sum of 
expected utilities of all patients and minimum improvement in the expected utility of 
different patients’ types. They showed that the allocation mechanism does induce 
patients to declare the type of kidney he/she would be willing to accept at the time they 
join kidney waiting-list by ensuring that patients who wait longer receive better kidneys 
[28]. There are many other examples of research on the use of incentives in health care 
[29-34]. However, we are not aware of any research on incentives to promote optimal 
allocation of HIV prevention resources. 
In this paper, we model a two-level resource allocation problem in which the UD uses 
incentives to promote optimal allocation by the LD. Our study attempts to answer the 
following questions. Under what situations does giving incentives to the LD help 
encourage optimal allocation at the lower level? and What is the optimal level of 
incentives? The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the 
mathematical description of the model. Section 3 introduces mathematical analysis of 
the model and illustrates with a numerical example. Concluding comments are provided 
in Section 4.  
4.2. The Model 
We developed a single period model of a two-level decision-making process. There is a 
single decision-maker at each level and a fixed time horizon of length 0T  . The LD 
has two decisions: 1. What proportion of the funds received to allocate based on equity? 
And 2. How should the remaining funds be allocated to programs? The UD has one 
decision, which is the amount to allocate to the lower level. The UD uses an incentive 
scheme to encourage the LD reduce the fraction of funds reserved for equity by making 
the amount received by the lower-level dependent on this fraction. In particular, the 
upper-level may withhold funds to encourage allocation that is more efficient. 
The LD chooses r  0 1r  , which is the fraction of the funds to be reserved for 
proportional allocation, and then distributes amount , 1,2,...jy j m  to program .j  As in 
Zaric and Brandeau, we assume that one program is available for each risk group, that 
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the programs do not interact, and that the costs and benefits scale linearly [26]. Let B be 
the budget of the upper-level and Z be the amount allocated to the lower-level. The UD 
has a total budget B, chooses a fraction f , 0 1f   and allocates an amount Z  to the 
lower-level using the following equation: 
   1Z r B rf  .         (4.1) 
We refer to f as the ―strength of the incentive‖ in that a higher value of f corresponds to 
a stronger penalty for equity at the lower-level. To illustrate, consider the following 
examples. The LD receives the total budget B when 0f   and receives  1 r  times the 
budget B when 1f  . When 0r  , all funds are reserved for an optimal allocation and 
the lower-level receives B regardless of f. When 1r  , all the funds are reserved for a 
proportional allocation and the lower-level receives  1B f . 
We formulate this problem as a dynamic program in which the time sequence is as 
follows: the upper-level chooses f ; then the lower-level chooses r for the given value of
f ; then the lower-level determines
jy for the given values of f and r . We solve this 
problem using backward induction and present the details in the reverse time sequence. 
4.2.1 The Lower-level Model 
Stage 3: We develop a model at this stage similar to the lower-level models of Zaric and 
Brandeau [26] and Kaplan and Merson [24]. Let 
jh be the number of HIV infections 
prevented per dollar invested in a program j over timeT . Let 
jn be the size of the risk 
group j and j
j
N n . We assume that the programs have been indexed so that
1 2 .... mh h h   . The total number of HIV infections averted, IA , is given by the 
following equation: 
1 1 2 2 ... m mIA h y h y h y    .        (4.2) 
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In the last step of the dynamic program, given r and f , the total number of infections 
averted is found by solving the following linear programming problem: 
1 2
1 1 2 2
,..,
max ...
m
m m
y ,y y
IA h y h y h y           (4.3) 
 
1
S.t.   1
m
j
j
y Z B rf

           (4.4) 
j
j
n
y rZ
N
            (4.5) 
This is similar to the ―Knapsack LP‖ formulation at the lower-level in Zaric and 
Brandeau [26] and the resulting optimal solution is of the following form: 
N
n
rZ
N
n
rZZy m ...2
1
, 
,     2
j
j
n
y rZ j ,...,m
N
  . 
      1 11IA r Z h rk B rf h rk     ,      (4.6) 
where,    21 2 1...
m
m
nn
k h h h h
N N
     . 
Note that 1h k  and the result of stage 3 is the function  IA r .  
Stage 2: In the second step, the LD chooses r to maximize his utility function. We 
assume that the LD’s utility function considers equity (as captured through r), efficiency 
(as captured through  IA r ), and funds received (as captured through  Z r ). We 
investigate two different forms for the utility function, linear and multiplicative,  LU r  
and  MU r , given by 
     LU r aZ r br cIA r           (4.7) 
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and  
     
a cb
MU r Z r r IA r .        (4.8) 
In the case of  LU r , the parameters , , 0a b c  represent the relative weights applied to 
funds received, equity, and infections averted. In the case of  MU r , the parameters 
, , 0a b c  are exponents of budget, equity, and infections averted. We assume that 
values of a, b, and c are known by both the LD and the UD. Depending on which utility 
function is used, the lower-level optimization problem is written as: 
     : maxL L
r
L U r aZ r br cIA r         (4.9) 
or 
     : max
a cb
M M
r
L U r Z r r IA r        (4.10) 
s.t.    0 1  r           (4.11) 
The LD solves LL or ML to obtain  *r f . 
4.2.2 The Upper-level Model 
Stage 1: As in other models [9, 10, 26], we assume that the objective at the upper-level 
is to maximize the number of infections averted. Thus, upper-level resource allocation 
problem is:  
  : max *i
f
IA IA r f , where ,i L M       (4.12) 
s.t.  0 1f             (4.13) 
            * arg max ir f L r        (4.14) 
4.3. Analysis  
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In this section, we analyze the optimization problem for both utility functions. All 
proofs are shown in the appendix. We focus on the case of three sub-populations (i.e. 
m=3) and     321 2 1 3
nn
k h h h h
N N
    , although the results are easily generalizable 
beyond this.  
4.3.1 Linear Utility Function 
Before stating the solution, we define three threshold values: 
  khcaB
cBkb
f Lt



1
,  1chaBb
L
ut  , and cBkb
L
lt  .  
Proposition 4.1: For problem LL with three sub-populations: 
(i) LU  is a convex function of r  and therefore the optimal solution is either * 0r   or 
* 1r  . 
(ii) If  ff Lt then 1* r . 
(iii) If  ff Lt then 0*r .        ∎ 
Corollary 4.1: When L
utb b  then 1
*r  and when L
ltb b , then 0
* r .  ∎ 
Part (i) of Proposition 4.1 says that an extreme point solution of allocating all or none 
based on equity is always optimal. Part (ii) says that all of the funds received from the 
upper-level are reserved for proportional allocation if the strength of the incentive is less 
than a threshold value L
tf . Alternatively, part (iii) says that that all funds will be 
allocated optimally if the strength of the given incentive is greater than L
tf . Corollary 
4.1 relates the optimal lower-level decision to various problem parameters. It says that 
all funds are allocated optimally if the LD has a lower preference for equity  Lltb b and 
all funds are allocated proportionally if it has a higher preference for equity  Lutb b . 
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We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level resource 
allocation problem. 
Proposition 4.2: For problem LIA with three sub-populations: 
(i) If L
ltb b then * 0r  at the lower level regardless of f. LIA  is independent of f and 
any f is optimal. Thus,   * 1*LIA r f Bh .  
(ii) If L
utb b then * 1r  at the lower level regardless of f.   khfBIAL  11  and 
0*f is optimal. Thus,     * 1*LIA r f B h k  . 
(iii) If L L
lt utb b b  then any *
L
tf f  is optimal, resulting in 0
* r and
  * 1*LIA r f Bh . 
(iv) Z = B.           ∎ 
Part (i) of Proposition 4.2 says that any level of incentive is optimal if the coefficient of 
r in the lower-level linear utility function is less than L
ltb . In this case, the LD will always 
choose to allocate the entire budget optimally even without incentives from the upper-
level and will therefore receive maximum budget. Part (ii) says that if the coefficient of 
r is greater than L
utb , then the LD will always allocate all funds proportionally, 
regardless of any incentives. Since IA is decreasing in f, it is optimal to set * 0f  . This 
results in the lower-level receiving the maximum possible budget. Part (iii) says that the 
level of incentive provided should be greater than L
tf  if the coefficient of r is in 
between L
utb and
L
ltb . For b between these levels, a choice of incentive above
L
tf will 
ensure optimal allocation and the LD will receive entire budget B. 
This may have implications for LD about revealing their preferences for proportional 
allocation. A feasible amount of incentive may help the UD to encourage the LD for 
doing optimal allocation. However, if the LD strongly prefers proportional or optimal 
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allocation then would always choose to allocate proportionally or optimally even with or 
without incentives. 
4.3.2 Multiplicative Utility Function 
We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the lower-level resource 
allocation problem when a multiplicative utility function is used. First, we define three 
terms.
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Proposition 4.3: For problem ML  with three populations,  * min ,1lr r .  ∎ 
Corollary 4.2: 
i) If M
tb b then 
a. If 
10
M
tf f   then 
* 1r  . 
b. If 
1 1
M
tf f   then 
1*  lrr . 
ii) If M
tb b then 
1*  lrr .        ∎ 
Proposition 4.3 says that either all or a fraction  0 1lr  of the funds are reserved for 
proportional allocation. Corollary 4.2 gives threshold conditions under which each result 
is optimal.  
The multiplicative utility function has similarities with the linear utility function. In both 
cases, a UD can use incentives to encourage the LD allocate to the budget optimally. In 
addition, in both cases there are situations where the lower-level will always choose to 
kh
ck
bMt


1
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allocate proportionally  * 1r  . We next present results for the upper-level when the LD 
has a multiplicative utility function. 
Proposition 4.4: For problem MIA with three populations: 
(i) If 
M
tb b then 
a) * 0f  is optimal if 
1 th h , resulting in * 1r  at the lower-level and 
   * 1*MIA r B h k  . 
b) * 1f  is optimal if
1 th h , resulting in * 1
lr r  at the lower-level and 
    * 1* 1 l lMIA r B r h r k   . 
(ii) If 
M
tb b then * 1f  is optimal, resulting in * 1
lr r  at the lower-level and
    * 1* 1 l lMIA r B r h r k   .        ∎ 
Part i-a of Proposition 4.4 says that no incentive is given if the exponent of r in the 
lower-level multiplicative utility function is greater than M
tb and infections averted/$ in 
program 1 are lower than a threshold th . In this case, the UD may not provide any 
incentive if the LD have higher preference for proportional allocation and less infections 
are averted/$ in the region. The LD will choose to allocate the entire budget 
proportionally without incentives and will receive the budget B. Part i-b says that 
maximum incentive is given if the exponent of r in the lower-level multiplicative utility 
function is greater than M
tb and infections averted/$ in program 1 are higher than a 
threshold th . In this case, the UD may provide full incentive if the LD have higher 
preference for proportional allocation and higher infections are averted/$ in the region. 
The LD will choose to allocate optimally with incentives and will receive  1 lB r . Part 
(ii) says that maximum incentive is optimal if the coefficient of r in the lower-level 
multiplicative utility function is less than M
tb . The LD will choose to allocate optimally 
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with incentives. Since IA is increasing in f it is optimal to set * 1f  . This results in the 
LD receiving a fraction of the budget,  1 lB r .  
Implications for the LD with multiplicative utility function are similar to that with the 
linear utility function. Incentives may help to maximize the total infections averted/$ 
invested. Maximum incentives could be provided to the LD with higher preference for 
proportional allocation and higher infections averted/$ in the region which may result in 
optimal allocation. However, no incentive could be provided to the LD with higher 
preference for proportional allocation and less infections averted/$ in the region in order 
to maximize the total infections averted/$. This may result in proportional allocation of 
the entire budget. Maximum incentives could be given to the LD with less preference 
for proportional allocation since it may switch from proportional to optimal allocation 
with incentives. 
4.4. Example 
We illustrate with an example. We used data for California from Zaric and Brandeau 
[26] and the California Department of Public Health [35]. We assumed three risk groups 
(m=3): injection drug users (IDUs), i = 1, heterosexuals (HET) , i = 2, and men who 
have sex with men (MSM) , i = 3. Risk group 1 consists of 17,759 IDUs, risk group 2 
consists of 12,167 HET, and risk group 3 consists of 121,128 MSM. We estimated the 
potential cost and effectiveness of interventions in each population by calculating the 
number of infections averted per dollar invested using a formula published elsewhere 
[9] as 0.00012, 0.000046, and 0.0000088, in risk groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We 
estimate that approximately $35,512,626 of the CDC’s $297,049,344 budget is allocated 
to California [36].  
4.4.1 Linear Utility Function 
To estimate a, b, and c, in the lower-level linear utility function we set 1b  and 
assumed  0LU r  = γ and  1LU r  = 1, 0 1   (i.e., we assumed that, given a 
choice between no equity and all equity, the decision-maker prefers all equity). In the 
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base case we assumed that γ = 0.5. This resulted in estimates of a =0.00000004, b = 1, 
and c = 0.0004. 
Figure 4.1 shows the value of 
L
tf for budget ranging from $10 million to $50 million 
and three lines represent three different values of c relative to the base case estimates. 
Since
L
tf is decreasing in B, as the budget increases the LD will choose optimal 
allocation for a smaller incentive. When the budget is large enough, 
L
tf = 0, suggesting 
that no incentive is needed. When the budget is small, 
L
tf > 1, suggesting that 
proportional allocation is always chosen. The threshold 
L
tf is decreasing in c, implying 
that the lower-level will choose optimal allocation for a larger budget and higher 
number of HIV infections averted/$ in a program.  
Figure 4.2 contains two graphs showing 
L
utb and 
L
ltb for different values of a and c. The 
two lines divide each graph into three regions defined by the optimal lower-level 
decision. The topmost region in each graph corresponds to a region where the LD will 
always choose to allocate the entire budget proportionally regardless of the incentive 
provided. The lowermost region in both graphs shows the region where the LD will 
always choose to allocate entire budget optimally regardless of the incentive provided. 
The middle region in both the graphs shows that the LD may choose to allocate 
optimally depending on the incentive and total budget. The threshold 
L
utb is increasing in 
c and a. That is, the topmost region is decreasing in c and a suggesting that the LD is 
less likely to choose proportional allocation as its preferences for the budget and the 
number of infections averted increases. In Figure 4.2a, the threshold 
L
ltb is increasing in c 
and in the second graph, is constant in a. That is, the lowermost region is increasing in c 
and constant in a suggesting that the LD is most likely to choose optimal allocation as 
its preferences for the number of infections averted increases and the choice of 
allocating optimally does not depend on the budget received.  
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Figure 4.3 shows the value of 
L
tf for budget ranging from $10 million to $50 million. 
The graph has three lines for three different values of 1n  relative to the base case 
estimate. The threshold value 
L
tf is decreasing in B and 1n , meaning that the lower-level 
will choose optimal allocation even for a small incentive if the size of the risk group 
with highest number of infections averted per dollar invested is small and the budget 
received from the upper-level is high. The threshold 
L
tf is less than one for 1n at half the 
base case and reaches zero for B equal to $20 million. Thus, for a large budget the LD 
may choose to allocate optimally. The threshold
L
tf is less than one for B less than $14 
million and base case 1n and zero for B greater than $30 million. This suggests that for 
larger budget and larger risk group with highest number of infections averted per dollar 
no incentive is needed to encourage optimality. 
Figure 4.4 contains two graphs showing linear utility function for different values of r 
and the three lines in each graph represents three different values of f. In the first graph, 
if the coefficient of r in the linear utility function is less than 
L
ltb then the utility function 
gets maximized at r = 0, suggesting that the LD with less preferences for equity may 
choose optimal allocation. In the second graph, if the lower-level has high preference for 
equity then it may choose proportional allocation even with incentives.  
4.4.2 Multiplicative Utility Function 
To estimate a, b, and c, in the lower-level multiplicative utility function we set 1a b 
and assumed  0LU r  = γ and  1LU r  = 1, 0 1   (i.e., we assumed that, given a 
choice between no equity and all equity, the decision-maker prefers all equity). This 
resulted in estimates of a =1, b = 1, and c = 2.584. 
Figure 4.5 shows that r* is non-increasing in f. As the incentive provided increases, a 
non-increasing fraction of the funds are reserved for proportional allocation. As long as,
1 1
M
tf  , incentives from the upper-level can be used to improve the outcomes. 
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Figure 4.6 contains three graphs showing total infection averted for different values of f 
for the case i-a)
M
tb b , 1 th h , i-b)
M
tb b , 1 th h , and ii)
M
tb b of Proposition 4.4. In the 
first and the second graph, total infected averted decreases in f for
10,
M
tf f   and 
increases in f for  1 ,1Mtf f   . However, the total infections averted in the first graph are 
maximized at * 0f  and in the second graph at * 1f  . This suggests that if the LD 
prefers proportional allocation above a threshold then no incentive is given if the 
infections averted/$ in the program is less than a threshold, however, full incentive is 
given if the infections averted/$ in the program is above a threshold in order to 
maximize total infected averted. In the second graph, total infected averted increases in f 
for all f. Thus, if the LD prefers proportional allocation below a threshold then 
maximum incentives should be provided. 
Figure 4.7 shows multiplicative utility function for different values of r and the three 
lines in the graph represents three different values of f. As the incentives increase, the 
LD’s utility function is maximized at an interior point suggesting that the lower-level 
chooses to allocate optimally. This implies that as the incentives increase, the LD 
chooses to allocate optimally, however, switches to proportional allocation if no 
incentives are provided.  
4.5. Discussion 
We considered a two-level resource allocation problem where the objective at the upper-
level is to maximize the total number of HIV infections averted and the objective at the 
lower-level is to maximize a utility function that contains terms for infections averted, 
budget, and equity. We considered two general forms for the utility function at the 
lower-level. The linear objective function is convex in the fraction of the funds reserved 
for proportional allocation and therefore the optimal allocation has either all or none of 
the funds reserved for equity. The choice of all or none depends on several factors 
including the level of the incentive provided by the upper-level and the coefficient of the 
proportional allocation term in the lower-level utility function. 
The possible way to implement this model in practice is that the UD chooses f and the 
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LD chooses r and jy , then the upper-level directly allocates the funds to program j so 
there is no opportunity for the LD to reneg on its plan. 
Our analysis suggests that incentives may not be needed if the LD strongly prefers 
optimal allocation as it would always choose to allocate optimally even without 
incentives. For a larger budget and higher number of HIV infections averted/$ in a 
program, the LD may always prefer optimal allocation. Further, for the larger budget 
and bigger size of the risk group with highest number of infections averted/$ no 
incentive is needed to encourage optimality. However, incentives might be very 
beneficial if the LD has less preference for optimal allocation since it may switch from 
optimal to proportional allocation without incentives.  
The function  1Z B rf   incorporating the LD’s concerns about equity and upper-
levels choice about the strength of incentive is proposed to help demonstrate the 
significance of incentives in encouraging optimal allocation of HIV prevention funds. 
However, different incentive schemes could be developed. Our analysis can be 
generalized for different incentive schemes by adjusting for the upper and lower-level 
utility functions. Further, the paper looks at a type of incentive. Other types of 
incentives based on quality or performance could be considered. Recognition of the LDs 
who are making optimal allocation decisions by the UD or introducing rebate which is 
paid by the LD to the UD if he is unable to prevent targeted number of new infections 
can also be considered.  
We are not aware of any information specifying functional forms for the utility 
functions of the regional-level decision maker in practice. However, our analysis has 
demonstrated the value of such information to the UD This research is first step in 
generation of such utility functions that includes significant components that are trivial 
at the lower level. The results of this evaluation will be useful for policy makers in order 
to put forward a useful incentive scheme to promote optimal decisions at the lower-
level.  
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We considered a single region at the lower-level. However, it could be extended to 
multiple regions. A short time horizon model was considered which does not 
incorporate epidemic dynamics. Models for longer time horizons could be developed. 
These would need to consider epidemic dynamics and may lead to different allocation 
decisions. We assumed that benefits of intervention scale linearly with respect to 
amounts invested. This assumption is common in cost effectiveness analysis but may 
not always be valid. We assumed that there is no upper limit on amount invested in the 
programs. However, in the presence of comprehensive information regarding the upper 
limit on the amount to be invested in the program, decision-makers can invest the 
amount equal to the upper limit to the program preventing highest number of infections, 
then to the program preventing second highest number of infections and so on. The 
remaining budget can then be withheld for future use. The information regarding the 
upper limit on the amount to be invested in the program can be incorporated into the 
model and decisions can be made accordingly. 
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Figure 4.1: Threshold Ltf versus budget for different values of c (coefficient of the total 
infections averted). Three lines are shown corresponding to the base case value of c, c/2, 
and 2c.  
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Figure 4.2: Threshold values Lutb and 
L
ltb for different values of a, b, and c.  
 
Figure 4.2a: Threshold values Lutb and 
L
ltb for different values of b and c.  
 
Figure 4.2b: Threshold values Lutb and 
L
ltb for different values of a and b. 
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Figure 4.3: Threshold Ltf versus budget for different values of 1n ( the size of the risk 
group with highest number of infections averted). 
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Figure 4.4: Utility function versus r. 
 
Figure 4.4a: Linear utility function  LU r versus r for 
L
ltb b . 
 
Figure 4.4b: Linear utility function  LU r versus r for 
L
utb b . 
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Figure 4.5: Optimal value r* versus f. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
r*
f
* 1lr r   * 1r   
1
M
tf  
77 
 
Figure 4.6: Total infections averted versus f . 
 
Figure 4.6a: Total infections averted versus f for the case Mtb b and 1 th h . 
 
Figure 4.6b: Total infections averted versus f for the case Mtb b and 1 th h . 
 
Figure 4.6c: Total infections averted versus f for the case Mtb b . 
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Figure 4.7: Multiplicative utility function  MU r versus r. 
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Chapter 5 
Optimal Incentives for HIV Prevention Funds Allocation under 
Asymmetric Information 
5.1. Introduction 
Resource allocation models often require cost and effectiveness data on the results of an 
intervention or the number of infections prevented by an intervention. However, these 
data may not be available in practice due to several reasons including context-specific 
data requirements of a model, missing data, and lack of tools to collect the necessary 
information [1]. The Compendium of HIV/AIDS Prevention Interventions published by 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lists effectiveness of various 
interventions. However, cost estimates are not listed [2]. Various parameters such as the 
preferences for equity-based allocation, resources expended at the regional level, 
infections prevented per dollar, and utilization of resources from various other sources at 
the regional level may be known at the regional level, but unknown at the national level 
[3].  
Donors, advocacy groups, or regional-level decision-makers may have preferences for 
distributing the prevention funds based on equity. However, these preferences are often 
unknown to the national-level decision-maker. For example, Bautista-Arredondo et al. 
reviewed data from developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America on the 
allocation of HIV/AIDS prevention funds and found that the regional-level decision-
makers often prefer equity-based heuristics [4].  
If incentives are provided by the national-level decision-maker to the regional-level 
decision- makers to reveal information, then this may lead to an optimal resource 
allocation. Lasry et al. modeled a two-level decision-making process and evaluated the 
impact of optimal versus simple allocation techniques by comparing four allocation 
strategies. They showed that if optimization modeling is to be applied at only one level of 
the decision-making process, then it is more beneficial to apply it at the lower level than 
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at the upper level, and they concluded that the upper-level decision-maker should develop 
incentives to encourage an optimal allocation at the lower-levels [5]. Zaric and Brandeau 
extended this work to include multiple regions and various sub-populations and compared 
optimal and proportional (in proportion to HIV incidences) allocation strategies using 
data from 40 U.S. states and three risk groups and obtained similar conclusions [6]. 
Malvankar and Zaric extended this work by developing an incentive scheme for a multi-
level decision-making process if complete information is available at both the national 
and the regional levels [7]. We expand on the work of Malvankar and Zaric by modeling 
information asymmetry in the HIV/AIDS prevention funds allocation process. 
Information asymmetry in a resource allocation process can occur if regional-level 
decision- makers possess superior information compared to the national-level decision-
maker. In the fiscal federalism literature, decision-makers at the regional level often 
allocate resources based on regional preferences which may not be known to the decision-
makers at the national level [8, 9]. Therefore, fiscal federalism under asymmetric 
information often leads to ambiguity in outcomes [10, 11].  
Bossert and Beauvais used a principal-agent framework in which the Ministry of Health 
acts as the principal and the municipal and regional governments act as agents [12]. The 
local agents often have their own preferences and respond to local donors and advocacy 
groups which may have different preferences than those of the principal. The authors 
showed that diverse mechanisms are employed by the principal such as providing 
incentives, monitoring, reporting, and performance reviews to achieve the objective 
regarding the optimal allocation of resources.  
Some studies examine incentives in cases of asymmetric information in health care 
resource allocation. Peterson et al. reviewed studies assessing the impact of financial 
incentives on improving health care quality under symmetric and asymmetric information 
systems [13]. Gurnani et al. investigated the impact of incentives in a two-echelon 
healthcare supply chain model [14]. They found that the cost structure and uncertainty in 
market demand govern the nature of incentives for sharing information among members 
of the supply chain. McKenna et al. developed a two-stage stochastic programming model 
for a health care resource allocation problem to evaluate different budgets and budgetary 
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policies [15]. There are many other examples of research on incentives under asymmetric 
information in health care resource allocation [16-19]. However, we are not aware of any 
incentive-based models developed by modeling information asymmetry in an HIV/AIDS 
resource allocation process.  
In this paper, we model information asymmetry in a multi-level HIV/AIDS resource 
allocation process in which an upper-level decision-maker (UD) allocates funds to a 
single lower-level decision-maker (LD) who then allocates funds to two programs. Our 
study attempts to answer the following questions. What is the impact of incentives if the 
preferences of the LD about equity-based (proportional) allocation are unknown to the 
UD? Or What is the impact of incentives if the infections prevented per dollar at the 
lower level are unknown to the UD? The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 introduces the model. Section 3 provides a mathematical analysis of the proposed model 
and Section 4 provides a numerical example. Conclusions and extensions are discussed in 
Section 5. 
5.2. Model Formulation 
We develop a single period model of a two-level decision-making process similar to the 
model of Malvankar and Zaric [7]. There is an upper-level decision-maker (UD) using an 
incentive scheme to encourage a single lower-level decision maker (LD) to allocate 
limited resources optimally under asymmetric information. 
We consider two sources of information asymmetry. In case 1, the preferences of the LD 
about allocating HIV/AIDS prevention funds based on equity are unknown to the UD. In 
case 2, the number of infections prevented per dollar in a program is known to the LD, 
but unknown to the UD.  
We assume that with probability p, the LD is of a high type and with probability q, where 
q = 1 - p, the LD is of a low type. In case 1, a high type LD has higher preferences, 
represented as
Hb for allocating HIV/AIDS prevention funds based on equity and a low 
type LD has lower preferences, represented as , .
L H Lb b b  Similarly in case 2, a high 
type LD has higher number of infections prevented per dollar, represented as 2
Hh , in a 
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program and a low type LD has a lower number of infections prevented per dollar, 
represented as 2
Lh , in a program, 2 2
H Lh h .  
The LD chooses  0 1ij ijr r  , 1,2i  , where i represents the case, and ,j H L , where, 
H represents high type and L represents low type LD in a case. The LD distributes 
amount , 1,2my m   to program m. As in Zaric and Brandeau [6], we assume that one 
program is available for each risk group, that the programs do not interact, and that the 
costs and benefits scale linearly. Similar to Malvankar and Zaric [7], we assume that the 
UD has a total budget B, chooses a fraction f , 0 1f   and allocates an amount Z to the 
LD using the following equation: 
   1ij ijZ r B r f  .         (5.1) 
According to equation (1), the amount received by LD decreases with the decrease with f 
and decrease with ijr is an incentive scheme developed in Malvankar and Zaric [7]. 
This is a dynamic programming problem with the following time sequence: the UD 
chooses f ; then the LD chooses
ijr  for the given value of f ; then the LD determines my for 
the given values of f and
ijr . We solve this problem using backward induction and present 
the details in a reverse time sequence. 
5.2.1 The Lower-level Model  
Stage 3: The model developed in this stage is similar to that of Zaric and Brandeau [6] 
and Malvankar and Zaric [7]. Let , 1,2mh m  be the number of HIV infections prevented 
per dollar invested in a program m. Let
mn be the size of the risk group m and 1 2N n n  . 
The total number of HIV infections averted, IA , is given by the following equation: 
1 1 2 2IA h y h y  ,         (5.2) 
In the last step of the dynamic program, given 
ijr and f , the total number of infections 
averted is found by solving the following linear programming problem: 
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1 2
1 1 2 2max 
y ,y
IA h y h y           (5.3)
 
 1 2S.t.   1 ijy y Z B r f   
 
       (5.4) 
j
j ij
n
y r Z
N
 , 1,2j           (5.5) 
This is a Knapsack LP and easily solved. The solution depends on the case.  
Case 1 
2
1 ij
n
y Z r Z
N
  , 
2
2 ij
n
y r Z
N
 . Thus,  
      1 1 1 1 1 11 ,j j j jIA r Z h r k B r f h r k          (5.6) 
where, , ,j H L   21 2
n
k h h
N
  and 
1h k . 
Case 2 
In case 2, the solution depends on the type at the lower level. For the high type LD,
  
1
1 ij
n
y r Z
N
 , 
1
2 ij
n
y Z r Z
N
  . Thus,  
      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21H HH H H HIA r Z h r k B r f h r k      with probability p  (5.7) 
where,   12 2 1H
n
k h h
N
  and 2 2
Hh k  or  
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For the low type LD,
  
2
1 ij
n
y Z r Z
N
  , 
2
2 ij
n
y r Z
N
 . Thus,  
      2 1 2 1 2 1 2 11L L L LIA r Z h r k B r f h r k      with probability q   (5.8) 
where,   21 1 2L
n
k h h
N
  and 
1 1h k . 
Stage 2: In the second step, the LD chooses
ijr to maximize his utility function. We use the 
model developed in Malvankar and Zaric [7] at the lower-level in which equity is 
captured through
ijr , efficiency is captured through  ijIA r , and funds received as  ijZ r . 
We investigate two different forms for the utility function, linear and multiplicative, 
 L ijU r  and  M ijU r , given for each case below, 
Case 1 
     1 1 1 1jL j j j jU r aZ r b r cIA r          (5.9) 
or  
         1 1 1 1
ja cb
M j j j jU r Z r r IA r        (5.10) 
Case 2 
     2 2 2 2L j j j jU r aZ r br cIA r          (5.11) 
or  
         2 2 2 2
a cb
M j j j jU r Z r r IA r        (5.12) 
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In the case of  L ijU r , the parameters , , , , 0H La b b b c  represent the relative weights 
applied to funds received, equity, and infections averted. In the case of  M ijU r , the 
parameters , , , , 0H La b b b c  are exponents of budget, equity, and infections averted. 
Depending on which utility function is used, the lower-level optimization problem is 
written as: 
 : max
ij
iL L ij
r
L U r          (5.13) 
or 
 : max
ij
iM M ij
r
L U r
  
       (5.14) 
s.t.    0 1  ijr           (5.15) 
The LD solves
iLL or iML to obtain  *ijr f . 
5.2.2 The Upper-level Model  
Stage 1: Similar to Zaric and Brandeau and Malvankar and Zaric, we assume that the 
objective at the upper level is to maximize the number of infections averted [6, 20]. Thus, 
the upper-level resource allocation problem is:  
  : Max E *iL ij
f
IA IA r f       
    (5.16) 
or 
  : Max E *iM ij
f
IA IA r f  
        (5.17)
 
   S.t.   0 1 f           (5.18)
 
   * argmax ij i ijr f U r        (5.19) 
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where,   E *ijIA r f   in each case is given below, 
Case 1 
        1 1 1 1 1 1E * 1 1ij H H L LIA r f B r f h r k p B r f h r k q           (5.20) 
Case 2 
        2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1E * 1 1ij H H H L LIA r f B r f h r k p B r f h r k q           (5.21) 
5.3. Analysis  
In this section, we analyze the optimization problem for both utility functions for the two 
cases of asymmetric information.  
5.3.1 Case 1 
We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
resource allocation problem when the LD has a linear utility function and the preferences 
of the lower level to allocate based on equity are unknown to the UD.  
Proposition 5.1: For problem 
1LIA with two sub-populations: 
(a) If H bL
utb b ,
bL L bL
lt utb b b  ,
bL
tp p then * 0f  is optimal, resulting in 1 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
   1 ,E IA B h k   and  LOE 1 .p Bk   
(b) If H bL
utb b ,
bL L bL
lt utb b b  ,
bL
tp p then 2*
bL
tf f is optimal, resulting in 1 * 1,Hr 
1 * 0,Lr   
    2 1 11 ,bLtE IA B f h k p Bh q    and  2 1LOE .
bL
tpBf h k   
(c) Otherwise, LOE is zero.        ∎ 
Part (a) of Proposition 5.1 states that no incentive is provided if a high type LD has 
preferences to allocate the budget based on equity are higher than bL
utb , a low type LD has 
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preferences between bL
ltb and 
bL
utb , and the probability that a LD is of a high type is higher 
than bL
tp then the loss of efficiency (LOE) is  1 p Bk compared to the full information 
case. This suggests that if there is a high probability that a LD is of a high type and that 
the LD has preferences for allocating the budget based on equity then no incentive is 
given since the LD will choose to allocate proportionally even with incentives. There is a 
LOE which increases with the decrease in the probability that a LD is of high type since if 
the LD is of low type then an optimal allocation can be encourage by giving incentives. 
Part (b) states that an 
2
bL
tf level of incentive is optimal if a high type LD has preferences to 
allocate the budget based on equity higher than bL
utb , a low type LD has preferences 
between bL
ltb and 
bL
utb , and the probability that a LD is of high type is lower than 
bL
tp then 
the LOE is  2 1
bL
tpBf h k  
compared to the full information case. In this case, if the LD is 
of high type then this person will always choose to allocate the entire budget based on 
equity even with incentives and, if the LD is of low type, then that person can be 
encouraged by providing incentives to allocate the entire budget optimally. If the 
probability that a LD will be of low type is high, then incentives should be given to 
encourage optimal allocation. On comparing this case with a full information case, there 
is a LOE incurred at the upper level. The LOE increases with the increase in the budget, 
level of the incentive provided, the probability that the LD is of high type, and the number 
of infections prevented per dollar in a program at the lower-level. This implies that if the 
UD provides more and more incentives to the LD and if the LD is of low type then 
incentives will encourage an optimal allocation. However, if the LD is of high type then 
that person will always choose to allocate the resources based on equity even with high 
incentives and thus, providing more financial incentives will result in a loss at the upper 
level. Part (c) states that in the other cases specified in Table 5.4 in Appendix 9, the loss 
of efficiency is zero. 
Table 5.4 shows that for a high or a low type LD, if the preferences to allocate the budget 
based on equity are lower than a set threshold, then regardless of incentives, the LD 
would choose to allocate optimally. However, if the preferences are higher than a set 
threshold, then the LD would choose to allocate proportionally and no incentive is given. 
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If the LD has moderate preferences for allocating the budget based on equity, then an 
incentive is given to encourage an optimal allocation. Some cases cannot exist since 
H Lb b . 
We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
resource allocation problem when the LD has a multiplicative utility function and the 
preferences of the lower level to allocate based on equity are unknown to the UD.  
Proposition 5.2: For problem
1MIA with two sub-populations, under various conditions the 
LOE is specified in Table 5.2, otherwise, LOE is zero.    ∎ 
Table 5.2 shows that if there is a high probability that the LD is of a high type and a 
higher number of infections are prevented per dollar, then full incentives are given so that 
the LD will choose to allocate optimally even with higher preferences for allocating the 
budget based on equity. In this case, the LOE decreases with the increase in the 
probability that the LD is of high type since higher infections are prevented. Further, no 
incentive is given if fewer infections are prevented per dollar since both types of LDs will 
choose to allocate based on equity even with incentives. In this case there will be a loss of 
efficiency which will depend on the budget, the probability that the LD is of high type, 
and the number of infections prevented per dollar. In other cases specified in Tables 5.5 
in Appendix 9, the loss of efficiency is zero. 
Table 5.5 states that if both the LDs have fewer preferences to allocate the budget based 
on equity then full incentives are provided so that entire budget is allocated optimally. 
Further, if both the LDs have higher preferences to allocate the budget based on equity 
and there is a high probability that the LD is of high type then also full incentives are 
provided to encourage optimal allocation. However, in this case there is a loss of 
efficiency. 
5.3.2 Case 2 
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We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
resource allocation problem when the LD has a linear utility function and the infections 
prevented per dollar at the lower level are unknown to the UD.  
Proposition 5.3: For problem 
2LIA with two sub-populations: 
(a) If 
2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  , 1 2
hL
th h ,
hL
tp p then 1*
hL
tf f is optimal, resulting in 2 * 0,Hr  2 * 1,Lr   
    2 1 1 11 ,H hLtE IA Bh p B f h k q     and    1 1 1LOE 1 .
hL
tp Bf h k    
(b) If 
2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  , 1 2
hL
th h ,
hL
tp p then * 0f  is optimal, resulting in 2 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
     2 2 1 1 ,HE IA B h k p B h k q     and 2LOE .pBk  
(c) Otherwise, LOE is zero.        ∎ 
Part (a) of Proposition 5.3 states that the 
1
hL
tf level of incentive is optimal if a high type 
LD has the number of infections prevented per dollar between 
2
hL
th and 1
hL
th , a low type LD 
has the infections prevented per dollar below
2
hL
th , and the probability that a LD is of high 
type is higher than hL
tp then the loss of efficiency is    1 1 11
hL
tp Bf h k  . In this case, the 
LD with a moderate number of infections prevented per dollar can be encouraged to 
allocate the budget optimally by providing a suitable level of incentives. Further, with a 
high probability that the LD is of high type, the LOE decreases. If the LD has fewer 
infections prevented/dollar, then even with incentives the LD would choose to allocate 
based on equity. The LOE increases with the increase in the budget, infections prevented 
per dollar, and the level of incentives, and decreases with the increase in the probability 
that the LD is of high type. In this case, providing more financial incentives will result in 
a loss of efficiency at the upper level. 
Part (b) says that no incentive is given if a high type LD has infections prevented per 
dollar between 
2
hL
th and 1
hL
th , a low type LD has infections prevented per dollar below 2
hL
th , 
and the probability that a LD is of high type is lower than hL
tp then the loss of efficiency is 
2pBk . In this case, no incentive is given because both the LD, whether of a high or low 
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type, would always choose to allocate the entire budget based on equity even with 
incentives. Thus, where there is a lower probability that a LD will be of high type, no 
incentive is given to prevent a maximum number of infections. There is a loss of 
efficiency (LOE) incurred at the upper level. This loss is reduced to zero when the 
probability that the LD is of a high type is zero. The LOE increases with an increase in 
the budget and infections prevented per dollar are at the lower-level. Part (c) states that in 
other cases specified in Tables 5.6 in Appendix 9, the loss of efficiency is zero. 
Table 5.6 shows that for both types of LDs, if higher number of infections is prevented 
per dollar, then both the LDs will choose to allocate optimal regardless of the incentive 
given. Further, if moderate infections are prevented per dollar in both regions then 
incentive will encourage optimal allocation and both the LDs will allocate optimally. 
However, no incentives are given if 1 of the LD has higher number of infections 
prevented per dollar and the other LD has fewer infections prevented per dollar since the 
LD with higher infections prevented will always choose to allocate optimally and the LD 
with fewer infections prevented will always choose to allocate proportionally. 
We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
resource allocation problem when the LD has a linear utility function and the infections 
prevented per dollar at the lower level are unknown to the UD.  
Proposition 5.4: For problem
2MIA with two sub-populations, under various conditions the 
LOE is specified in Table 5.3, otherwise, LOE is zero.    ∎ 
Table 5.3 states that full incentives are provided if there is a high probability that the LD 
is of a high type and a higher number of infections are prevented per dollar. In this case, 
entire budget will be allocated optimally preventing maximum infections. If there is a low 
probability that the LD is of high type and a moderate number of infections are prevented 
per dollar then full incentives are given to prevent maximum infections. However, no 
incentive is given if there is a low probability that the LD is of high type and higher 
number of infections is prevented per dollar. In all the cases described above, there will 
be a loss of efficiency when we compare the results in those achieved in the full 
information case. This loss will depend on the budget, the probability that the LD is of a 
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high type, and the number of infections prevented per dollar. In other cases specified in 
Tables 5.7 in Appendix 9, the loss of efficiency is zero. 
Table 5.7 shows that if fewer infections are prevented per dollar in both the regions then 
full incentive is given to encourage both the LDs to choose optimal allocation. In this 
case, there is no loss of efficiency. However, if higher infections are prevented per dollar 
in both the regions then no incentive is given if there is a low probability that the LD is of 
high type. Since, it will result in a loss of efficiency. 
5.4. Example 
We illustrate with an example from Malvankar and Zaric (2008). We assumed two risk 
groups: injection drug users (IDUs), i = 1 and heterosexuals (HET), i = 2, where risk 
group 1 consists of 17,759 IDUs and risk group 2 consists of 12,167 HET. We use the 
estimated number of infections averted per dollar published in Malvankar and Zaric 
(2008) as 0.00012 and 0.000046 in risk groups 1 and 2, respectively, and approximately 
$35,512,626 of the CDC’s $297,049,344 budget is allocated to California [20, 21]. 
To estimate a, b, and c, we assume that a = 1 - b - c in the lower-level utility functions 
and the preferences for infections averted per dollar (c) is 0.1. In case 1, we assume that 
preferences of the LD for allocating the budget based on equity can be as high as 0.8 with 
a probability of 0.7p  (i.e. we assumed that, the LD often prefers equity) and as low as 
0.2 with a probability 0.3q  . In case 2, we set the number of infections averted per 
dollar in risk group 2 as high as twice that of 0.000046 with probability 0.4p  (i.e. we 
assumed that since the LD often prefers equity, it is rare that a high number of infections 
is averted), as low as half of 0.000046 with probability 0.6q  , and
0.8 0.2
0.5
2
b

  . In 
case 3, we assume 0.8, 0.2,H Lb b   2 2 0.000046 ,Hh  and 2 0.000046 / 2,Lh  1 0.7,p 
2 0.4.p   
Figure 5.1 consists of 3 graphs showing the total number of HIV infections averted for a 
budget ranging from $20 million to $80 million and the two lines in each graph represent 
two cases, full and asymmetric information when the preferences of the LD for allocating 
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the budget based on equity are unknown to the UD and LD has a linear utility function. 
The 3 graphs correspond to three different values of 
1h relative to the base case estimates. 
In all, the 3 graphs show the difference between the number of HIV infections averted in 
full and asymmetric information case. The difference increases as the budget increases. 
This shows that when the budget is higher, fewer infections are averted under asymmetric 
information compared to full information. In the first graph, when the budget is small 
enough, B = $20 million, and 
1h is half the base case value, then the difference between 
the number of infections averted in full and asymmetric information cases is negligible. 
On the other hand, in the third graph, the difference between the number of infections 
averted in full and asymmetric information cases is highest when the budget is highest, B 
= $80 million, and 
1h is twice the base case value. This implies that when infections 
prevented per dollar are higher LOE is higher. 
Figure 5.2 consists of 3 graphs showing the total number of HIV infections averted for a 
budget ranging from $20 million to $80 million and the two lines in each graph represents 
two cases, full and asymmetric information under a linear lower-level utility function 
when the infections averted per dollar are unknown to the UD. The 3 graphs correspond 
to three different values of b  relative to the base case estimates. In the case of 
information asymmetry, fewer infections are averted compared to the full information 
case when preferences for allocating the budget based on equity are lower, as shown in 
the first graph. If complete information is available and the preferences for allocating the 
budget based on equity are higher, then even with incentives the LD will choose to 
allocate the entire budget based on equity then the number of infections averted in full 
and asymmetric information cases is almost similar as shown in the third graph. However, 
infections averted in the third graph are lower compared to the first graph under 
asymmetric information. This suggests that, when preferences for allocating the budget 
based on equity are higher, then a lower number of infections are averted and the LOE is 
less. 
Figure 5.3 contains two graphs. The first graph shows the number of expected infections 
averted for the different values of p in cases 1 and 2, where p is the probability that LD is 
of a high type having higher preferences for allocating the budget based on equity in case 
96 
 
1 and a higher number of infections averted per dollar in case 2. The expected number of 
infections prevented
 
is decreasing in p for case 1 and is increasing in p for case 2. This 
suggests that the number of expected infections prevented increase with the increase in 
the probability. 
Figure 5.4 shows the expected number of infections averted for the budget ranging from 
$20 million to $80 million and the 3 lines represent different values of N relative to the 
base case estimates. The difference between Since  E IA is increasing in B and N, as the 
budget and total size of the risk groups increases, the number of infections prevented per 
dollar in each of the 3 cases increases. 
5.5. Discussion 
We considered asymmetric information in a two-level HIV prevention funds allocation 
process in which the first case of information asymmetry is about preferences for 
allocating the budget based on equity which are unknown to the UD. The second case is 
about the number of infections prevented per dollar in a program which are known to the 
LD, but unknown to the UD. Similar to Malvankar and Zaric (2008) we assume that the 
objective at the upper level is to maximize the total number of HIV/AIDS infections 
averted and that the objective at the lower level is to maximize a utility function. We 
considered a linear and a multiplicative form of the utility function for each type of 
information asymmetry. 
Our numerical analysis suggests that incentives can encourage an optimal allocation 
under asymmetric information. However, there is a loss of efficiency when we compare 
an asymmetric information case with a full information case. Under various conditions in 
two different cases, the LOE increase with the increase in the budget and the size of the 
risk group. As the budget increases, fewer infections are averted under asymmetric 
information compared to full information. LOE also depends on the difference between 
the number of infections prevented per dollar in both risk groups. If preferences about 
allocating the budget based on equity are higher regardless of the type of LD, then the 
LOE is lower. As the preferences of the LD to prevent infections increase, the difference 
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between the numbers of infections averted in full and asymmetric information cases 
decreases. 
If full information is available about the effectiveness of various interventions, the 
number of infections prevented per dollar invested in a region, and the total size of the 
infected population, etc. is available to the UD, then the information can be used to 
formulate a feasible incentive scheme to encourage optimal allocation. However, in 
practice, there is usually missing data or incomplete or no information available to the 
UD. We consider 2 cases of asymmetric information here. Further, our model is 
generalizable when various other parameters of the utility function, for example, 
preferences regarding the budget received and the number of infections prevented is 
unknown to the UD.  
There are multiple stakeholders including donors, advocacy groups, local governments, 
non-profit organizations, and community-based organizations taking part in the decision-
making process at the lower level. Each stakeholder has its own priorities, objectives, and 
limitations (Lasry et al., 2009). We assume that there is a single decision-maker at the 
lower level. However, we also consider asymmetric information at the upper level about 
the preferences of the lower level decision-maker to allocate based on equity which can 
capture the impact that various stakeholders have in making a resource allocation decision 
about equity at the lower level that is unknown to the upper level.  
Our analysis has certain limitations. We consider only 2 cases of asymmetric information. 
In practice, there could be a number of factors impacting the decision which are unknown 
to the upper level decision-maker such as local politics, and social considerations 
including religion, human rights and values, cultural values, etc. A model incorporating 
asymmetric information about these various factors could be developed. The model thus 
developed can be complex and may lead to different allocation decisions. Here we use an 
incentive scheme developed elsewhere. However, our goal was to show the impact of 
incentives under conditions of asymmetric information. Our model can be generalized for 
other incentive schemes. We also consider a short time horizon model. In the future, we 
would like to extend our model to a more distant time horizon under information 
asymmetry. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Notations. 
 
Thresholds  1,2i   
  1 1
H
bL
t
b cBk
f
B a c h k


 
, 
  2 1
L
bL
t
b cBk
f
B a c h k


 
, 
 2 1
bL
t bL
t
k
p
k f h k

 
, 
 1
bL
utb B a ch  , 
  21 2 ,
bL
lt
n
b cB h h
N
 
 
 
   
1
1
1 2
H H
bM
t H H
b h b c k
f
a b c h a b c k
 

    
, 
 
   
1
2
1
,
2
L L
bM
t L L
b h b c k
f
a b c h a b c k
 

    
            
22 2
1 1 12 4 4 2
,
j j j j j
bM
tj
a b c h k k a b c h b c k a b c kb h k a c
h
c
             

, ,j H L  
1
1
bM
t
ck
b
h k


, 
    
     
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
,
1 1
l l
L LbM
t l l l l
H H L L
h k r h r k
p
r h r k r h r k
   

    
 
  
       
1
1 1 1
2
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
,
1 1
l l
L L L
bM
t
l l l l
L L H H L
h c
r h r k
b cp
h c
r h r k h k r h r k
b c
  

       

 
          
 1
2
1 1 14 2
.
2 2
l
j
j j j j j j
j
a b c h f b c k a b c h f b c k a b c kfb h
r
a b c kf
           

 
 
  
2
1
2 2
hL
t H
b cBk
f
B a c h k


 
, 
  
1
2
1 1
hL
t
b cBk
f
B a c h k


 
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Table 5.1: Continued. 
 
Thresholds  1,2i   
1 1
1
hL
t
Nb
h h
cBn
  , 
2
1hL
t
b
h a
c B
 
  
 
, 
3 1
2
hL
t
Nb
h h
cBn
  , 
 
 
1 1
1
2
1 1
1
2
,
1
hL
t
hL
t
hL
t
h k
f
k
p
h k
f
k



  
  21 1 2L
n
k h h
N
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  12 2 1 ,H
n
k h h
N
 
 
 
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1
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hM
t H
bh b c k
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L LhM
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p
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
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Table 5.1: Continued. 
 
Thresholds  1,2i   
  
       
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1
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Table 5.2: LOE for multiplicative utility function when preferences for allocating based on equity are unknown at the upper level. 
 
Conditions  Optimal Asymmetric LOE F AE IA E IA         
From Table 5.4 Additional 
Conditions 
f * 
1 *jr  
AE IA    
1 ,
H bM
tb b
1 ,
L bM
tb b  
1 ,
bM
tp p
1
bM bM
tH tLh h h   
1 
1 1* ,
l
H Hr r
2 2*
l
H Hr r  
  1 1 11 l lH HB r h r k p  
  1 1 11 l lL LB r h r k q   
       1 1 1 11 1 l lL Lp B h k r h r k      
1 ,
bM
tp p
1
bM bM
tL tHh h h   
     1 1 1 11 l lH HpB h k r h r k     
1 ,
H bM
tb b
1 ,
L bM
tb b  
1 ,
bM
tHh h 2
bM
tp p       1 1 1 11 l lH HpB h k r h r k     
1 ,
H bM
tb b
1 ,
L bM
tb b  
1 ,
bM
tp p
1
bM bM
tH tLh h h   
0 
1 * 1,Hr 
1 * 1Lr   
 1B h k       1 1 1 11 l lH HpB r h r k h k     
1 ,
bM
tp p
1
bM bM
tL tHh h h   
       1 1 1 11 1 l lL Lp B r h r k h k      
1 ,
H bM
tb b
1 ,
L bM
tb b  
1 ,
bM
tHh h 2
bM
tp p  1
* 1,Hr 
1 1*
l
L Lr r  
  11 L
h c
B h k p B q
b c
 

      11 1 11 1 l lL L L
h c
p B r h r k
b c
 
    
   
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Table 5.3: LOE for multiplicative utility function when infections prevented per dollar are unknown at the upper level. 
Conditions  from Table 5.2 Additional 
Conditions 
Optimal Asymmetric LOE F AE IA E IA         
f * 2 *,jr
,j H L  
AE IA    
2 1 ,
H hM
th h 2 2 ,
L hM
th h  2 3 ,
H hM
th h
1 ,
hM
tp p 1 4
hM
th h  
1 
2 2* ,
l
H Hr r
2 2* .
l
L Lr r  
 21 lHB r p 
 2 2 2H lHh r k 
 21 lLB r 
 1 2 1lLh r k q  
     2 2 2 2 2 21H l H lH HpB h k r h r k     
2 3 ,
H hM
th h
1 ,
hM
tp p 1 4
hM
th h  
       1 1 2 1 2 11 1 l lL Lp B h k r h r k    
 
2 1 ,
H hM
th h 2 2 ,
L hM
th h  2 3 ,
H hM
th h 2
hM
tp p       2 2 2 2 2 21H l H lH HpB h k r h r k   
 
2 1 ,
H hM
th h 2 2 ,
L hM
th h  1 4 ,
hM
th h 3
hM
tp p         1 1 2 1 2 11 1 l lL Lp B h k r h r k    
 
2 1 ,
H hM
th h 2 2 ,
L hM
th h  2 3 ,
H hM
th h
1 ,
hM
tp p 1 4
hM
th h  
0 
2 * 1,Hr 
2 * 1.Lr   
 2 2HB h k p 
 1 1B h k q  
     2 2 2 2 2 21 l H l HH HpB r h r k h k     
2 3 ,
H hM
th h
1 ,
hM
tp p 1 4
hM
th h  
       2 1 2 1 1 11 1 l lL Lp B r h r k h k    
 
1 2 3 ,
hM H hM
t th h h  2 2 ,
L hM
th h  2 3 ,
H hM
th h 2
hM
tp p  
1 
2 * 1,Hr 
2 2*
l
L Lr r  
 2 2HB h k p 
 
1chB q
b c
 
     12 1 2 11 1 l lL L
h c
p B r h r k
b c
 
    
   
2 1 ,
H hM
th h 2 2 ,
L hM
th h
 1 4
,hMth h 3
hM
tp p  
0 
2 *Hr  2 ,
l
Hr
2 * 1Lr    
2
Hch
B p
b c


 1 1B h k q  
   22 2 2 21
H
l H l
H H
h c
pB r h r k
b c
 
   
   
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Figure 5.1:HIV Infections Averted versus budget for full information and asymmetric 
information for different values of 
1h (infections averted/$ in program one). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1a: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case valus of 
1 / 2h . 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1b: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case valus of 
1h . 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1c: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case valus of 
12h . 
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Figure 5.2:HIV Infections Averted versus budget for full information and asymmetric 
information for different values of b (coefficient of the fraction of budget to be reserved 
for proportional allocation). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2a: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case value of b/2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2b: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case value of b. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2c: HIV Infections Averted versus budget for the base case value of 2b. 
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Figure 5.3:Expected HIV infections averted for various values of p for the two cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4:Expected HIV infections averted versus budget for both the cases for 
different values of N (total size of the risk groups). 
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Chapter 6 
Multi-level Allocation of HIV Prevention Funds: A Multiple Incentive 
Model 
6.1. Introduction 
As described in Chapter 2, main sources of funding to prevent HIV/AIDS infections 
worldwide are the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Bank's 
Global AIDS Program, the World Health Organization, the US President's Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief, and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Funds 
are often allocated by these agencies at multiple levels. In Chapter 4, we consider a 
model in which an upper-level decision maker (UD) allocates fund to a single lower-
level decision maker (LD) who then distributes funds to 3 local programs. In this 
chapter, we extend this model to multiple lower levels competing for the budget at the 
upper level.  
Mathematical programming (MP) models assuming a single decision maker [1-3] and 
multiple decision makers [4, 5] have been developed to aid this resource allocation 
process. However, simple allocation techniques are often preferred [6]. In order to 
encourage optimal allocation of resources, incentives could be provided to decision 
makers [7-9].  
Some work addressing incentives in health care resource allocation proposing 
optimization models [10, 11] has been done. Chick et al. formulated a cost-sharing 
contract between government and the vaccine manufacturer that provides incentives to 
both parties so that the vaccine supply chain gets optimized by improving the supply of 
vaccine [10]. Zhang and Zenios proposed a multi-period principal-agent model in which 
the physician is an agent and the medical insurer is a principal to design optimal 
contracts for the principal [11].  
Some work incorporating game theory has been done in health care resource distribution 
settings. McPake et al. modeled two-tier charging, the practice in which hospitals offer 
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two separate qualities of service, basic and premium service, at different prices, as a 
Stackelberg game in which the Ministry of Health (MOH) is a leader and the hospital is 
a follower. MOH sets the prices that maximize its utility function subject to its budget 
constraint set by Ministry of Finance and then the hospital follows by setting its quality 
levels maximizing its surplus. The case in which MOH sets prices but provides only 
lump-sum subsidies to the hospital was compared to the case in which MOH sets prices 
and also provides an activity-based subsidy for the provision of a basic service that 
reflects the volume of the service provided. They showed that switching to activity-
based payment doubles the quality level of the basic and premium services [12]. Sun et 
al. modeled various countries as players in a game during an outbreak of an epidemic 
making optimal decisions about allocating their own drug stockpiles to protect their 
populations. However, we not aware of any modeling of an HIV prevention funds 
allocation process in which multiple lower levels are competing for the budget at the 
upper level [13]. 
In this chapter, an incentive-based resource allocation process with a UD allocating 
funds to 2 LDs who then allocates funds to 3 programs is considered. We seek to answer 
the following questions: What is the impact of incentives on the optimal solution of the 
HIV/AIDS resource allocation process if multiple regions are competing for the budget? 
What is the impact of incentives provided within regions and/or between regions? The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 formulates the model. Section 6.3 
provides mathematical analysis and Section 6.4 solves a numerical example. The 
conclusion and extensions are discussed in Section 6.5. 
6.2. Model Formulation 
We modeled the allocation process for prevention funds in which a single UD allocates 
funds to 2 independent LDs, representing regions in a single period. The 2 LDs then 
allocate funds to three programs between their regions. In the first stage, the UD decides 
the level of incentive within regions  f and between regions  g that maximizes its 
utility function consisting of the total infections averted. In the second stage, responding 
to the UD’s decision, the 2 LDs simultaneously choose the fraction of the funds received 
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to be reserved for proportional allocation   , 1,2, , ,mir i m fg f g  , where i represents 
region i and m represents the type of incentive, maximizing their own utility functions 
and then allocate the funds to the three programs. We consider three cases: the ―fg‖ case 
in which, the UD considers 2 types of incentives within regions
 
and between regions,   
―f ‖ case in which, incentives within regions are considered, and ―g‖ case in which, 
incentives between regions are considered. 
Let B be the budget of the UD. We assume that the budget B is divided into a fixed 
portion fB and an incentive portion  1 f B , where the fraction f ,0 1f  , is chosen by 
the UD. Further, the upper level allocates an amount , 1,2iZ i   
to the two lower levels, 
which is assumed to be again divided into a fixed portion F
iZ coming from fixed portion 
of the budget
1 2
F FZ Z fB  and an incentive portion IiZ coming from the incentive 
portion of the budget  1 2 1
I IZ Z f B   (we assume that the UD can hold back certain 
amount of funds for future use). The total amount received by each region is
F I
i i iZ Z Z  . We assume that
F
iZ is proportional to the size of the infected population in 
region i given by, 
1 2
F i
i
N
Z fB
N N


, where, iN is the size of the infected population in 
region i.  
There are many ways in which incentives could be implemented in a multi-level HIV 
prevention funds allocation process. As an illustrative example, we consider an 
incentive scheme with the following functional form: 
 
 
 
1
1 1 , , 1,2,
2
m m
i iI m
i i
r r
Z r g f B i i i i
 
       , where, f and g,  0 , 1f g  , and 
 1 2 1
I IZ Z B f    as shown below: 
Clearly, if 0g  ⇒     1 2 2 1
1
1 1 1
2
m m m mr r r r      , otherwise,
 
      1 1 2 2 2 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
2
m m m m m mr g r r r g r r       
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Thus,           1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 .
2
I I m m m m m mZ Z B f r g r r r g r r B f             
f and g are chosen by the UD, represents incentives within and between a region, 
respectively. The functional form of the incentive scheme will allow us to separately 
consider the impact of each incentive.  0 1m mi ir r  , fraction of the funds to be 
reserved for proportional allocation, is chosen by a LD. A higher value of 1
mr  
corresponds to a stronger penalty for equity for the lower level decision maker 1 (LD1) 
and a bigger reward for lower-level decision maker 2 (LD2). For example, if the LD1 
chooses to allocate entire budget proportionally, 1 1
mr  and if the LD2 chooses to 
allocate entire budget optimally, 2 0
mr  then the LD1 will receive zero incentivized 
budget, whereas the LD2 will receive  1 f B  or the budget B when 0f  . When
1 2 0
m mr r  , entire budget is allocated optimally and incentivized budget is divided 
equally between the two LDs. When 1 2 1
m mr r  , entire budget is allocated 
proportionally and the LD i receives    
1 2
1
1 1
2
iNg B f fB
N N
  

. ―g‖ is similar to 
the incentive used in chapter 4. 
The lower level then distributes amount , 1,2,3ijy j  to program j in region i. We assume 
that 1 program is available for each of 3 different risk groups, that the programs do not 
interact, and that the costs and benefits scale linearly, as in Zaric and Brandeau [8]. We 
solve this problem using backward induction and present the details in the given time 
sequence. 
Stage 1: Upper-level Choice of f and g 
Similar to chapter 4 and 5, we assume that the objective at the upper level is to 
maximize the number of infections averted. The upper-level resource allocation problem 
in stage 1 is written as follows:  
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  
,
: max * , , 1,2, , ,m mi i i
f g
i
IA IA r f g i m fg f g       (6.1) 
s.t.  0 1f             (6.2) 
      0 1g            (6.3) 
       
    * , arg maxm mi i ir f g L r        (6.4) 
where,   * ,mi iIA r f g represents the total infections averted and is calculated by solving 
an optimization problem in stage 3,  mi iL r represents the lower-level optimization 
problem solved in stage 2, subscript i represents the utility function of LD i. 
Stage 2: Lower-level Choice of 
m
ir  
In the second step, each LD has a single decision of what proportion of the funds 
received to allocate based on equity and it chooses 
m
ir to maximize its own utility 
function. We assume that the utility function is linear function of equity  mir , efficiency, 
defined by the number of infections averted  iIA , and funds received  iZ . This is 
defined by, 
   , ,m m m m mi i i i i i i i i i iU a Z r r b r c IA r r          (6.5) 
where, iU , , , 0i i ia b c   
represents the relative weights applied to funds received, equity, 
and infections averted. We assume that values of , ,i ia b and ic  are known to both the 
LDs as well as the UD. The lower-level optimization problem for each LD is written as: 
   : max , ,
m
i
m m m m m m
i i i i i i i i i i i i
r
L U a Z r r b r c IA r r         (6.6) 
s.t.    0 1  mir           (6.7) 
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            * arg maxm mi i ir L r          (6.8) 
LD1 solves 1
mL to obtain  1 * ,
mr f g given the value of  f , g and  2 * ,
mr f g . Similarly, 
LD2
 
solves 2
mL to obtain  2 * ,
mr f g given the value of  f , g and  1 * ,
mr f g . 
Stage 3: Lower-level Allocation to Programs 
We develop a model at this stage similar to the lower-level model of Zaric and Brandeau 
[8] and Malvankar and Zaric [9]. Let 
ijh be the number of HIV infections prevented per 
dollar invested in a program j in region i over time T. Let 
ijn be the size of the risk group 
j in region i and i ij
j
N n . We assume that the programs have been indexed so that
1 2 3i i ih h h  . The total number of HIV infections averted, iIA , is given by the following 
equation: 
1 1 2 2 3 3i i i i i i iIA h y h y h y           (6.9) 
In this stage, given m
ir , f, and g, the total number of infections averted is obtained by 
solving the following LP: 
1 2 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
,
max 
i i i
i i i i i i i
y ,y y
IA h y h y h y          (6.10) 
3
1
s.t.   ij i
j
y Z

          (6.11) 
, 1 2 3
ijm
ij i i
i
n
y r Z j , ,
N
          (6.12) 
The optimal solution of this ―Knapsack LP‖ is of the following form: 
2 3
1
2 3
i i
i i i i i i
n n
y Z rZ rZ
N N
    
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,     2 3
ij
ij i i
i
n
y rZ j ,
N
   
The result of stage 3 is the function  mi iIA r , 
 mi iIA r = 2 31 1 2 1 3
2 3
( ) ( )m mi ii i i i i i i i
n n
Z h r h h r h h
N N
 
    
 
     (6.13) 
=
 
   1
1 2
1
1
2
i i i
i i
r r N
f B fB h k
N N

    
       
, where
   2 31 2 1 3 1
2 3
i i
i i i i i i
n n
k h h h h h
N N
     . 
6.3. Analysis  
In this section, we present the analysis of the problem. All notations are specified in 
table 6.1 and proofs are given in the appendix.  
6.3.1 Two Incentives (“fg” case) 
We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the lower-level problem 
when incentives are provided within and between regions. 
Proposition 6.1: For problem
fg
iL with three sub-populations, 
(i) iU  is a cubic function of 
fg
ir . If the coefficient of  
3
fg
ir is greater than zero in iU  
then  * min ,1fg fgui ir r , otherwise *fg fgui ir r or 0 or 1.  
(ii) The conditions for existence of Nash equilibriums (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1),
 and  1 2,fgu fgur r  are specified in Table 6.2.     ∎ 
 1 ,0 ,fgur
 20, ,fgur
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Part (i) of Proposition 6.1 says that either a fraction  0 1fguir  or none or all of the 
funds are reserved for proportional allocation. Part (ii) says all the conditions for 
existence of Nash equilibriums are specified in Table 6.2. Table 6.2 says that if the LD 
has bigger size of the total infected population and lower preferences for infections 
prevented per dollar then fewer incentives are given between regions and higher 
incentives are given within regions to encourage optimality if both the LDs have 
moderate preferences for proportional allocation. Higher incentives are given within 
regions and lower incentives are given between regions to encourage the LD with higher 
preferences for infections prevented per dollar to allocate the entire budget optimally 
even if both the LDs have moderate preferences for proportional allocation. However, if 
both the LDs have higher preferences for proportional allocation then fewer incentives 
are given within regions and higher incentives are given between regions to encourage 
the LD with higher preferences for infections prevented per dollar to allocate the entire 
budget optimally. 
We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level problem 
when incentives are provided within and between regions. 
Proposition 6.2: For problem fg
iIA , the optimal f *, g*, and number of infections 
prevented for various conditions are specified in Table 6.3.    ∎ 
Proposition 6.2 says that optimal f *, g *and *fgiIA for all conditions listed in Table 6.2 
are specified in Table 6.3. Table 6.3 says that if 1 of the LD has higher infections 
prevented/$, moderate preferences for allocating the budget based on equity, and higher 
preferences for infections prevented/dollar then full incentives are given within and 
between so that the entire budget is allocated to that LD who will choose to allocate 
optimally. If 1 of the LD has higher infections prevented/dollar and other LD has higher 
preferences for infections prevented/dollar then moderate incentives are given within 
regions and full incentives are given between regions so that entire budget gets allocated 
optimally by the LD with higher preferences for infections prevented/dollar.  
6.3.2 Between Region Incentives (“g” case) 
116 
 
We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
problem when incentives are provided between regions. 
Proposition 6.3: For problem 
g
iL with three sub-populations, 
(i) iU  is a cubic function of 
g
ir . If the coefficient of  
3
g
ir is greater than zero in iU  
then  * min ,1f fui ir r , otherwise *gir  guir or 0 or 1.  
(ii) The conditions for existence of Nash equilibriums (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1),  1 2, ,gu gur r
 1 ,0 ,gur and  20, gur  are specified in Table 6.4.     ∎ 
Part (i) of Proposition 6.3 says that either a fraction  0 1guir  or all or none of the 
funds are reserved for proportional allocation. Part (ii) says all the conditions for 
existence of Nash equilibriums are specified in Table 6.4. Table 6.4 says that if both the 
LDs moderately prefer proportional allocation, 1 of the LD has larger risk group, and 
other LD has lower preference for infections prevented/dollar then lower incentives are 
given between regions since the LDs will allocate the budget optimally. If one of the 
LDs has a higher preference for infections prevented per dollar and both the LDs have a 
higher preference for proportional allocation, then the LD with higher preference for 
infections prevented per dollar will choose to allocate optimally with higher incentives, 
whereas, the other LD will continue to allocate proportionally even with higher 
incentives.  
We next present the results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level 
problem when incentives are provided between regions. 
Proposition 6.4: For problem g
iIA , optimal g* and number of infections prevented for 
various conditions are specified in Table 6.5.     ∎ 
Proposition 6.4 says that optimal g* and *giIA for all conditions listed in Table 6.4 are 
specified in Table 6.5. Table 6.5 indicates that if 1 of the LDs has higher preference for 
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infections prevented per dollar then full incentives are given to allocate the entire budget 
to that LD if both the LDs strongly prefer a proportional allocation. In this case, the 
entire budget is allocated optimally. If 1 of the LD moderately prefers proportional 
allocation and has lower preference for infections prevented/dollar and other LD highly 
prefers proportional allocation then both the LDs will choose to allocate proportionally 
even with moderate incentives. 
6.3.3 Within Region Incentives (“f ” case) 
We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the lower-level problem 
when incentives are provided within regions. 
Proposition 6.5: For problem 
f
iL with three sub-populations, 
(i) iU  is a convex function of 
f
ir  and therefore the optimal solution is either * 0
f
ir   or 
1.  
(ii) The conditions for existence of 4 Nash equilibriums (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1) are 
specified in Table 6.6.         ∎ 
Part (i) of Proposition 6.5 states that an extreme point solution of allocating all or none 
of the funds is always optimal. Part (ii) states that all the conditions for existence of 4 
Nash equilibriums are specified in Table 6.6. Table 6.6 shows that if the both LDs have 
a lower preference for proportional allocation and a higher preference for the budget 
received then they will allocate the budget optimally with higher incentives within their 
regions. If LD1 has a moderate preference for a proportional allocation and a larger 
infected population, then LD1 will choose to allocate optimally with lower incentives; 
however, higher incentives are provided to LD2 with a moderate preference for a 
proportional allocation and a higher preference for the budget received. If LD1 has 
higher preference for proportional allocation and LD2 has moderate preference for 
proportional allocation then full incentives within regions are given to encourage LD2 to 
allocate optimally if LD2 has bigger infected population.  
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We next present results that characterize the optimal solution to the upper-level problem 
when incentives are provided within regions. For problem f
iIA , we first identified all 
sub-cases of the 5 cases listed in Table 6.6. Secondly, we combined some similar sub-
cases and then all the sub-cased were solved to get the optimal solutions at the upper 
level.  
Proposition 6.6: For problem f
iIA , optimal f * and number of infections prevented for 
various conditions are specified in Table 6.7.     ∎ 
Proposition 6.6 states that optimal f * and *fiIA for all conditions listed in Table 6.6 are 
specified in Table 6.7. Table 6.7 presents 3 different sub-cases. Sub-case 1 includes the 
conditions under which (0, 0) and (1, 1) exist together as multiple equilibria and unique 
equilibrium. Incentives are provided to encourage (0, 0) equilibrium if both the LDs 
have moderate preference for proportional allocation and moderate infections are 
prevented per dollar. Sub-case 2 includes the conditions under which (0, 1) and (1, 0) 
exist together as multiple equilibria. A moderate incentive is given to encourage (0,1) if 
the higher infections/dollar are prevented in risk group 1 than in risk group 2 and both 
the LDs have moderate preferences for proportional allocation. Sub-case 3 includes the 
conditions under which no equilibrium and unique equilibrium exist. A full incentive is 
given to allocate the entire budget to a region if infections prevented per dollar in other 
region are lower than a threshold.  
6.4. Example 
We illustrate with an example using data for California from Zaric and Brandeau [8], 
Office of AIDS [14] and for New York from Bureau of HIV/AIDS Epidemiology [15] 
for 3 risk groups  , 3, 1,2, 1,2,3i jm i j   , HET, MSM, and IDUs in each state. Risk 
group 1 consists of 18,383 and 25,109 IDUs, risk group 2 consists of 14,701 and 18,801 
HET, and risk group 3 consists of 125,351 and 32,109 MSM for California and New 
York, respectively. We obtained estimates of the potential cost and effectiveness of 
interventions in each population from elsewhere [8]. We calculated the number of 
infections averted per dollar invested in each intervention using a formula published 
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elsewhere [8] as 0.00012, 0.000046, and 0.0000088, in risk groups 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. We estimate that approximately $35,512,626 and $48,067,309 of the 
CDC’s $297,049,344 budget is allocated to California and New York, respectively. 
To estimate , ,i ia b and ic in the lower-level utility function, we set 1i i ia b c    and 
preferences for infections averted per dollar  ic as 0.4. We assume that both the LDs 
have moderate preferences for allocating the budget proportionally 1 20.5, 0.55b b  . 
Figure 6.1 shows total HIV infections averted for budget ranging from $20 million to 
$80 million and three lines in the graph represents the three cases, ―fg‖ case in which 
both type of incentives between and within regions are given, ―g‖ case in which 
incentives are given between regions and ―f ‖ case in which incentives are given within 
regions. In the 3 graphs the difference between HIV infections averted in all the 3 cases 
increase as the budget increases. This shows that when the budget is higher, fewer 
infections are averted in ―f ‖ case compared to ―g‖ case. As the budget increases, this 
difference becomes prominent.  
6.5. Discussion  
We formulated the strategic interactions between the decision makers at multi-level in 
the resource allocation process for HIV prevention funds. The UD decides the level of 
incentive that maximizes the total infections averted and then the 2 LDs decides the 
fraction of the funds to be reserved for proportional allocation maximizing their utility 
functions. We considered 2 types of incentives, within and between regions. We 
analyzed each type of incentives separately as well as jointly in 3 different cases. In the 
―fg‖ case, we consider incentives within and between regions. In the ―g‖ case, incentives 
are considered between regions and in the ―f ‖ case, incentives are considered within 
regions.  
We described the problem that is posed to the donor or the UD to award money among 
the proposed HIV prevention activities. We showed how incentives, based on the LD’s 
concerns about equity, help encourage effective utilization of constrained prevention 
resources and significantly improve the health outcomes. We further compared 2 
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different types of incentives and its impact at the lower and the upper level. Both types 
of incentives encourage optimal allocation of the entire budget by the LD with higher 
infections prevented/dollar, higher preferences for infections prevented/dollar if both the 
LDs have moderate preferences for proportional allocation. However, if both the LDs 
have higher preferences for proportional allocation then incentives are given only 
between regions to encourage optimal allocation. Further, no incentives are given within 
regions if both the LDs have moderate preferences for proportional allocation and 
infections prevented/dollar in a region with larger infected population is higher than the 
other region. 
We identified several possible extensions to the paper. First, we considered a model in 
which single upper levels allocate funds to 2 lower levels who then distribute funds to 3 
programs. However, it could be extended to multiple UDs, regions and programs by 
characterizing an incentive scheme that incorporates preferences and redefining the 
utility functions. Another important extension could be a sequential game with 
imperfect information in which UD leads by setting the level of incentive that 
maximizes its utility function and then the 2 LDs follow simultaneously by setting the 
fraction of the funds to be reserved for proportional allocation maximizing their utility 
functions where information at the lower level is unknown at the upper level. In this 
game, bayes rule about the lower level decisions could be incorporated to make decision 
at the upper level. Further, a dynamic game proceeding over time through a sequence of 
moves can be considered and it may lead to different allocation decisions. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of Notations 
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Table 6.1: Continued. 
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Table 6.1: Continued. 
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Table 6.1: Continued. 
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Table 6.2: Conditions for existence of Nash equilibriums for ―fg‖ case. 
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 3 4 3 4min , , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f   3 3max , ,fg fgti t ig g g  2 ,fgi tic c 3 ,fgi tia a
  1 1 2
2
fg
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir   
 3 4 3 4min , , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f   3 3max , ,fg fgti t ig g g  2 ,fgi tic c
  1 1 2
2
fg
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 0,fgir 
* 1fgir   
 3 3max , ,fg fgti t if f f   3 3max , ,fg fgti t ig g g  2 ,fgi tic c 3 ,fgi tia a
  1 2 ,
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k     1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k        
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir   
 3 3max , ,fg fgti t if f f   3 3max , ,fg fgti t ig g g  2 ,fgi tic c  
  1 2 ,
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k     1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k        
* 0,fgir 
* 1fgir   
 1 2 3 4min , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f    1 2 3max , , ,fg fg fgti ti t ig g g g  2 ,fgi t ic c  3fgi t ia a 
 
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir   
 1 2 3 4min , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f    1 2 3max , , ,fg fg fgti ti t ig g g g  2 ,fgi t ic c 
 
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
  1 1 2
2
fg
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 1,fgir 
* 0fgir   
 1 2max , ,fg fgti tig g g  1 2 5min , ,fg fg fgti ti t if f f f    1min ,fgi t ib b 
 
max ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
    
* 1,fgir 
* 0fgir   
 1min ,fgi tib b  5min fgtif f  * 0
fg
ir   
  1 1 2 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
  1 1 2 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
  1 1 2 ,
2
fg
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k        
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Table 6.3: Optimal f * and *fgiIA for ― fg ‖case. 
 
 *, *f g  *, 1,2fgiIA i   Conditions  Equili-
brium 
 1 ,fgtif  1max ,fgtig
2fgtig  
  2
1
1 * 1 *
2i
f g
B

  



 1
1 2
* i
i i
f N
h k
N N
 
  
 
 
max ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
* 1fgir 
 
0,  3 3max ,fg fgti t ig g      
2
1
1
1 *
2
i i
i
g
B h k


  
2 ,
fg
i tic c 3 ,
fg
i tia a 1
fg
t i ib b  
  1 2
2
i i i i
B
a c h k      
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir 
 
 13 14min , ,fg fgt tf f
23 24, ,fg fgt tf f
 13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1  
 1 *
2
f
B
 


1
11
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
11 1 ,
fg
th h 1 12 ,
fg
tc c
  1 1 2
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
 
1 * 0,
fgr 
2 * 1
fgr 
 
0,
 13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1
 
11Bh  11 1 ,
fg
th h 1 12 ,
fg
tc c
  1 1 2
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
 
21Bh  11 1 ,
fg
th h 2 22 ,
fg
tc c
  1 1 2
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
 
1 * 1,
fgr 
2 * 0
fgr 
 
 13 14min , ,fg fgt tf f
23 24, ,fg fgt tf f
 13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1
 
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


   
11 1 ,
fg
th h 2 22 ,
fg
tc c
  1 1 2
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
 
  3 3max , ,fg fgti t if f 
 3 3max ,fg fgti t ig g   
  2
1
1 * 1 *
2i
f g
B

  



 1
1 2
* i
i i
f N
h k
N N


 
 
  1 2 ,
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k  
3 ,
fg
i tia a
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k         
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir 
 
 
  1 1 2 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k   
2 ,
fg
i tic c
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Table 6.3: Continued. 
 
 *, *f g  *, 1,2fgiIA i   Conditions  Equili-
brium 
1,  13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1  
1
11
1 2
N
B h
N N
 11 1 ,
fg
th h 1 12 ,
fg
tc c
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k  
 
1 * 0,
fgr 
2 * 1
fgr 
 
  13 23max , ,fg fgt tf f
 13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1
 
 
1
1 2
1 * *
2
f f N
B
N N
  
  
 
11h  
11 1 ,
fg
th h 1 12 ,
fg
tc c
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k  
 
1,  13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1  
2
21
1 2
N
B h
N N
 11 1 ,
fg
th h 2 22 ,
fg
tc c
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k  
 
1 * 1,
fgr 
2 * 0
fgr 
 
  13 23max , ,fg fgt tf f
 13 23max , ,fg fgt tg g
1
 
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


   
11 1 ,
fg
th h 2 22 ,
fg
tc c
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k  
 
 1 ,fgtif  1max ,fgtig
2 3,fg fgti t ig g   
  2
1
1 * 1 *
2i
f g
B

  



 1
1 2
* i
i i
f N
h k
N N


 
 
 
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
2 ,
fg
i t ic c  3,
fg
i t ia a 
1
fg
t i ib b  
  1 2
2
i i i i
B
a c h k      
* 1,fgir 
* 1fgir 
 
 12 23min , ,fg fgt tf f
 24 11 12, max , ,fg fg fgt t tf g g
 23 ,1fgtg   
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 1 2
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
2 22 ,
fg
tc c 11 1 ,
fg
th h
  21 2 2 2 21 22
2
fg
t
B
b b a c h k   
 
1 * 1,
fgr 
2 * 0
fgr 
 
 11 ,fgtf
 11 12max , ,fg fgt tg g
 23 ,1fgtg   
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 1 2
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
2 22 ,
fg
tc c 11 1 ,
fg
th h
  21 2 2 2 21 22
2
fg
t
B
b b a c h k   
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Table 6.3: Continued. 
 
 *, *f g  *, 1,2fgiIA i   Conditions  Equili-
brium 
 21 ,fgtf
 21 22max , ,fg fgt tg g
13,1fgtg   
 1 *
2
f
B
 


1
11
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 1 2
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
1 12 ,
fg
tc c 11 1 ,
fg
th h
  11 1 1 1 11 12
2
fg
t
B
b b a c h k   
 
1 * 0,
fgr 
2 * 1
fgr 
 
  22 13 14min , , ,fg fg fgt t tf f f
 21 22max , ,fg fgt tg g
13,1fgtg   
 1 *
2
f
B
 


1
11
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 1 2
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
1 12 ,
fg
tc c 11 1 ,
fg
th h
  11 1 1 1 11 12
2
fg
t
B
b b a c h k   
 
  12 25min , ,fg fgt tf f
  11 12max , ,1fg fgt tg g    
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
11 1 ,
fg
th h  2 21min ,fgtb b
 
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 2
max ,
2 3
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
1 * 1,
fgr 
2 * 0
fgr 
 
 11 ,fgtf
  11 12max , ,1fg fgt tg g    
 1 *
2
f
B
 


2
21
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
11 1 ,
fg
th h  2 21min ,fgtb b
 
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 2
max ,
2 3
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
 21 ,fgtf
  21 22max , ,1fg fgt tg g    
 1 *
2
f
B
 


1
11
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 11 1 1 11, min ,fg fgt th h b b 
 
2 2 2 2 2
2
1 2
max ,
2 3
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
1 * 0,
fgr 
2 * 1
fgr 
 
  22 15min , ,fg fgt tf f
  21 22max , ,1fg fgt tg g    
 1 *
2
f
B
 


1
11
1 2
*f N
h
N N


 
 
 11 1 1 11, min ,fg fgt th h b b 
 
2 2 2 2 2
2
1 2
max ,
2 3
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
 
  0, 0,1   11 21
2
B
h h   1min
fg
i tib b  * 0
fg
ir 
 
 
 
129 
 
Table 6.4: Conditions for existence of Nash equilibriums for ―g‖ case. 
 
 Conditions  Equilibrium 
1  1 2max , ,g gti tig g g ,
2
i i
i
Bc k
b  1,2i   
* 1gir   
2  3 3min , ,g gti t ig g g  1,gi tia a 1,gi t iN N  1,
g
i tic c , 1,2,i i 
,i i   1 1 ,
2
g
ti i i i i
B
b b a c h    1 1
2
g
t i i i i i
B
b b a c h        
* ,g gui ir r
*g gui ir r   
3  3 3min , ,g gti t ig g g   1 1 ,
2
g
ti i i i i
B
b b a c h   1,
g
i tic c
 1 1
2
g
t i i i i i
B
b b a c h        
* 0,gir 
*g gui ir r   
4  3 3max , ,g gti t ig g g  1,gi tib b 2 ,
g
i tic c 2 ,
g
i tia a 1
g
i t ib b   
* 1,gir 
* 1gir   
5  3 3max , ,g gti t ig g g  1,gi tib b 2 ,
g
i tic c 1
g
i t ib b   
* 0,gir 
* 1gir   
6  1 2 3max , , ,g g gti ti t ig g g g  ,
2
i i
i
Bc k
b  2 ,
g
i t ic c  2 ,
g
i t ia a 
  1 1 2
2
g
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 1,gir 
* 1gir   
7  1 2 3max , , ,g g gti ti t ig g g g  ,
2
i i
i
Bc k
b  2 ,
g
i t ic c 
  1 1 2
2
g
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 1,gir 
* 0gir   
8  1 2max , ,g gti tig g g  1min ,gi t ib b 
2
i i
i
Bc k
b 
 
* 1,gir 
* 0gir   
9  1min gi tib b  * 0
g
ir   
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Table 6.5: Optimal *g and *giIA for ― g ‖case. 
 
*g  *giIA  Conditions  Equilibrium 
 1 2max ,g gti tig g   1 *
2
g
B


 
2
1
1
i i
i
h k


 
2
i i
i
Bc k
b   
* 1gir   
 3 3max ,g gti t ig g    1 *
2
g
B


 
2
1
1
i i
i
h k


 
1,
g
i tib b 2 ,
g
i tic c 2 ,
g
i tia a 1
g
i t ib b   
* 1,gir 
* 1gir   
 3 3max , ,g gti t ig g 
1  
1iBh  
1,
g
i tib b 2 ,
g
i tic c 1
g
i t ib b   
* 0,gir 
* 1gir   
 1 2max , ,g gti tig g
3gt ig   
 1 *
2
g
B


 
2
1
1
i i
i
h k


 
,
2
i i
i
Bc k
b  2 ,
g
i t ic c  2 ,
g
i t ia a 
  1 1 2
2
g
t i i i i i i
B
b b a c h k          
* 1,gir 
* 1gir   
 1 2max , ,g gti tig g
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Table 6.6: Conditions for existence of Nash equilibriums for ― f ―case. 
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Table 6.7: Optimal f * and *fLIA for ― f  ‖case. 
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Figure 6.1: HIV infections averted versus budget for both regions for all three cases. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions  
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of incentives in 
encouraging optimal allocation in a multi-level HIV prevention funds allocation process 
We first examined practical as well as theoretical models in the literature in Chapters 2 
and 3, respectively. We then developed a series of models to investigate the impact of 
incentives in a two-level decision making process. To our knowledge, these models are 
the first to consider the impact of incentives in a HIV prevention funds allocation 
process. 
Three different model frameworks were developed in three chapters. In Chapter 4, we 
consider a two-level decision-making process in which an upper-level decision maker 
(UD) allocates funds to a single lower-level decision maker (LD) who then distributes 
funds to three programs. Here the UD uses an incentive scheme to encourage the LD to 
reduce the fraction of funds reserved for equity by making the amount received by the 
LD dependent on this fraction. In particular, the UD may withhold funds to encourage 
an allocation that is more efficient. We illustrate this process with an example using data 
from California, U.S.  
In Chapter 5, we extend the model developed in Chapter 4 to include information 
asymmetry. We assume that there is an UD who is allocating funds to a single LD who 
then distributes funds to two programs. We consider 2 sources of information 
asymmetry. In case 1, the preferences of the LD with respect to allocating funds 
proportionally are unknown to the UD. In case 2, the number of infections prevented per 
dollar is known to the LD, but is unknown to the UD. We illustrate this arrangement 
with an example using data from California, U.S.  
In Chapter 6, we extend the model developed in Chapter 4 to include multiple LDs. 
Here we examine the impact of two different types of incentives within and between the 
lower levels. The UD sets two levels of incentives that maximize the total number of 
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infections averted and the LDs simultaneously set the fraction of the funds received to 
be reserved for proportional allocation. We examine three cases: one in which the UD 
provides two types of incentives both between regions
 
and within regions; a second in 
which the UD provides incentives only between regions, and a third in which the UD 
provides incentives only within regions. We illustrate the use of these models using data 
from California and New York, U.S. 
Managerial Insights 
Our results provide many useful insights for policy makers about how to design 
incentive schemes that help to encourage effective utilization of limited funds and 
significantly improve health outcomes at the lower level. We list some of these as 
follows: 
 If the LD strongly prefers optimal or proportional allocation then that person will 
choose to allocate optimally or proportionally even without incentives. 
 Incentives may be beneficial if the LD has less preference for optimal allocation 
since that person may switch from optimal to proportional allocation without 
incentives.  
 Incentives may not be needed for a larger budget and bigger size of the risk 
group with highest number of infections averted/dollar, or a larger budget and 
higher number of infections averted/ dollar in a program since the LD will 
always elect to allocate optimally even without incentives. 
 The LD is less likely to choose a proportional allocation as that person’s 
preferences for the budget and the number of infections averted increases. 
 Incentives can encourage an optimal allocation under asymmetric information. 
However, there is a loss of efficiency (LOE) when we compare an asymmetric 
information case with a full information case. 
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 The loss of efficiency (LOE) increasewith the increase in the budget, the number 
of infections prevented per dollar, the level of incentive given, size of the risk 
group, and the probability that the LD is of high type.  
 If fewer infections are prevented per dollar in both the regions or if both the LDs 
have lower preferences for proportional allocation then full incentive is given to 
encourage both the LDs to choose optimal allocation. In this case, there is no 
loss of efficiency. 
 Both types of incentives, between and within the regions encourage optimal 
allocation of the entire budget by the LD with higher preferences for infections 
prevented/dollar if both the LDs have moderate preferences for proportional 
allocation. However, if both the LDs have higher preferences for proportional 
allocation then incentives are given only between regions to encourage optimal 
allocation.  
 No incentives are given within regions if both the LDs have moderate 
preferences for proportional allocation and infections prevented/dollar in a 
region with larger infected population is higher than the other region. 
Directions for Future Research 
We identified several possible directions for future research. Short time horizon models 
were developed which do not incorporate epidemic dynamics. Thus, models for use with 
respect to longer time horizons could be developed that would take into account 
epidemic dynamics which may then lead to different allocation decisions.  
We assumed that the benefits of intervention scale linearly with respect to amounts 
invested which is a common assumption in cost-effectiveness analysis. However, this 
assumption may not always be valid. I would like to develop a model that incorporates a 
production function, which is defined as a function that links the number of dollars 
invested in a program with the number of HIV/AIDS infections prevented.  
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Different types of incentive schemes were considered under both symmetric and 
asymmetric information cases, incorporating the LD’s concerns about equity and the 
UD’s decision regarding the strength of the incentives to help demonstrate the 
significance of incentives in encouraging an optimal allocation of HIV prevention funds. 
However, our primary purpose is to show the significance of incentives and our analysis 
could be generalized for various other incentive schemes by adjusting for the upper and 
lower-level utility functions.  
We assume that there is a single decision maker at the upper level. However, in practice, 
there are multiple stakeholders including donors and advocacy groups taking part in the 
decision making process and each having its own priorities, objectives, and limitations. I 
would like to develop a model in which multiple UDs take part in the decision making 
process and have their own priorities. The objective function in the model could be a 
weighted sum of the priorities to be maximised subject to given constraints. The 
analysis of such a model may lead to different analyses.  
A feasible incentive scheme can be formulated to encourage optimal allocation if data is 
available to the UD. However, in practice, the required data is often unavailable. We 
consider 2 cases of information asymmetry. There could be various other factors present 
at the lower level impacting decisions at the upper level and which are unknown to the 
upper level such as local politics and social considerations. I would like to examine the 
impact of incentives under such asymmetric information. A signalling model can be 
formulated which incorporates such asymmetric information about various factors at the 
lower level. 
Another possible extension could be a sequential game employing imperfect 
information in which the game includes an UD who is allocating funds to multiple LDs 
over multiple periods. Incomplete information regarding decisions made at the lower-
levels is available at the upper level. This would lead to a complex model in which a 
priori information about the lower level could be incorporated to make decision at the 
upper level. 
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APPENDICES 
 
8. Proof of Chapter 4 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1 
Proof: (i) The lower-level utility function is aZ br cIA  . When  1Z B rf  and
  11IA B rf h rk   are substituted into this we obtain: LL : max  L
r
U aZ br cIA  
    11 1aB rf br cB rf h rk       
s.t.    0 1r   
The second derivative of LU with respect to r is given by, 
      1
d
 1 2 0
d
LU aB f b cB f h rk k rf cBfk
r
             . 
Since 0LU
  , LU  is a convex function of r and the optimal solution is either * 1r  or 
0. 
(ii)   10LU aB cBh  and       11 1 1LU aB f b cB f h k      . 
If    1 0L LU U  then 
* 1r   and if    1 0L LU U  then * 0r  .   (8.1) 
Note that   1 0B a c h k   because 1h k . 
If 
  1
L
t
b cBk
f f
B a c h k

 
 
then 1aBf cBfh cBfk b cBk     
Thus, 10 aBf b cBfh cBfk cBk      .  
Adding 1aB cBh to each side, we obtain 
    1 11 1aB cBh aB f b cB f h k       .     (8.2) 
⇒    0 1U U . 
Thus,    0 1U U  if Ltf f . 
(iii) This follows by reversing the inequality Ltf f   in part (ii).   ∎ 
Proof of Corollary 4.1:  
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Proof: When Lutb b , then 
L
utb b  1B a ch  ⇒  1b cBk B a ch ck    ⇒
  1
1Lt
b cBk
f
B a c h k

 
 
. 
From Proposition 1, part (iii) we know that Ltf f ⇒
* 1r  . Since 0 1f   and 1
L
tf  , 
then Lutb b ⇒ 1
*r  . 
Next, consider the case when Lltb b cBk  ⇒ 0b cBk  ⇒   1
0Lt
b cBk
f
B a c h k

 
 
.  
From Proposition 1, part (ii) we know that Ltf f ⇒
* 0r  .    ∎ 
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is straightforward and omitted.    ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 
Proof: Recall that the lower-level optimization model is 
      M 1: max   1
a c ca b c b
M
r
L U r Z r IA B rf r h rk

     
s.t.    0 1r   
The first derivative of  MU r is 
       
1 11
11
a c ca c b
MU r B rf r h rk Q r
            (8.3) 
where,         2 21 12 q q qQ r r a b c kf r a b c h f b c k bh a r b r c            . 
We solve for *r  by setting,   0MU r  . 
Equation (8.3) has 5 roots given by 1
1
, 0,
h
r r r
f k
   and the two roots of the 
quadratic equation  Q r . The first three roots result in   0MU r  . We thus focus on 
the two roots of  Q r . We first show that  Q r  has two positive real roots. 
2 4q q qb a c       
2
1 14 2a b c h f b c k a b c kfbh         
           
2 2
1 1 12 4 2  a b c h f a b c h f b c k b c k a b c kfbh             
 
          
2
1 14 2a b c h f b c k a b c b c a b c b h fk             
               
11
2
1
2
1
24 42 kfbhcbakcbfhcbakcbkcbfhcbafhcba 
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       
2
1 14 0a b c h f b c k c a c h fk             (8.4) 
The inequality in (8.4) follows from the fact that both terms are strictly positive. Thus, 
 Q r has two real roots. Let lr and ur , l ur r , be the two roots of  Q r  defined by, 
          
 
2
1 1 14 2
2 2
u
a b c h f b c k a b c h f b c k a b c kfbh
r
a b c kf
           

 
 
          
 
2
1 1 14 2
2 2
l
a b c h f b c k a b c h f b c k a b c kfbh
r
a b c kf
           

 
 
           (8.5) 
Since 1, , , , 0 and 0a b c h k f  , and from (8.4) 0
lr   and by definition 0 l ur r  . 
Thus,  Q r has two positive real roots. 
 MU r is continuous on [0, m] and is differentiable on (0, m), where
11min ,
h
m
f k
 
  
 
. 
Since    M M0 0U U m  , then by Rolle’s Theorem     0,  s.t. 0r m U r   . Since
l ur r , this value of r is lr . If 1lr  then * lr r , otherwise, * 1r  . Thus, 
 * min ,1lr r .          ∎  
Prior to stating the result for a multiplicative function, we define some new notations. 
 
   2 1 2 2
M
t
b c k
f
a b c h a b c k
 

    
,
 
1
2 2a b c
m
a b c
 

 
, 2
2 3a b c
m
a b c
 

 
,
3
2a b c
m
a b c
 

 
,
  
 
1 1 2 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
1i
ti
i
h n n n m
n
h n m h n h n
 

 
, 1,2,3i  .  
Proof of Corollary 4.2: 
Proof: By using L’Hopital’s rule, 
 
1
0
lim l
f
bh
r
b c k


.     (8.6) 
We next show that Mtb b ⇒ 10 1
M
tf  . 
M
tb b ⇒  1 0bh b c k    
    1 1a c h k bh b c k      1 0bh b c k         (8.7) 
   1 2 0a b c h a b c k             (8.8) 
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1
0M
t
f  and 1 1
M
tf   follows immediately from (8.7). 
Thus, Mtb b ⇒ 10 1
M
tf  .        (8.9) 
i-a) We first show that if Mtb b and 10
M
tf f  then 1
lr  , which implies * 1r  .  
If 0f  then 
 
1
0
lim 1l
f
bh
r
b c k
 

, which implies * 1r  .  
Now suppose,
 
   
1
1
1 2
M
t
bh b c k
f f
a b c h a b c k
 
 
    
, 
      1 12f a b c h a b c k bh b c k        where inequality follows from (8.8). 
This inequality is rearranged as follows. 
      1 12a b c fk a b c fh b c k bh          
          
2
1 14 2 4 2 4 2a b c fk a b c fh b c k a b c fk bh a b c fk              
             
      
2 2
1 1
2
1 1
4 2 4 2
4 2
a b c fh b c k a b c fk a b c fh b c k a b c fk
     a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk
             
       
            
2 2
1 1 12 2 4 2a b c fh b c k a b c fk  a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk                
           (8.10) 
In order to show that the term inside the square bracket is positive so that we do not 
have to worry about absolute value we separately consider the 2 sub-cases: 1 1tn n or 
1 1tn n .  
i-a-1) Let 1 1tn n
  
 
1 1 2 3 1
1 1 1 2 2 3 3
1h n n n m
h n m h n h n
 

 
. Then  
     1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1n h n m h n h n h n n n m      
⇒      1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 31h n n n m m h n h n      , 
⇒    1 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 3h n n n m h n h n h n h n       
⇒     321 1 1 2 1 3
nn
h m h h h h
N N
 
    
 
, where 1 2 3N n n n    
Thus, 1 1 0h m k   
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⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      .       (8.11) 
Thus,
 
   2 1 2 2
M
t
b c k
f
a b c h a b c k
 

    
< 0. 
Since 0f  and 2 0
M
tf  ⇒ 2 .
M
tf f  
Thus,       1 2 2f a b c h a b c k b c k         
⇒      1 2 2 0a b c fh b c k a b c fk             (8.12) 
Thus, the term inside the square bracket in (8.10) is positive. From (8.10) we get, 
⇒
            
2
1 1 12 2 4 2a b c fh b c k a b c fk a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk                
           (8.13) 
⇒
          
 
2
1 1 14 2
1
2 2
l
a b c h f b c k a b c h f b c k a b c kfbh
r
a b c kf
           
 
 
 
Since, u lr r ⇒ * 1r  .        (8.14) 
i-a-2) Let 1 1tn n  
1 1tn n ⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      ⇒ 2 0
M
tf   
There are 2 sub-cases to consider: 1 2tn n and 1 2tn n . 
i-a-2-1) Let 1 2tn n
  
 
1 1 2 3 2
1 1 2 2 2 3 3
1h n n n m
h n m h n h n
 

 
.     (8.15) 
On reversing inequality in (8.11) we get 1 2 0h m k  ⇒    1 2 3 0h a b c k a b c      . 
Thus, 
   1 2 2 4h a b c k a b c b c        
⇒      1 2 2h a b c k a b c k b c         
⇒
 
    21
1
2 2
M
t
k b c
f
h a b c k a b c
 
 
    
.      (8.16) 
Thus, 20 1
M
tf  . From (8.9), we have 10 1
M
tf  . 
Next we show that 1 2
M M
t tf f . 
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Let        
2 22
1 1 0b h k kc k c a c a c h k         
⇒         
2 22 2 2 2
1 1 12 0b h k bkc h k k c k c a c a c h k           
⇒     
2 2 2
1 12 2 0b a b c h k bkch bk c k c a b c          
⇒         2 21 1 2 2 2 2 0bh a b c h k a b c bk a b c k c a b c             
⇒         21 1 2 2 2 0bh a b c h k a b c b c k a b c           
⇒
              1 1 12 2 2b c k a b c h k a b c bh b c k a b c h k a b c                
From (8.8), we know that    1 2 0h a b c k a b c       and 
   1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      . 
 
   
 
   
1
1 12 2 2
b c k bh b c k
a b c h k a b c a b c h k a b c
   

         
 
⇒ 1 2
M M
t tf f           (8.17) 
Next we show that 1 2t tn n , 
Let           1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 31 1 1 1m h n m m h n h n m h n m m h n h n          
Because, 1 21 1m m   and    1 2 2 11 1m m m m    
 
 
 
 
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
1 1m m
h n m h n h n h n m h n h n
 

   
 
  
 
  
 
1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 2
1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
1 1h n n n m h n n n m
h n m h n h n h n m h n h n
   

   
 
Thus, 1 2t tn n .          (8.18) 
Thus, 1 20
M M
t tf f f     
2
M
tf f
 
   1 2 2
k b c
h a b c k a b c
 

    
 
     1 2 2f h a b c k a b c k b c           
     1 2 2 0h f a b c k b c kf a b c         
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The term inside the square bracket in Eq (8.10) is positive, thus, from (8.14) * 1.r 
           (8.19) 
i-a-2-2) Let 1 2tn n ⇒ 2 1
M
tf  which follows by reversing the in equality in (8.15). 
Thus, 1 20 1
M M
t tf f f    , from (8.19) we know that * 1r  . 
Therefore, for each of the three conditions, i.e. Mtb b , 10
M
tf f  , and 1 1tn n or 
M
tb b , 10
M
tf f  1 1tn n , and 1 2tn n or 
M
tb b , 10
M
tf f  , 1 1tn n , and 1 2tn n , 
we get * 1r  . 
This completes the proof of (i) part a. Now we examine (i) part b. There are two sub-
cases. 
i-b-1) Note that 1 1
M
tf f  and 1 1tn n then the direction of the inequality in (8.14) is 
reversed. Thus, * 1lr r  .        (8.20) 
From (8.13), 
            
2
1 1 12 2 4 2a b c fh b c k a b c fk a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk                
(8.21)
 
 
 
   
 
1
1
2
u
a b c fh b c k
r
a b c fk
   
 
 
 
From (8.12),      1 2 2 0a b c fh b c k a b c fk         
   
 
1
2
2
a b c fh b c k
a b c fk
   

 
 
   
 
1
1 1
2
a b c fh b c k
a b c fk
   
 
 
       (8.22) 
      
            fkcbabhkcbfhcbakcbfhcba
fkcbakcbfhcba
24
222
1
2
11
1


      
 
          
 
ur
fkcba
 fkcbabhkcbfhcbakcbfhcba
fkcba
fkcbakcbfhcba






22
24
22
222
1
2
11
1
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Thus, 
   
 
1
1 1 1
2
u u
a b c fh b c k
r r
a b c fk
   
    
 
.     (8.23) 
i-b-2) Let 1 1tn n  
1 1tn n ⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      ⇒ 2 0
M
tf   
There are 2 sub-cases to consider: 1 2tn n and 1 2tn n . 
i-b-2-1) 1 2tn n ⇒ 2 1
M
tf   from (8.16). 
Thus, 20 1
M
tf  . 
From (8.17) 1 2
M M
t tf f . 
Thus, either 1 2
M M
t tf f f  or 1 2 1
M M
t tf f f   case exist. 
If 1 2
M M
t tf f f  , we know from (8.20) and (8.23) * 1
lr r  and 1ur  , respectively.
           (8.24) 
If 1 2 1
M M
t tf f f   we show that * 1
lr r  and 1ur  . Let
 
   2 1 2 2
M
t
k b c
f f
h a b c k a b c
 
 
    
 
     1 2 2f h a b c k a b c k b c           
     1 2 2 0h f a b c kf b c k a b c         
The term inside the square bracket in Equation (8.10) is negative, thus, 
            
2
1 1 12 2 4 2a b c fh b c k a b c fk a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk                 
           (8.25) 
          
      
2
1 1 1
1
4 2
2 2 2
a b c fh b c k a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk
a b c fh b c k a b c fk
            
      
 
 
   
 
1
1
2
l
a b c fh b c k
r
a b c fk
   
 
 
 
          
 
   
 
1
222
24
11
2
11 





fkcba
kcbfhcba
fkcba
fkcbabhkcbfhcbakcbfhcba
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The direction of the inequality in (8.22) is reversed. Thus, 
   
 
1
1 1
2
a b c fh b c k
a b c fk
   
 
 
. 
Thus, * 1
lr r  .         (8.26) 
            
2
1 1 12 2 4 2a b c fh b c k a b c fk a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk                 
 
          
 
2
1 1 14 2
1
2 2
u
a b c fh b c k a b c fh b c k bh a b c fk
r  
a b c fk
          
 
 
 
Thus, 1ur  .           (8.27) 
i-b-2-2) Let 1 2tn n ⇒ 2 1
M
tf  from (8.17), thus, 1 1
M
tf f    
From (8.24), * 1lr r  and 1ur  . 
This completes the proof of part (i) and we now consider part (ii). 
ii) Let Mtb b ⇒  1 0bh b c k   . 
If 0f  then from (8.6)
 
1* 1l
bh
r r
b c k
  

. 
We next show that if 0 1f  then also 1*  lrr .  
There are two sub-cases to consider: 1 3tn n and 1 3tn n . 
ii-1) Let 1 3tn n ⇒ 1 3 0h m k  ⇒    1 2 0a b c h a b c k      ⇒ 1 1
M
tf  . 
   1 2 0h a b c a b c k      ⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c a b c k      ⇒ 2 0
M
tf  . 
On reversing inequalities in (8.17) , 2 1
M M
t tf f , thus, 2 10 1
M M
t tf f   . 
Thus, there are two possibilities either 20
M
tf f  or 2 1
M
tf f  . 
If  20
M
tf f  then the term inside square bracket is positive and from (8.20) * 1.
lr r   
If 2 1
M
tf f   then the term inside square bracket is negative, thus, from (8.26) 
* 1lr r  . 
ii-2) Let 1 3tn n ⇒    1 2 0a b c h a b c k      . 
Thus, 1 0
M
tf  and 0 1f  ⇒ 1 .
M
tf f  
Recall from (8.18) that 1 2t tn n . There are 3 sub-cases to consider: 
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ii-2-1) Let 1 1tn n ⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      ⇒ 2 0
M
tf  . Similar proof as part a-
1 of (i). 
ii-2-2) Let 2 1 1t tn n n  ⇒ 2 1
M
tf  . Thus, from (8.20), * 1
lr r  . 
ii-2-3) Let 1 2 1t tn n n  ⇒    1 2 2 0h a b c k a b c      ⇒ 20 1
M
tf  . Thus, either
20
M
tf f  or 2 1
M
tf f   exist. 
If 20
M
tf f  then from (8.20), * 1
lr r   and if 2 1
M
tf f  then from (8.25), 
* 1lr r  .          ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4.4 
Proof: Before proving parts (i) and (ii) of proposition 4, we first show that   *MIA r f  
is an increasing function in f. Clearly,  
      l l lM M
l
dIA r f IA r r f
df r f
 
 
 
. 
  *MIA r f is a quadratic function in r having roots 1
h
k
and 
1
f
.   *MIA r f is 
decreasing in  0,1r since both 1
h
k
and 
1
f
are greater than 1. Before, we show that lr is 
decreasing in f, we define some terms: 
 1 1a b c h     
 2 b c k    
 3 14 2a b c kbh     
 4 2 2a b c k     
Therefore, 
 
2
1 2 1 2 3
4
l
f f f
r
f
    

   
 . 
On simplification,
 
 
22
1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
22
4 1 2 3
2 2 2
2
l f f f fdr
df f f f
      
   
    

 
, we now show that
lr is decreasing in f. 
Let 20 4 4ac c   
     1 14 2 4a b c kbh a b c kh b c       
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3 1 24 0    
2 2 2 4 2 2 3 2
1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 2 3
2 2 2 3 4 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 3
4 4 8 4 4
4 8 4 4
f f f f f
f f f
        
     
    
   
 
   
2
2 22
1 2 2 3 2 1 2 32 2 2f f f f      
      
 
 
 
 
22
1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3
22
4 1 2 3
2 2 2
0
2
l f f f fdr
df f f f
      
   
    
 
 
. 
Thus,   lMIA r f is an increasing function in f.     (8.28) 
(i) For 10
M
tf f  ,  * 1MIA r  is an increasing function in f. Thus, * 0f   
and    1* 1MIA r B h k   .        (8.29) 
For 1 1
M
tf f  ,     1* 1l l lMIA r r B r f h r k    is an increasing function in f, from 
(8.28). Thus, * 1f  and     1* 1l l lMIA r r B r h r k    . 
We next compare  * 1MIA r  and  * lMIA r r . 
⇒     1 11 l lB h k B r h r k     
⇒    
2
1 0
l lr k r h k k     
The function    
2
1
l lr k r h k k   , is a quadratic function having minimum at 
2
1 1,1
2 2
h k h k
k k
   
     
where 1 1
2
h k
k

 and 
2
11 0
2
h k
k
 
  
 
. The graph of the quadratic 
function passes through two points  ,0k  and  1,1k h , where 1 0k h  . The roots,
, 1,2tir i  are given below, 
Let 
   
2 2
1 1 4
, 1,2
2
ti
h k h k k
r i
k
   
   
where,  1 1,tr   and  2 0,1tr  . 
We next show that if 1 th h then    
2
1
l lr k r h k k   > 0.  
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Let 1 th h  
⇒
            
22 2
1 1 1
1
2 4 4 2a b c h k k a b c h b c k a b c kbh k a c
h
c
             

 
⇒
            
2 2 2
1 1 1 14 2 2 4a b c h b c k a b c kbh h c k a c a b c h k k               
Rearranging and dividing by 2k , 
          
 
   
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
4 2 4
2 2 2
a b c h b c k a b c h b c k a b c kbh h k h k k
a b c k k
               

 
⇒ 2
l
tr r  and thus,    
2
1
l lr k r h k k   > 0. 
⇒     1 11 l lB h k B r h r k      
⇒  * 1MIA r  >  * lMIA r r . 
Thus, from (8.29) * 0f  is optimal. Similarly, if 1 th h then    
2
1
l lr k r h k k    < 0, 
thus, * 1f  is optimal. 
(ii) Note that if Mtb b then * 1
lr r   and from (8.28),   lMIA r f is an increasing 
function in f, thus, * 1f  .        ∎ 
 
151 
 
9. Proof of Chapter 5 
 
Lower-level  
Case 1 (Linear Utility Function) 
From Proposition 4.1 in Chapter 4, we can show that for problem 1LL with two sub-
populations:  
(i)  1 , ,L jU r j H L  is a convex function of 1 jr  and therefore the optimal solution is 
either 1 * 0jr   or 1. 
(ii) For a high type LD: 
(a) If 1
bL
tf f   then 1 * 1Hr  . 
(b) If 1
bL
tf f   then 1 * 0Hr  . 
(iii) For a low type LD: 
(a) If 2
bL
tf f   then 1 * 1Lr  . 
(b) If 2
bL
tf f   then 1 * 0Lr  .       ∎ 
From Corollary 4.1 in Chapter 4 we get,  
When , ,j bLutb b j H L  then 1 * 1jr  and when
j bL
ltb b then 1 * 0jr  .  ∎ 
From the conditions listed above we get Table 5.3. In Table 5.3, if 
, ,j bLltb b j H L  then any  * 0,1f  , resulting in 1 * 0jr  and   1E IA Bh . Similarly, 
under other conditions given in Table 5.3, optimal solution can or cannot exist. The 
reason that an optimal solution cannot exist is given in the footnote.  
Case 1 (Multiplicative Utility Function) 
From Proposition 4.3 and Corollary 4.2 in Chapter 4, we can show that for problem 1ML
with two sub-populations,  1 1* min ,1lj jr r . 
For a high type LD: 
i) If 1
H bM
tb b then  
a) If 10
bM
tf f  then 1 * 1Hr  . 
b) If 1 1
bM
tf f  then 1 1
* 1lH Hr r  . 
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ii) If 1
H bM
tb b then 1 1
* 1lH Hr r  . 
For a low type LD: 
i) If 1
L bM
tb b then 
a) If 20
bM
tf f  then 1 * 1Lr  . 
b) If 2 1
bM
tf f   then 1 1
* 1lL Lr r  . 
ii) If 1
L bM
tb b then 1 1
* 1lL Lr r  .       ∎ 
From the conditions listed above we get Table 5.4. In Table 5.4, if 1 , ,
j bM
tb b j H L 
then * 1f  is optimal, resulting in 1 1* 1
l
j jr r   and     1 1 11
l l
H HE IA B r h r k p   
  1 1 11 l lL LB r h r k q  , which can be written as below: 
 E IA  = 0, if 20, bLtf f  
     1 1 1 1 1 11 1l l l lH H L LB r f h r k p B r f h r k q      , if 2 1,bL bLt tf f f , where 
2 1
bL bL
t tf f  
   1 1 11 l lH HB r f h r k   , if 1 ,1bLtf f    
A convex combination of   1 1 11 l lH HB r f h r k  and   1 1 11 l lL LB r f h r k  is a convex 
function.   1 1 11 l lH HB r f h r k  is an increasing function in f, therefore, * 1f  is 
optimal.
 
Similarly, under other conditions given in Table 5.4, optimal solution can or 
cannot exist. We next solve one of the cases specified in Table 5.4 and other cases can 
be solved in a similar manner. 
 
If 1 , ,
j bM
tb b j H L   then 
 * 0f  is optimal, resulting in    1E IA B h k  . 
 * 1f  is optimal, resulting in
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1l l l lH H L LE IA B r f h r k p B r h r k q      . 
We next show that, if 
1 , , ,
j bM
tb b j H L  1
bM
tp p then * 1f  is optimal, resulting in 
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1 .l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
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Let 
    
     
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
,
1 1
l l
L LbM
t l l l l
H H L L
h k r h r k
p p
r h r k r h r k
   
 
    
where 
     1 1 1 1 1 11 1 0l l l lH H L Lr h r k r h r k      since 
   
 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1l l l lL L H H
l l
H L
r r r r
h k
r r
  


, where 
   
 
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1l l l lL L H H
l l
H L
r r r r
k
r r
  

is an infinitesimally small quantity than 1h . 
    
     
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
l l
L L
l l l l
H H L L
h k r h r k
p
r h r k r h r k
   

    
 
This inequality is rearranged as follows. 
⇒            1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q E IA B h k          
Therefore, if 
1 , , ,
j bM
tb b j H L  1
bM
tp p then * 1f  is optimal, resulting in 
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1 .l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
Case 2 (Linear Utility Function) 
At the program level, if 1 2h h then     2 2 2 21 l H lH HE IA B r f h r k    and if 1 2h h then
    2 1 2 11 l lL LE IA B r f h r k   . From Proposition 4.1, we can show that for problem 
2LL with two sub-populations: 
(i)  2 * , ,L jU r j L M  is a convex function of 2 jr  and the optimal solution is either 
2 * 0jr  or 1. 
(ii) For a high type LD:  
a) If 1
hL
tf f   then 2 * 1Hr  . 
b) If 1
hL
tf f   then 2 * 0Hr  . 
(iii) For a low type LD: 
a) If 2
hL
tf f   then 2 * 1Lr  . 
b) If 2
hL
tf f   then 2 * 0Lr  .       ∎ 
From Corollary 4.1 we can show that:  
(i) For a high type LD:  
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a)
 
If
 2 2
H hL
th h and
hL
tb b then 2 * 1Hr  . 
b) If
 2 1
H hL
th h then 2 * 0Hr  . 
(ii) For a low type LD:  
a) If
 1 2
hL
th h and
hL
tb b  then 2 * 1Lr  . 
b) If
 2 3
L hL
th h , and
hL
tc c then 2 * 0Lr  .     ∎ 
We next show that if 1 2
hL
th h  and
hL
tb b  then 2 * 1Lr  .  
Let 1 2
hL
th h , where 2 0
hL
th  since
hL
tb b . 
1 2
1hL
t
b
h h a
B c
 
   
 
⇒  1b B a ch  ⇒  1 1 1b cBk B a ch ck    ⇒
  
1
2
1 1
1hLt
b cBk
f
B a c h k

 
 
. We know that 2
hL
tf f ⇒ 2 * 1Lr  . Similarly we obtain other 
conditions.  
From the conditions listed above we get Table 5.5. Under conditions given in 
Table 5.5, optimal solution can or cannot exist. The reasons are provided in the footnote. 
Case 2 (Multiplicative Utility Function) 
From Proposition 4.3 and Corollary 4.2, we can show that for problem 2ML with two 
sub-populations,  2 2* min ,1lj jr r . 
For a high type LD:  
i) If 2 1
H hM
th h then 
a) If 10
bM
tf f  then 2 * 1Hr  . 
b) If 1 1
bM
tf f   then 2 2
* 1lH Hr r  . 
ii) If 2 1
H hM
th h then 2 2
* 1lH Hr r  . 
For a low type LD:  
i) If 2 2
L hM
th h  then 
a) If 20
bM
tf f  then 2 * 1.Lr   
b) If 2 1
bM
tf f   then 2 2
* 1lL Lr r  . 
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ii) If 2 2
L hM
th h then 2 2
* 1lL Lr r  .       ∎ 
From the conditions listed above we get Table 5.6. For each condition specified in table 
5.6, optimal solutions can or cannot exist. The reasons are provided in the footnote. 
 
Upper-level  
 
To calculate the loss of efficiency (LOE) in the asymmetric information case, first of all, 
based on the optimal f * value the optimal r * and *IA can be obtained from condition 
specified at the lower level for each type of LD. Thus,
AE IA    can be calculated for 
each optimal value of f *, where superscript A presents asymmetric information case. 
We calculate 
FE IA   for the full information case from Chapter 4. Thus,
LOE F AE IA E IA        .  
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Table 5.4: Upper-level problem for linear utility function at the lower level when b is unknown. 
 
 L bL
ltb b  
L bL
utb b  
bL L bL
lt utb b b   
H bL
ltb b    1E IA Bh , 
 * 0,1 ,f   
1 * 0, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0
 
Cannot exist 
1
 Cannot exist
 1
 
H bL
utb b     1 1 ,E IA B h k p Bh q  
* 0f  , 
1 * 1,Hr  1 * 0,Lr   
LOE 0  
   1 ,E IA B h k 
* 0,f   
1 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0
 
If bL
tp p then    1 ,E IA B h k   
* 0,f   
1 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
If bL
tp p then     2 1 11 ,bLtE IA B f h k p Bh q     
2*
bL
tf f , 
1 * 1,Hr  1 * 0,Lr   
LOE 0
 
bL H bL
lt utb b b     1E IA Bh , 
1* ,1
bL
tf f   , 
1 * 0, , ,jr j H L 
2
 
LOE 0  
Cannot exist
 1
   1,E IA Bh  
 1 2* max , ,1 ,bL bLt tf f f    
1 * 0, , ,jr j H L 
3
 
LOE 0  
 
                                                 
1
Cannot exist because we have assumed
H Lb b , which implies
bL bL
ut ltb b . 
2
 Other case is not considered because if 
L bL
ltb b and 
bL H bL
lt utb b b  then  E IA when 1
bL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 1
bL
tf f .  
3
 Other 3 cases are not considered because 1)
1 2
bL bL
t tf f , 2) if 
bL L bL
lt utb b b  ,
bL H bL
lt utb b b  and 2
bL
tf f then  E IA when 2
bL
tf f is higher than  E IA
when
2
bL
tf f , and 3) if 
bL L bL
lt utb b b  ,
bL H bL
lt utb b b  and 1
bL
tf f then  E IA when 1
bL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 1
bL
tf f , respectively. 
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Table 5.5: Upper level problem for the multiplicative utility function at the lower level when b is unknown. 
 
 
1
L bM
tb b  1
L bM
tb b  
1
H bM
tb b  If 1
bM
tp p  then 
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q     
* 1,f   
1 1* 1, , .
l
j jr r j H L    
If 
1
bM
tp p  then 
   1E IA B h k  , 
* 0,f    
1 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0.
 
If 
2
bM
tp p then 
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
* 1,f   
1 1* 1, , .
l
j jr r j H L    
If 
2
bM
tp p then 
    11 ,L
h c
E IA B h k p B q
b c
  

 
* 0,f   
1 * 1,Hr  1 1* 1,
l
L Lr r   
LOE 0.
 
1
H bM
tb b  Cannot exist.
4
        1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,l l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
* 1,f   
1 1* 1, , ,
l
j jr r j H L    
LOE 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Cannot exist because
H Lb b . 
158 
 
Table 5.6: Upper level problem for linear utility function at the lower level when h is unknown. 
 
 
2 3
L hL
th h  1 2
hL
th h  2 3 ,
L hL
th h 1 2
hL
th h  
2 1
H hL
th h    2 1 ,
HE IA Bh p Bh q 
 * 0,1 ,f 
2 * 0, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0.  
   2 1 1 ,
HE IA Bh p B h k q  
 
* 0,f   
2 * 0,Hr  2 * 1,Lr   
LOE 0.
 
  2 1 ,
HE IA Bh p Bh q 
2* ,1
hL
tf f   , 
2 * 0, , ,jr j H L 
5
 
LOE 0.
 
2 2
H hL
th h  Cannot exist
6
      2 2 1 1 ,HE IA B h k p B h k q     
* 0f  , 
2 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0.
 
Cannot exist
6
 
2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h     2 1 ,
HE IA Bh p Bh q 
1* ,1
hL
tf f   , 
2 * 0, , ,jr j H L 
7
 
LOE 0.  
If hL
tp p then     2 1 1 11 ,H hLtE IA Bh p B f h k q     
1* ,
hL
tf f 2 * 0,Hr  2 * 1.Lr   
If hL
tp p  then      2 2 1 1 ,HE IA B h k p B h k q     
* 0f  , 2 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0.
 
  2 1 ,
HE IA Bh p Bh q 
 1 2* max , ,1 ,hL hLt tf f f   
2 * 0, , ,jr j H L 
8
 
LOE 0.  
 
                                                 
5
Not considered because if 
2 1
H hL
th h , 2 3 ,
L hL
th h and 1 2
hL
th h then  E IA when 2
hL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 2
hL
tf f .  
6
Cannot exist because
2 1
Hh h . 
7
Not considered because if 
2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  , 2 3 ,
L hL
th h 1 2
hL
th h and 1
hL
tf f then  E IA when 2
hL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 2
hL
tf f .  
8
Other 3 cases are not considered because 1) if 
2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  , 2 3 ,
L hL
th h 1 2
hL
th h and 1
hL
tf f then  E IA when 2
hL
tf f is higher than  E IA when
2
hL
tf f , 2) if 2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  , 2 3 ,
L hL
th h 1 2
hL
th h and 1
hL
tf f then  E IA when 2
hL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 2
hL
tf f , and 3) if 2 2 1
hL H hL
t th h h  ,
2 3 ,
L hL
th h 1 2
hL
th h and 1
hL
tf f then  E IA when 2
hL
tf f is higher than  E IA when 2
hL
tf f , respectively. 
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Table 5.7: Upper level problem for the multiplicative utility function at the lower level when h is unknown. 
 
 
2 2
L hM
th h  2 2
L hM
th h  
2 1
H hM
th h  If 1
hM
tp p then 
       2 2 2 2 2 1 2 11 1 ,l H l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
* 1,f   
2 2* 1, , .
l
j jr r j H L    
If 
1
hM
tp p then  
     2 2 1 1 ,HE IA B h k p B h k q     
* 0,f   
2 * 1, , ,jr j H L   
LOE 0.
 
If 
2
hM
tp p then 
    2 2 2 21 l H lH HE IA B r h r k p   
  2 1 2 11 ,l lL LB r h r k q   
* 1,f   
2 2* 1, , .
l
j jr r j H L     
If 
2
hM
tp p then 
   
 
1
2 2 ,
H chE IA B h k p B q
b c
  

 
* 0,f   
2 * 1,Hr  2 2* 1,
l
L Lr r   
LOE 0.  
2 1
H hM
th h  If 3
hM
tp p then  
       2 2 2 2 2 1 2 11 1 ,l H l l lH H L LE IA B r h r k p B r h r k q       
* 1,f   
2 2* 1, , .
l
j jr r j H L     
If 
3
hM
tp p then 
 
 
 2 1 1 ,
Hch
E IA B p B h k q
b c
  

 
* 0,f   
2 2* ,
l
H Hr r 2 * 1,Lr   
LOE 0.  
    2 2 2 21 l H lH HE IA B r h r k p   
  2 1 2 11 ,l lL LB r h r k q   
* 1,f   
2 2* 1, , ,
l
j jr r j H L    
LOE 0.  
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10. Proof of Chapter 6 
 
Two Incentives (“fg” Case) 
 
Proof for Proposition 6.1: 
 
(i) The lower-level utility function is , 1,2
fg
i i i i i ia Z b r c IA i   . When 
   1 1 1
, , 1,2,
2
fg fg fg
i i i i
i
i i
r r f r g fN
Z B i i i i
N N


    
      
  
, and
 1 fgi i i i iIA Z h r k  are substituted into this we obtain:
fg
i i i i i i iU a Z b r c IA     
  
   
1
1 1 1
2
fg fg fg
i i ifg fgi
i i i i i i i
i i
r r f r g fN
a c h r k B b r
N N


    
     
    
   
3 2
fg fg fg
ci i ci i ci i cia r b r c r d     
where,
 1
0
2
ci i i
f
a Bc k g

   ,
 
     1
1
1 1 0
2
fg
ci i i i i i i
f
b B c k g r g a c h

      , 
 
        1
1
1 1 1
2
fg fg i i i
ci i i i i i i i i
i i
f fBc k N
c b B g r a c h c k r
N N
 


       

,
 
   1
1
1 0
2
fg i
ci i i i i
i i
f fN
d r a c h B
N N


 
     
 
. 
The first derivative of iU  
is,  
 
2
' 3 2fg fgi ci i ci i ciU a r b r c           (10.1) 
Setting,  ' 0i iU r  gives two roots, 
2 22 4 12 2 4 12
,
6 6
ci ci ci ci ci ci ci cifgu fgl
i i
ci ci
b b a c b b a c
r r
a a
     
  of the quadratic equation 
(10.1). If 0cic  then 0
fgu
ir  and 0
fgl
ir  . If 0cic  then 0
fgu fgl
i ir r  and if 0cic  then 
imaginary roots exist resulting in * 0
fg
ir  . Thus, if 0cic  then  * min ,1fg fgui ir r , if 
1
fg
i tib b  then 0cic  resulting in *
fg fgu
i ir r or 0 or 1 and if 1
fg
tib b then 0cic   resulting 
in * 0
fg
ir  .          ∎ 
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We next show that if 1
fg
i tib b then
24 12 0ci ci cib a c  and if 1
fg
tib b then
24 12 0ci ci cib a c  . 
Let : 24 12ci ci cib a c
 
     
2 2 2
1
1
4 1 1
4
fg
i i i i i i
f B
g a c h c k g r

       
   
       1
1 1
12 1 1 1
2 2
fg fg i i i
i i i i i i i i i i
i i
f f c k BfN
g Bc k b B a c h g r c k r
N N
 

  
        
 
 
       
2
2 2
11 1 1
fg
i i i i i if B g a c h c k g r      
   
 
       1
1
6 1 6 1 1 1 1
2
fg fg i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i
f c k BfN
b g f Bc k g f Bc k B a c h g r c k r
N N
 

 
          
 
Thus, if 1
fg
i tib b then
24 12 0ci ci cib a c  and if 1
fg
tib b then
24 12 0ci ci cib a c  .
 
 (10.2) 
(ii) To obtain the conditions listed in Table 2, we show that if 1
fg fg
i t ir r  ,
 1 2max , ,fg fgti tig g g 1 2 ,
fg fg
ti tif f f  and  
max , ,
2 3
i i i i i
i
i i
Bc k N Bc k
b
N N
  
  
  
then 1.fguir   
First of all, we show that, if 1
fg fg
i t ir r  , 1
fg
tig g , 1
fg
tif f , and  2
i i i
i
i i
Bc k N
b
N N


then 
0cic  . 
Let 
 
  
  
 
1
1
1
2
1
1 1
i i i i
i i i i i
i ifg fg
i t i
i i i i i
b c k fN
a c h g c k
f B f N N
r r
c k a c h g

 
    
  
 
 
, where 
 
  
  1
2
1 0
1 1
i i i i
i i i i i
i i
b c k fN
a c h g c k
f B f N N
     
  
since 1
fg
tig g , 1 1
fg
tig  since
1
fg
tif f  and 1 1
fg
tif  since  2
i i i
i
i i
Bc k N
b
N N


.
 
⇒
    
 
 
    
1
1
1 1 1
2 2
1
2
i
i i i i i i
i ifg
i
i i i i i
fBNB B
b f a c h g c k f
N N
r
B
f c k a c h g


 
         
  
 
This inequality is rearranged as follows. 
⇒
 
        1
1
1 1 1 0
2
fg fg i i i
ci i i i i i i i i
i i
f fBc k N
c b B g r a c h c k r
N N
 


        

. 
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We next show that 1 2
fg fg
t i t ir r  since 
 
  
 
  
1
1
1 2 1
i i i ii i i i
i i
a c h kb c k fN
g
f B f N N
 
   
  
 
  
  1
2
1
1 1
i i i i
i i i i i
i i
b c k fN
a c h g c k
f B f N N
    
  
 and
  
   1 11
2 2
i i i i i i
i i i i i
a c h k c k
g g c k a c h g
 
     . 
 
   
  
    
1
2
1
2 2
1
1 1
0
1
i i i i
i i i i
i ifg
t i
i i i i i i
b c k fN
a c h k g
f B f N N
r
a c h k g c k g


    
  
 
   
, because 
 
   
  1
2 2
1 0
1 1
i i i i
i i i i
i i
b c k fN
a c h k g
f B f N N
     
  
since 2
fg
tig g , 2 1
fg
tig  since
2 ,
fg
tif f  where, clearly 2 0
fg
tif  .
 
2
fg fg
i t ir r  ⇒
  
     
  
 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2
i i i i i i i ifg i i i i i
i i
i i
a c h k a c h kc k Bc k fN
r g g f B b f B g
N N


    
        
   
This inequality is rearranged as follows. 
⇒
   
     1
1 1
3 2 1 1
2 2
fg
i i i i i i i i
f f
Bc k g B c k g r g a c h
 
    
 
        1
1
1 1 1
2
fg fg i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i
f fBc k N
b B g r a c h c k r
N N
 


       
  
⇒  3 2ci ci cia b c  
 
⇒      
22 29 6 3ci ci ci ci ci ci cib a a b b a c       , since 0cia   
⇒         
2 2 29 6 3ci ci ci ci ci ci cib a a b b a c         , since 0cib   
⇒     
2 23 3ci ci ci ci cib a b a c      
Since 0cia  and 0cib  , if 0cic  then 
2 3 0ci ci cib a c  and if 0cic  then from Eq. (10.2)
2 3 0ci ci cib a c  if 1
fg
i tib b . 
⇒   23 3ci ci ci ci cib a b a c      
⇒
 
2 3
1
3
ci ci ci cifgu
i
ci
b b a c
r
a
  
 
 
       (10.3) 
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Thus, if 1
fg fg
i t ir r  , 1
fg
tig g , 1
fg
tif f , and  2
i i i
i
i i
Bc k N
b
N N


then 0cic  and if 2
fg fg
i t ir r  ,
2
fg
tig g , 2
fg
tif f , where 1 2
fg fg
ti tif f  since
3
i i
i
Bc k
b  , then 1
fgu
ir  .    (10.4) 
Therefore, if 0cic   then 1
fgu
ir  since 1 2
fg fg
t i t ir r  .     (10.5) 
We next show that, if
 
3
fg
tif f and   1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   then 1 1
fg
t ir   . 
Let
 
 
1
3
1
2
2
2
i
i i i i
fg
ti
i i
i i i i
i i
b
a c h k
Bf f
c k
a c h k
N N
  
 
  

, where clearly,  1 2 0
i i
i i i i
i i
c k
a c h k
N N
   

and   1
2
2 0ii i i i
b
a c h k
B
    if   1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   .
 
Thus,    1 1
2
2 2i i ii i i i i i i i
i i
c k b
f a c h k a c h k
N N B
 
       
 
 
⇒        1 1 1
2
2 1i i i i i i i i i i i i i
i i
b c k
a c h g a c h k f a c h g
B N N
        

 
⇒
 
  
  
 
1
1
1
2
1
1 1
1
i i i i
i i i i i
i ifg
t i
i i i i i
b c k fN
a c h g c k
f B f N N
r
c k a c h g


    
  
 
 
.
 
Thus, if 3
fg
tif f and   1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   then 1 1.
fg
t ir       (10.6) 
From equation (10.4), if 1
fg fg
i t ir r  , 1
fg
tig g , 1
fg
tif f , and  2
i i i
i
i i
Bc k N
b
N N


then 0cic  , 
where 1 1
fg
t ir   since, clearly 1 3
fg fg
ti tif f . 
Similarly, we can show that 
1. if 1
fg
i tib b , 1
fg fg
i t ir r  , 3
fg
tif f and   1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   then 0cic  , where
  1 1 2
2
fg
ti i i i i
B
b a c h k   and 1 1
fg
t ir   .      (10.7) 
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2. if 1
fg
i tib b , 1
fg fg
i t ir r  , 3
fg
tif f , and   1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   then 0cic  , where
1 1
fg
t ir   .          (10.8) 
We next show that     1 1 1 2
2 2
fg
ti i i i i i i i
B B
b a c h a c h k     . 
Let 
       22 1
1
1 1 1 12
1
2 3 2 3
fgu
i i i ii i
i i i
i i i i
g r f B f g a c hfk NB
a c h
N N gc k


                 
             
 
      
2
1 1 11
0
2 3
fgu fgu
i ii i
g r g rB f c k
g
 
       
 
 
 
 
On rearranging the terms,  
⇒  
 1 12
fg i i i
i i i ti
i i
fBc k NB
a c h b
N N
   

 
     
     
2
1
1
1 11
1 1 1 .
2 3
fgu
i i i i i i
fgu fgu
i i i i i i i
i i
c k g r g a c hf
B g r a c h c k r
gc k

 
 
     
      
 
 
We next show that, if 2
fg fg
i t ir r  , 3 ,
fg
tig g 4
fg
tif f , 1
fg
i tia a , and 
 1
2
i i i
i
B a c h
b

 then
1fguir  , where 2 1
fg
t ir   .        (10.9) 
Let 
 
1
3
2 21
0
1
fg i i i i i
ti
i i i i i i
a c h fN b
g
c k f N N Bc k
 
    
  
since
1
4
1
2
2
i
i i i
fg
ti
i i i
i i i
i i
b
a c h
Bf f
N c k
a c h
N N
 
 
 

  
⇒ 1 1
2 2i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
N a c h b a c h
f
N N c k Bc k c k
  
   
 
, where 1
2
0i i i i
i i i i
N a c h
N N c k

 

since
1 1
2fg i i i
i ti i i
i i
N c k
a a c h
N N
  

.  
⇒
 1 12 2i i ii i i i i
i i i i i i i i
f a c hfN b a c h
N N c k Bc k c k
 
  

 
⇒
    
1
3
2 2
0
1 1
fg i i i i i
ti
i i i i i i
fN a c h b
g
f N N c k Bc k f

   
  
.
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Let 
 
1
3
2 21
1
fg i i i i i
ti
i i i i i i
a c h fN b
g g
c k f N N Bc k
 
    
  
 
⇒
   
    
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 1 1
i i i i i i i ii i i i i i i i i
i i
a c h k a c h kc k a c h c k fN b
g g g
f N N B f
    
    
  
 
This inequality can be rearranged as follows. 
⇒
    
 
   
 1 1
1 1
1 1 2 2 2
i i i i i i i ii i i i i i
i i
a c h k a c h kb c k fN c k
g g g
B f f N N
   
     
  
 
⇒ 2
fg
t ir  
    
 
 
 
 
1
1
1
1 1 2
1
1
2 2
i i i ii i i i
i i
i i i ii i
a c h kb c k fN
g
B f f N N
a c h kc k
g g

 
  
  

 
   
Let 2
fg fg
i t ir r  then from equation (10.3) we get 1
fgu
ir  . 
 
Therefore, if 2
fg fg
i t ir r  ,  3 4min , ,fg fgti tif f f 3 ,fgtig g 1 ,fgi tia a  and 
 1 1
2
fg
ti i i i i
B
b b a c h   then 1
fgu
ir   where 2 1
fg
t ir   . Similarly, from equation (10.7) if 
2 ,
fg fg
i t ir r   3 4min , ,fg fgti tif f f   1 1 2 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k     and 3
fg
tig g  then 1
fgu
ir  , 
where 2 1
fg
t ir    from equation (10.9) since 3
fg
tig g , 3 1
fg
tig  since 
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   . Similarly, from equation (10.8) if 1 2
fg fg
t i i t ir r r    , 3
fg
tif f ,
  1 2
2
i i i i i
B
b a c h k   , and 3
fg
tig g then 1
fgu
ir  . 
 
If 1
fg
i tib b , where 1 0
fg
tib  since 5
fg
tif f , 5 1
fg
tif  . 
 
We next show that, in Table 5, if  3 4 3 4min , , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f   3 3min , ,fg fgti t ig g g 
 1 1 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i
B
b b a c h    1 1 ,
2
fg
t i i i i i
B
b b a c h       1 ,
fg
i tic c 1 2 ,
fg fg
ti i tia a a   and
1
fg fg
i t iN N  then    * 0, * * , *fg fg fgu fg fgu fg fgui i i i i i iU r r r U r r r r        .  
 
Let 1
fg
ti ic c  
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⇒
 
  
 
          1
1
1 1
2
1
1 1 1 1
2
fgu fgu
i i i i
i
fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu i i
i i i i i i i i
i i
f
b Ba g r r
c
f fBk N
B h r k g r r k r r g
N N

 


   

 
          
 
where, 
 
  
1
1 1 0
2
fgu fgu
i i i i
f
b Ba g r r

     since 2
fg
i tia a . 
⇒
 
  
1
1 1
2
fgu fgu
i i i i
f
b Ba g r r

    
 
          1
1
1 1 1 1
2
fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu i i
i i i i i i i i i
i i
f fBk N
c B h r k g r r k r r g
N N
 

 
          
 ⇒
 
         1
1
1 1 1 1
2
fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
f
r b r B g r r a c h r k c k r r g 

         
 
fgu
i i i i
i i
r fBc k N
N N  
⇒
 
 
 
 
 1
1
1
2
fgu
fgu fgui i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i
fr fBc k N fBN
r b B r a c h
N N N N

 
 
         
 
         1
1
1 1 1 1
2
fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu fgu
i i i i i i i i i i i i
f
r B g r r a c h r k c k r r g 

          
 
 
 
 1
1
1
2
fgu i
i i i i
i i
f fBN
B r a c h
N N


 
     
 
⇒    * , * * 0, *fg fgu fg fgu fg fg fgui i i i i i iU r r r r U r r r         
Thus, if  3 4 3 4min , , , ,fg fg fg fgti ti t i t if f f f f   3 3min , ,fg fgti t ig g g   1 1 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i
B
b b a c h  
 1 1 ,
2
fg
t i i i i i
B
b b a c h       1
fg
i tic c  and 1 2 ,
fg fg
ti i tia a a  then * , *
fg fgu fg fgu
i i i ir r r r   , 
where 1 2
fg fg
ti tia a  since 1
fg fg
i t iN N  . Similarly, we can show that, if  3 4min , ,fg fgti tif f f
 3max ,fgtig g   1 1 2 ,
2
fg
ti i i i i i
B
b b a c h k    2
fg
i tic c  and 3
fg
i tia a then
   * 0, * 1 * 1, * 1fg fg fg fgi i i iU r r U r r      , where 2 0
fg
tic  since 3
fg
i tia a .  ∎ 
 
Proof for Proposition 6.2: 
 
The upper-level utility function is 
2
1
i
i
IA IA

   
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   
 
2
1
, 1
1 1 1
2
fg fg fg
i i i fgi
i i i
i i i i
i i
r r f r g fN
B h r k
N N

  

    
   
  

 
We next solve the upper-level problem. 
  
,
: max * , , 1,2, , ,m mi i i
f g
i
IA IA r f g i m fg f g 
 
   (10.10) 
s.t.  0 1f            (10.11) 
      0 1g           (10.12) 
       
    * , arg maxm mi i ir f g L r       (10.13) 
If    1 2* , 0, * , 1
m mr f g r f g  then IA is independent of g and is an increasing function 
of f if 11 1
fg
th h . Similarly, if    1 2* , 1, * , 0
m mr f g r f g  then IA is independent of g 
and is an increasing function of f if 11 1
fg
th h . If  * , 1
m
ir f g  then clearly IA  is a 
decreasing function of f and g. If  * , 0mir f g  then clearly IA  is independent of g and 
is a decreasing function of f . If    * , , 1m fgui ir f g r f g   then from the Second Partial 
Derivative Test we can show that there neither exist a local max or a local min. We next 
show that if  
2
0ff gg fgD IA IA IA   , where ffIA is the second partial derivative of IA
with respect to f then a saddle point at  *, *f g exist, where,  *, *f g is obtained by 
equating first derivative of IA
 
with respect to f and g to zero as below. 
  
 
2
1
, 1
1 1
0
2
fg fg fg
i i i fgi
f i i i
i i i i
i i
r r r g NIA
IA B h r k
f N N

  

   
      
   
  
⇒
 
 
 
 
2
1
, 1
2
1
, 1
1
2
*
1
2
fg fg
i i fgi
i i i
i i i i
i i
fg fg
i ifg fg
i i i i
i i
i i
r r N
h r k
N N
g
r r
r h r k

  


 

  
  
  

 



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   
2
1
1
1 0fg fgg i i i i
i
IA
IA B f r h r k
g 

     

  
⇒ * 1f   
Clearly, 0ffIA  , 0ggIA  , and  
2
1
1
0fgu fgugf i i i i
i
IA B r h r k

   .Thus, 0D  and neither 
a local max nor local min exists. Thus, a saddle point at  *, *f g  exist.  
If    1 1* , , 1,
m fgur f g r f g   2 * , 0
mr f g  then we substitute  1 * , 0
mr f g  in the 
above equations and show that neither local max nor local min exist.  ∎ 
 
Similarly, by substituting g = 0 and f = 0 in the results of ―fg‖ case, we obtain 
Proposition 6.3, 6.4 of ―g‖ case and Proposition 6.5 and 6.6 of ―f ‖ case.  ∎ 
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